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INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1968, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party 
(ABSP) came to power in Baghdad under the presidency of 
al-Bakr for whom the Iraqi 'strongman1, Saddam Hussein, 
had deputized. The glaring characteristics of the Iraqi 
Ba'athist regime had been secularist, radical, revolutiona­
ry and anti-imperialist. On the surface, Iraq seemed to 
be an ideal location for the expansion of Soviet influence. 
Similarly, from the Baghdad regime's viewpoint, at the 
time, to have warm, close relations with the Soviet Union 
was the best option for countering any threat endangering 
its national interests and security. Such close relations 
lay in the fact that, apart from being plunged into mili­
tary confrontation with Israel in the Arab-Israeli theater 
and border dispute over Shatt al-Arab waterway with the 
Teheran regime, the Ba'athist leaders in Baghdad were, 
moreover, politically isolated by the conservative, monar­
chical, and moderate Gulf sheikhdoms spearheaded by the 
Riyadh regime.
It is no exaggeration to say that in April 1972 
the Soviet-Iraqi relationship was conspicuously highlighted 
by the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Coopera­
tion. The then Iraqi Vice President, Saddam Hussein's 
pragmatic policy, as was widely believed, was behind his 
decision to reach such a friendship treaty with the Soviet 
Union. Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union was increased
because of (i) the necessity for suppressing the renewal 
of the Kurdish rebellion; (ii) the nationalisation of the 
Iraqi oil enterprise; (iii) the eruption of the Arab-Israel 
war in October 1973; and (iv) the massive military build-up 
of the Shah of Iran. Iraq has been given a large amount 
of economic, military and technical assistance by the 
Soviet Union.
Even so, any argument stating that the Kremlin 
leaders could direct the Baghdad regime's decisions to 
serve their interests should be questioned. It is necessa­
ry to re-consider any such argument for two reasons. First 
the Baghdad leaders, particularly Saddam Hussein, firmly 
put emphasis on their pragmatic and independent approach in 
order to serve their national interests. Second, despite 
the conclusion of the friendship treaty, mention should be 
made of the essential question of whether Iraq should be 
deemed a 'client' state of the Soviet Union.
Subject under discussion in this work will be 
the Soviet-Iraqi relationship since the Algiers Agreement 
on the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran on
6 March, 1975 up to the present situation of the Gulf war. 
Accordingly, the paper consists of four chapters.
The first chapter deals mainly with Soviet-Iraqi 
relations from the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975 to 
September 1980. The first section covers the discussion 
of the pragmatic and independent Iraqi decision for sign-
ing the agreement with the Shah of Iran. No doubt, the 
reaction of the Kremlin leader to this probably unexpected 
Iraqi decision are examined in the second section. The 
final section of this chapter offers, at some length, an __ 
account of the implications of the Iraqi decision to sign 
the agreement on Soviet-Iraqi relations which have been 
far from intimate.
The discussion in the second chapter is aimed at 
the Soviet-Iraqi relationship during the initial stage 
of the Gulf war, proceeding from the beginning of the 
Iraqi invasion in September 1980 to the end of the period 
of so-called 'stalemate' in May 1981. The first secion 
examines various reasons which justify the pragmatic Iraqi 
decision for initiating its full-scale invasion of Iran's 
Khuzestan in September 1980. The following section explores 
the Moscow leaders' response to the outbreak of the Gulf 
war. Explanations for why the Soviet Union adopted a 
position of 'non-interference' are also included. The 
last section of this chapter illustrates that Soviet-Iraqi 
relations have witnessed a number of ups and downs from 
the time of the eruption of the Iraqi-Iranian war.
The development of fierce military fighting in 
the war is examined in the first section of Chapter III. 
Closely related to the first section, the ensuing one 
discusses the Kremlins' changing position from one of 
'non-interference' to a posture of 'wait and see'. The
iv
last section of this chapter sheds light on the slightly 
improved Soviet-Iraqi relationship following the changing 
Soviet position. It also shows that the Kremlin leaders 
have gained some Iraqi favour.
The fourth and last chapter examines the possibi­
lity of whether the Baghdad regime would embark on another 
decision by unilaterally abrogating the friendship treaty. 
The second section of this chapter provides a critique - 
of the assertion that Iraq should be considered a 'client' 
state of the Soviet Union.
Map A: The Iran-Iraq Boundary in the Shatt al-Arab
Source: J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran:The Years of Crisis, 
(London:Croom Helm, 1984), p. 154.
Map B : The Shatt al-Arab Frontier (Algiers Agreement, 6 March, 1975)
Sources: Tareq Y. Ismael, Iraq & Iran:Roots of Conflict, (Syracuse:Syracuse 
University Press, 1982), p. 21.
Chapter I : Soviet-Iraqi Relations From the Algiers
Agreement of March 6, 1975 to September 
1980:Iraqi Attempts to Adopt an Indepen­
dent Line
Introduction
I have the pleasure to announce to you 
that a total accord was reached yesterday to 
end the differences between two fraternal 
countries, Iran and Iraq. 1
It was President Houari Boumiedienne who told 
the Algerian Assembly that on 6 March, 1975, at the end 
of an OPEC summit conference in Algiers, Iraq and Iran 
had reached a new boundary agreement. The aim of which 
was to put a permanent end to their territorial dispute, 
particularly over the Shatt-al Arab waterway. It was 
widely believed that the Algiers Agreement reflected 
a significant turning point in the Iraqi-Iranian rela­
tionship. Similarly, it could equally be argued that 
Soviet-Iraqi relations also witnessed a major change 
following the signing of the Algiers Agreement.
Analysis of Soviet-Iraqi relations in this 
chapter is, therefore, undertaken to investigate the 
effect on these relations of the Iraqi Ba'athists'
1 Le Monde, March 8, 1975. Quoted by Daniel Pipes,
'A Border Adrift:Origins of the Conflict', in Shirin 
Tahir-Kheli & Shaheen Ayubi, (eds.), The Iran-Iraq 
War:New Weapons, Old Conflicts, (New York:Praeger 
Publishers, 1983), p. 20.
2pursuit of pragmatic and independent decisions. In so 
doing, the discussions in this chapter will focus on the 
three following questions:
(i) What were the reasons for the Baghdad 
regime to sign the agreement?
(ii) What was the Soviet view of the agree­
ment?
(iii) What implications did the Iraqi decision 
to sign the agreement have for Soviet-Iraqi relations?
I : Iraq's Decision to Sign the Algiers Agreement
Following the Iranian unilateral and official 
abrogation in April 1969 of the 1937 treaty which esta­
blished an Iranian-Iraqi modus vivendi on the Shatt al- 
Arab, many futile attempts had been made to bridge the 
gulf between the two countries. Less than two months 
before the Algiers Agreement, in January 1975, for exam­
ple, there was a meeting between the Foreign Ministers 
of both Iran and Iraq in Istanbul. This meeting was 
totally unproductive. Returning from Turkey on 21 
January after the meeting, Dr. Sa'doun Hammadi, Iraqi
Foreign Minister, said that such talks had produced
2nothing new. The deterioration in these two countries'
2 Cited in J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran:The Years of 
Crisis, (London:Croom Helm, 1984), p. 126.
3relations continued until March 1975.
Great credit, therefore, should be given to 
President Boumiedienne for his role in effecting a recon­
ciliation between the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi Vice
3President Saddam Hussein. This 'historic' Algiers Agree­
ment of 6 March 1975 provided for the following:
(1) That the two sides should demarcate 
their land boundaries in accordance 
with the 1913 Protocol of Constanti­
nople and the minutes of the 1914 
Delimitation Commission.
(2) That both parties agree to delimit 
their river boundaries according to 
the thalweg line, i.e. the median 
line in the mid-channel.
(3) That they establish security and mu­
tual confidence along their common 
borders and undertake to exercise a 
strict and effective control with 
the aim of finally putting an end to 
all subversive infiltration.
(4) That the two parties also agree to 
view these provisions 'as indivisible 
elements of a comprehensive settle­
ment' , and that any violation of any 
provision would be regarded as a vio­
lation of the spirit of the agreement. 4
Following the signing of the Algiers Agreement, 
a number of high-level Iraqi-Iranian delegations exchanged 
visits in an attempt to implement the agreement. At the 
end of his official visit to Iraq on 26 March 1975, the 
Iranian Prime Minister succinctly described the agreement
5as heralding a 'new chapter' in Iraqi-Iranian relations.
It was hoped that a new era of detente and reconciliation
3 Ibid.
4 See Appendix A.
5 Baghdad Observer, April 1, 1975. Quoted in J.M. Abdulgh 
ni, o p .cit., p. 153.
4between the two countries, as well as a resurgence of 
peace and stability in the Gulf region, would emerge.
Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement did culminate in the 
Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Borders and Good Neigh­
bourly Relations signed in Baghdad on 13 June 1975. By 
signing the Baghdad Treaty, both sides were explicitly 
expressing their willingness to achieve a viable, final 
and lasting solution to all the problems confronting them.
This treaty
(a) reaffirmed the Algiers Agreement;
(b) instituted measures and mechanisms to 
stop any infiltration of a subversive 
nature along the borders;
(c) demarcated the river boundary by the 
principle of thalweg; and
(d) re-emphasized the indivisibility of 
the treaty. 6
This meant that the Iraqi-Iranian boundary river 
line geographically shifted from the eastern bank of the 
Shatt to the thalweg.
What explains Iraq's decision to reach such agree­
ments with Iran? In the first place, it was the common 
determination of both Iraq and Iran that a full-scale war 
must be avoided at all costs. They might have realized that 
any full-scale war would inevitably have involved the extensive 
destruction of their oil installations, particularly near 
Abadan and Basra that are located on the disputed Shatt-al
6 See Appendix B.
Arab waterway. Saddam Hussein told the Washington Post 
that the chance of a war 'was a fact all too clear to us 
and to Iran. Neither party wanted war; both sides decided
4= . 8for peace'.
Second, apparently this agreement constituted
an essentially quid pro quo arrangement. In order to sustain
the Shah's pledge to end his interference in Iraqi domestic
affairs and to cease his substantial military aid to the
Kurdish rebellion, which had burdened the Baghdad regime
with an enormous amount of financial resources and military
capabilities, Iraq took upon itself the unprecedented
obligation of granting Iran sovereignty over half of the
Shatt-al Arab. One indicator of Iran's massive aid to the
Iraqi Kurds was, as Sa'ad Jawad argues, that armed activity
9in Iraqi Kurdistan had come to an end by May 1975.
Third, in a practical sense, granting Iran half 
the waterway in return for an (even temporary) end to a 
crippling civil (Kurdish) war was a cheap price for Iraq; 
nevertheless, its leaders felt profoundly humiliated by 
this accord. The Iraqi regime continued to believe that 
it had signed the accord under duress, in order to fend off
7
7 J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 155.
8 Washington Post, April 25, 1975. Cited in ibid.
9 Sa'ad Jawad, 'Recent Developments in the Kurdish Issue', 
in Tim Niblock, (ed.), Iraq:The Contemporary State, 
(London;Croom Helm, 1982), p. 57.
immediate threats. From the Ba'athist perspective, the 
ultimate aim of Iran's enduring support for the Kurds was 
to dismember Iraq. Hence, the Iraqi regime contended that 
it had to reach an agreement with the Shah in order to pro­
tect its territorial integrity. As J.M. Abdulghani asserts
The Iraqis have attributed their territo­
rial concessions to the Shah to the failure of 
the .Arab states to support Iraq during the 
Iraqi-Iranian military confrontation, and to 
the failure of the Soviet Union to honour its 
military commitments to Iraq, (emphasis added) 10
He continues by pointing out what was at the 
time a secret reason that strengthened the Iraqi decision 
to finalize the agreement:
Saddam Hussein was to reveal in July 1980 
that:in March 1975, the Iraqi air force had only 
three bombs left as a result of the Kurdish war. 
He also disclosed that there was 'a great short­
age of ammunition' which had prevented the Iraqi 
army from continuing the war. Saddam Hussein 
maintained that this shortage of ammunition was 
kept in the utmost secrecy lest it affected the 
morale of the Iraqi army. According to him, 
only three people knew about this matter at the 
time:President al-Bakr, the Chief of Staff, and 
himself. 11
Fourth, the Baghdad regime, which was always 
intimidated by Iran's programme for a massive military 
build-up, attached great significance to the Algiers 
Agreement as an important conduit for reducing the growing 
arms race in the region.
10 In an interview with Hassan Tawalibah, Director- 
General of Public Relations, Ministry of Information 
and Culture, Baghdad, September 1, 1981. Cited in 
J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 156.
11 Ibid., pp. 156-57.
7By recognizing the existence of both the Algiers
Agreement and the Baghdad Treaty, as Aryeh Y. Yodfat explains,
the Soviet Union officially 'expressed satisfaction' with
12the agreements. This is probably because of the special
problems of the Gulf region and the dilemma these pose for
the Soviets. According to R.K. Ramazani, the Persian Gulf
13region is as rich in potential conflicts as in oil. Men­
tion should be made of a few examples of disputes in the 
Gulf region. According to Sreedhar, apart from the Iraqi- 
Iranian dispute, some of the other important disputes are 
those between Iraq and Kuwait over their common frontier 
and the question of control over Warbah and Bubiyan, two 
strategic islands lying in their offshore waters; between 
Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar island group located 
in their offshore waters; and between Oman and Saudi Arabia 
over Umm Zamul, a waterhole and surrounding territory in 
the undemarcated border over the nothernmost reaches of the 
Rub'al-Khali desert. ^
Most of these interstate conflicts, particularly 
such deep-rooted simmering conflicts as the Iranian-Iraqi
II: The Soviet View of the Algiers Agreement
12 Pravda, April 17, 1975; Izvestia, June 3, 1975; Cited 
by Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian 
Peninsula, (London:Croom Helm, 1983), p. 20.
13 R.K. Ramazani, 'Security in the Persian Gulf', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 4, Spring 1979, p. 826.
14 See Sreedhar, 'Flashpoints in the Gulf', The Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 46;
(cont'd)
territorial dispute, place the Soviet leaders in a political
dilemma. They have difficulty in deciding which side, if
any, to support. Thus to the Soviet decision-makers, the
Algiers Agreement put an end to the political dilemma of the
Iranian-Iraqi conflict. This agreement was warmly hailed
15as 'an important and wise decision by Iraq and Iran'.
Soviet political observer Igor Shavchenko noted:
The Soviet people, who are friendly to 
the Iranian and Iraqi peoples, wish for the 
establishment of normal good neighborly rela­
tions between them. This indisputable view 
of the Soviet Union was expressed by Nikolay 
Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet 
Presidium, who said:Bad relations between 
Iran and Iraq do not tally with the interests 
of peace, and we have always supported and 
will continue to support the settlement of 
the differences between Iran and Iraq...The 
Algiers Agreement...will probably play a 
significant role in improving the interna­
tional situation in the Middle East, parti­
cularly the Persian Gulf region. 16
Apart from praising the Iraqi and Iranian actions, 
Soviet commentary also attributed any tension in the Persian 
Gulf to the alleged imperialist-inspired divide-and-rule 
policy:
14 (cont'd); for further interpretation of the Bahraini- 
Qatari territorial dispute, see also in Rosemarie Said 
Zahlan, The Creation Qatar, (London:Croom Helm, 1979), 
pp. 85-90. The other recently published article dis­
cussing problems of historic claims to islands is 
written by Will D. Swearingen, 'Sources of Conflict Over
Oil in the Persian/Arabian Gulf', The Middle East Journal, 
Vol. XXXV, Summer 1981, pp. 322-27.
15 BBC Summary of World Broadcast (SWB):The Soviet Union (SU), 
4850, March 10, 1975, p. A4/1. Hereafter:SWB:SU.
16 Foreign Broadcast Information Service:The USSR, March
10, 1975, p. F3. Hereafter:FBIS:USSR. See also V. Shmarov, 
'Iran-Iraq:Constructive Dialogue', New Times, March 1975,
No. 13, pp. 10-11.
9There can be no doubt that this agreement 
is important:it lays down foundations for easing 
the dangerous tension which had plagued the rela­
tions between two neighbouring Middle Eastern 
states for a long time...The seeds of enmity were 
sown, and this hardly served the interests of the 
Iraqi and Iranian peoples. Hard feelings between 
Iraq and Iran were generated, as is well known, 
by foreign imperialist powers...In a word, there 
are-quite obvisouly-certain imperialist forces 
which are trying to play off Gulf countries against 
one another in order to aggravate the situation 
there, (emphasis added) 17
Given that the agreement exempted the Soviet 
leaders from having to take sides in a regional conflict, 
the outbreak of which would have jeopardized its quest 
for better relations with both countries, the Soviet 
leaders were also probably prepared to face any difficulty 
in their relations with the Iraqi Ba'athist regime. Three 
reasons account for this.
First, according to article 7 of the 1972 Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation, Iraq and the Soviet Union 
agreed to consult each other regularly on all important 
questions affecting their bilateral and multilateral 
relations, but it is possible that in finalizing the Al­
giers Agreement, the Baghdad regime ignored the Kremlin 
leaders. As Shahram Chubin argues, 'the sudden decision
by Iraq in March 1975 to settle its border conflict with
18Iran came as a surprise to the Kremlin leaders'.
17 SWB:SU, 4850, March 10, 1975, p. A4/2.
18 Shahram Chubin, Security in the Persian:The Role of 
Outside Powers, Vol. 4, (London:The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 87.
10
Second, the agreement was a symbol of the triumph 
of realpolitik and pragmatism over fiercely held ideological 
positions. Saddam Hussein is widely believed to have played 
a decisive role in bringing about the March agreement. It 
is quite noticeable that, as Amazia Baram maintains, Saddam 
Hussein, a strongman for many years before taking presiden­
tial office in July 1979, was the architect of the ideology 
of pragmatism that has been a new contribution to Ba'athist 
ideology in Iraq.^
Third and finally, although it is generally be­
lieved that Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union reached 
its zenith between 1972 (the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation) and March 1975, it is equally 
the case that Iraq did not become a satellite of the Soviet 
Union nor even feel itself obliged to pursue any policy 
contrary to its own national interests. Writing in 1978, 
Majid Khadduri said:
True, Iraq may have appeared to follow 
an isolationist policy with its neighbors and 
a policy more friendly to the Communist bloc 
for at least two or three years after the coming 
into force of the treaty with the Soviet Union.
But today it has become quite clear that 
Iraq, following the termination of the Kurdish 
war and the settlement of the frontier dispute 
with Iran, prefers to remain independent in all 
her actions and to conduct her foreign policy 
in accordance with what she considers her own 
national interests rather than the interests 
of the power or powers with whom she has entered
19 Amazia Baram, 'Saddam Hussein:A Political Profile', 
Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 17, Fall 1980, p. 139.
11
into an alliance. Nor has the Soviet Union shown 
readiness to meet all Iraqi demands, for on several 
matters, political and otherwise, Iraqi and Soviet 
leaders did not see eye to eye. 20
Yodfat agrees that the views expressed at that
time about Iraq's becoming a Soviet satellite were exag- 
21gerated. In this light, to the Baghdad regime, the agree­
ment became a means of adopting an increasingly independent 
line in its relations with the Soviet Union.
Ill; Soviet-Iraqi Relations Since the Algiers Agreement: 
Iraq's Independent Posture
As was noted earlier, following the signing of 
the agreement, the Soviet leaders should have been prepared 
to face difficulties in their relations with the Iraqi regime. 
In the event, problems did arise. With the border settle­
ment with Iran in 19 75, as Shahram Chubin argues, even though
the Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union did not end, it was
22reduced materially. Subsequently, Soviet-Iraqi relations 
were far from intimate and this development could be consi­
dered as a major setback to Soviet policy. The deteriorating 
relations were clearly attributable to the following factors:
(a) Iraq's efforts to improve relations with Persian Gulf 
states
In an interview with the Washington Post, in
20 Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq:A Study in Iraqi Politics 
Since 1968, (Washington, D.C.:The Middle East Institute, 
1978), p. 147.
21 Aryeh Y. Yodfat, op.cit., p. 20.
22 Shahram Chubin, op.cit., p. 88.
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1975, the then Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein said,
'we hope the spirit of the 1975 agreement will extend to
23every part of the region'. Before that, he had already,
although not explicitly, referred to the same subject when
he said in another interview that 'Iraq viewed the agreement
24in terms of the repercussions throughout this area'.
Following the conclusion of the agreement, as far as the 
security of the Gulf region was concerned, a consensus was 
reached among the Gulf states that the agreement was a posi­
tive development. J.M. Abdulghani argues that it was clear
after the 1975 agreement that Iraq implicitly accepted the
25political status quo in the region. Iraq reached the con­
clusion that Iraq's concern was to preserve Arabism in the 
small Arab Gulf states regardless of the political and 
ideological differences between Iraq and these states. One 
could argue that a less militant regional diplomacy might 
make Iraq more acceptable in the Gulf.
The Iraqi leaders attempted to draw up a security 
formula for the Gulf, in order to keep the region out of 
the arena of superpower rivalry. This independent Iraqi 
initiative could be taken as a forewarning of the precarious­
ness of any further Soviet role. The reasons underlying this 
interpretation are three-fold.
23 Washington Post, April 28, 1975.
24 New York Times, March 29, 1975.
25 J.M. Abdulghani, op .cit., p. 158.
13
First of all, although it is still widely assumed 
that Iraq's attempt to reach security arrangements with the 
Gulf states was perhaps dictated by US threats to seize Arab 
oilfields in the area, threats that alarmed not only the 
Iraqis but also the conservative regimes in the Gulf, suspi­
cion of Soviet expansionist motives was also not out of 
question.
Second, symptomatic of Iraq's endeavour to normalise
its relations with the Gulf states was the final agreement
in July 1975 between Iraq and Saudi Arabia that demarcated
2 6the neutral zone equally between the two countries. Iraq
had ceased its attempts to destabilize the rulers of Saudi
Arabia and the other conservative Persian Gulf regimes. In
April 1976 Saddam Hussein paid an official visit to Saudi
Arabia. He characterized Saudi-Iraqi relations as 'growing
27and being consolidated in all spheres'. From the Soviet
viewpoint, both advantages and disadvantages were to be
found in the new Iraqi initiatives. Should Iraq draw closer
to Saudi Arabia, it could conceivably influence the Riyadh
2 8regime towards a less pro-Western policy. On the other 
hand, by drawing closer to Saudi Arabia, it could more con­
ceivably be expected that Iraq might itself come under Saudi 
influence and stay further away from the Soviet Union.
26 Majid Khadduri, o p .cit., p. 158.
27 Arab Report and Record, April 1-15, 1976, p. 214.
Cited in J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 159.
28 A further study of intra-Arab diplomacy in the 1970s 
see Robert 0. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle 
East Since 1970, (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1982), 
chapter 7.
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Furthermore, equally disturbed by the Iraqi role in the 
Persian Gulf, the Soviet leaders felt sceptical about 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iraq and 
pro-Western Oman.
Third and finally, the principal Gulf sheikhdoms- 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
and Oman-are pro-Western and have no desire to see Soviet 
influence increase either directly or through its ally, Iraq. 
Because of this, the real intention of the Iraqi regime 
(secularist, radical and revolutionary) to improve its closer 
relations (or more precisely, to break through its regional 
isolation) with such Gulf sheikhdoms was still suspect:
The establishment of closer relations 
(at least on the economic and functional levels) 
between Iraq and the Arab states of the Gulf 
after 1975 did not follow from any change in 
Ba'athist policy towards the traditional struc­
tures of power in these states. On the contrary, 
the Ba'ath remained intent on putting across 
its own very different ideological perspectives 
to the populations of the areas, and continued 
to provide support for groups which shared 
these perspectives. Only with respect to Oman 
was there a discernible change : Following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Iraq and the Sultan's government in January 
197 6, Iraq appears to have stopped providing 
military assistance to the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Oman. General contacts with 
the PFLO, nevertheless, were maintained. 29
29 Tim Niblock, 'Iraqi Policies Towards the Arab States 
of the Gulf, 1958-1981', in Tim Niblock, (ed.), o p . 
cit., p. 145.
15
(b) Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute over Warbah and Bubiyan 
Islands
The Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement led indirectly 
to the straining of Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations. The most 
convincing explanation of such relations can be found 
in Claudia Wright's description of Iraq's geopolitical 
vulnerabilities. She maintains that:
From the Iraqi point of view, hostile 
hands are always potentially around the 
country's throat. 30
She further presents the view that:
Iraq has less than 50 miles of coastline 
on the Gulf-most of it unusable for shipping.
The main port, Basra, is nearly twice that 
distance away from the Gulf, up the Shatt-al 
Arab, and even in the best of times it has 
a three-month cargo bottleneck. Umm Qasr,the 
Iraqi naval base, lies on the border with Ku­
wait, and can only be reached by sea through 
a narrow passage between the Iraqi shore and 
Kuwaiti islands. The approach to Fao and the 
entrance to the Shatt estuary is commanded 
by Iranian artillery and naval posts on an 
around Abadan island.
Iraq is also the only member of the OPEC 
whose oil exports cannot reach the outside 
world without crossing foreign territory in 
the north (Syria, Lebanon and Turkey), or with­
out coming so close to Iranian territory in 
the south that it cannot be said to enjoy terri­
torial security at all for its principal means 
of survival. 31
30 Claudia Wright, 'Implications of the Iraq-Iran War', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, Winter 1980/81,
p. 277.
31 Ibid., p. 277.
The Iraqi leaders used this geopolitical
vulnerability as an impelling factor in acquiring a
deep-port facility in the Gulf, in order to provide
strategic depth. Iraq was strongly pressing its claims
to the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. It saw the two
Kuwaiti islands as indispensable for its deep-water port
at Umm Qasr. And it began to put pressure upon Kuwait to
lease its half of Bubiyan island for 99 years and to grant
32sovereignty over the island of Warbah. Dr. Sa'doun 
Hammadi, Iraqi Foreign Minister at that time, said:
Such an arrangement is a reasonable 
demand in view of Iraq's security needs and 
is not unprecedented in the relationship 
between two neighbours. 33
Because of demonstrative Soviet support for
34Iraq in its dispute with Kuwait in 1973, Kuwait conti­
nued to fear an invasion by Soviet-backed Iraq. However, 
neither the expansion of its territory nor threats to 
its neighbouring Gulf states, Saddam Hussein maintained, 
had been Iraqi aims. Although, in the end, the Kuwaiti 
government rejected Iraqi demands, both parties, never­
theless, agreed to end their territorial dispute through 
compromises. But no final agreement was achieved. No 
doubt, the Soviet objective of maintaining friendly
16
32 Washington Post, April 28, 1975.
33 Majid Khadduri, op.cit., p. 158.
34 See Anne M. Kelly, 'The Soviet Naval Presence During 
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute', in Michael MccGwire, 
Ken Booth, John McDonnell, (eds.), Soviet Naval Poli­
cy :Objectives and Constraints, (New York:Praeger 
Publishers, 1975), pp. 287-301.
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diplomatic relations with Kuwait (the sole Gulf sheikh­
dom enjoying such relations) necessitated the Kremlin 
leaders mollifying this tiny but economically powerful 
state. This is evident from the joint communique issued^ 
after the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad 
Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, paid a visit to Moscow at the beginning 
of December 1975. This communique reads:
Peace and security in this (Persian Gulf) 
area could be strengthened by prohibiting for­
eign interference in the affairs of this region, 
by insuring freedom of navigation in the Persian 
Gulf and by establishing trust and good-neighbor­
ly cooperation among all the states in the Gulf 
zone on the basis of non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs and respect for the 
right of each to free and independent develop­
ment. 35
Thus, Kuwait obtained, at least on paper, So­
viet support for its independence from Iraq, and, when 
this happened, the Soviet-Iraqi relationship became 
further strained.
(c) The ensuing intensification of the Iraqi-Syrian 
tension
Given the settlement with Iran, it could be 
argued that the Kremlin leaders expected to see a radi­
cal Iraqi-Syrian alliance to confront the American-sup-
35 pravda, December 9, 1975. Translated in the Current 
Digest of Soviet Press, 27, No. 49:23. Hereafter 
cited as CDSP.
ported Arab states. But it was far from true. The 
other outstanding foreign problem for Iraq was, however, 
its relations with Syria, and this was one conflict in 
which the Iraqis could not ask for assistance from Mos­
cow. The Soviet Union's close relations with Syria were 
underscored during Brezhnev's keynote address to the 25th 
Party Congress on February 24, 1976. Brezhnev explicitly 
ranked Syria over Iraq in his list of Arab allies. His 
speech declared that:
Now I shall say something about our rela­
tions with the Arab countries. During the past 
five-year period we established a good mutual 
understanding with Syria. We act in concert on 
many international problems, above all those of 
the Middle East. The conclusion of the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq, on the 
basis of which our relations are developing, 
was an important event. Cooperation with Alge­
ria and South Yemen is expanding and deepening. 3 6
The Iraqi leadership failed to appreciate 
this ranking. Moreover, there were a number of issues 
engendering rivalry between these two Ba'athist regimes. 
Obsessed with an ideological dispute with the Iraqi 
Ba'ath regime, Syria acrimoniously denounced the Iraqi- 
Iranian agreement. Apart from accusing the Iraqis of 
abandoning Arab national rights in the Shatt-al Arab 
and Arabistan, the Damascus regime also accused Iraq 
of ceding 14 Iraqi villages in the Sulaimaniyah province
18
36 Pravda, February 25, 1976. Translated in CDSP, 28, 
No. 8:7.
to Iran. This led the Syrian government to claim that
the Algiers Agreement confirmed Iraq's complete associa-
37tion with colonialism and imperialism.
It could be argued that Syria's denunciation 
of the Algiers Agreement also stemmed from fear that the 
settlement of the Iraqi-Iranian dispute would provide 
Iraq with military and political capabilities directed 
against Syria. One of the major points of contention 
between these two Ba'athist regimes is that each claims 
to be the legitimate organisation and the only represent­
ative of the Ba'athist movement which sees itself as the 
guardian and genuine expression of Arab national interest
In addition to the ideological element, Syria's 
severe attitude towards Iraq was conditioned by its dis­
cord with Baghdad over the allocation of the Euphrates 
water resources. The Iraqis claimed that, following 
Syrian construction of the Tabaka dam on the upper Eu­
phrates, the Syrians diverted their share of the waters 
and ignored the human and agricultural needs of the 
people of the lower Euphrates. Both countries met under 
Arab League auspices to work out the percentages of 
the river's waters each was to receive, yet no final 
compromise was reached. This was followed by minor 
provocations on each side, leading to the mobilization
37 J.M. Abdulghani, o p .c i t ., p. 160.
38 Abbas Kelidar, 'Iraq:The Search for Stability', 
Conflict Studies, No. 59, July 1975, pp. 19-20.
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of troops on each other's borders in June 1975. The 
Iraqi government, moreover, accused Syria of supporting 
Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq.
The delicate Soviet position could be also 
seen in the light of the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76. 
The Soviets' main allies, the Iraqis and the Syrians, 
fought each other. Both of them had received Soviet 
assistance, but both were involved in Lebanon on opposing 
sides.
By this time, Iraq was strongly opposed even 
to Soviet-endorsed peace plans for the Arab-Israeli con­
flict, such as the October 1977 joint statement with the 
US. The Iraqi leaders perceived that the Soviet leaders 
orchestrated such a plan because of a desire to regain 
their Middle East position.
While still seeking to forge an 'anti-imperial­
ist' alignment in the Arab world, the Soviet Union was 
concerned about the two contending Ba'athist regimes.
The Soviet Prime Minister, Aleksei Kosygin, in 1976 
shuttled between Baghdad and Damascus. But this effort 
came to naught. Although Syria and Iraq joined a number 
of other Arab states in forming the Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front to protest President Sadat's visit 
to Jerusalem in November 1977 (and, more importantly, to 
nullify Sadat's signing of the Sinai II disengagement
21
agreement), this unity did not last.
Saddam Hussein's ambition to lead the Arab 
world has also been described as one reason for the 
weakening of this unity. Hussein, as was noted, became 
president only in July 1979, although he had been the 
effective ruler of Iraq since the advent of the Ba'athist 
regime in July 19 6 8. The Syrian-Iraqi unity imperiled 
Hussein's ambitions, Adeed I. Dawisha argues:
since real power would reside with the 
presidency, which was to alternate between 
the Syrian President and Iraqi President. 
Whereas Hussein had always been able to do­
minate Iraqi politics through President Bakr 
from the lesser positions of vice president 
and assistant secretary-general of the Iraqi 
Ba'ath party, Hussein knew that such a rela­
tionship would not be possible in the pro­
jected united entity, given Syrian President 
Assad's strong personality and immense Arab 
and international prestige. 39
(d) Iraq's persecutions of the Iraqi communist party
The Baghdad regime's policy towards the Iraqi
Communist Party (ICP) might be referred to as a political
barometer in Soviet-Iraqi relations since the beginning
40of the Ba'athist regime m  1968. From that time, 
the relations had been full of mistrust, suspicion and 
apprehension. The Communist Party has been regarded
39 Adeed I. Dawisha, 'Iraq:The West's Opportunity', 
Foreign Policy, No. 41, Winter 1980-81, p. 141.
40 See Aryeh Y. Yodfat, 'The USSR and Arab Communist 
Parties-A Chilling Account of Great Power Penetra­
tion', The New Middle East, No. 32, May 1971.
as an alien threat to Arab culture and a conduit of
41a foreign power. In the Ba'athist view, more specifi­
cally, the communists were Soviet agents, serving Soviet 
interests. The Baghdad regime tacitly and publicly as- _ 
serted that, preceding the signature of the Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation in 1972, the Soviets had 
given assurances that they would not get involved in the 
relations between the Iraqi B a 1ath and Communist Parties, 
and that under no circumstances would the Soviet Union
conduct its relations with Iraq through activities of
42the Iraqi Communist Party.
When the ICP participated in the B a 1ath-controlled
43Progressive National Front m  July 1973, the Ba'athists 
made it clear that they were not prepared to tolerate 
any political activity by the ICP in the armed forces.
They further hinted that any element discovered attempting 
to organize political cells in the army would be imme­
diately abolished. By 1976, the ICP had rapidly become 
unhappy with its powerless position in the Iraqi govern­
ment (there were only two communists in the cabinet), and 
it had begun openly to demand an increased role for itself 
in the Progressive National Front. Ba'ath-ICP divisions
22
41 Shahram Chubin, o p .cit., p. 91.
42 Adeed I. Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World: 
The Limits to Superpower Influence', in Adeed Dawisha 
and Karen Dawisha, (eds.), The Soviet Union in the 
Middle East:Policies and Perspectives, (London:Heine- 
mann, 1982), p. 17.
43 See Robert 0. Freedman, 'Soviet Policy Toward Ba'athist 
Iraq, 1968-1979', in Robert H. Donaldson, (ed.), The 
Soviet Union in the Third World:Successes and Failures,
(Colorado:Westview Press, 1981), p. 178.
were embittered by:
(i) the ICP1s advocacy of genuine autonomy
for the Kurds and its open disagreement with the Ba'athist 
policy of resettling the Kurdish affair outside the 
Kurdish region, particularly because this involved a 
concession to the pro-Western Shah's regime in Iran.
(ii) Iraq's consolidation of its economic ties 
with the West. The ICP denounced what it perceived to 
be the growing power of 'private capital' and Iraq's
44continuing dependence on the capitalist world market.
Moreover, the ICP reportedly carried on anti­
government propaganda among Iraq's Kurds and Shi'ites.
In fact, the Ba'athists suspected communist involvement 
in the Shiite religious demonstrations in early 1977.
The Ba'athist suspicion of the I C P 's active role in 
stirring up internal political disorder became stronger 
when the Ba'athist regime evidently decided that the 
crackdown took precedence over its relations with the 
Soviet Union. Naim Haddad, a member of Iraq's ruling 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), stated that:
All communist parties all over the 
world are always trying to get power. We 
chop off any weed that pops up. 45
In May 1978, the Iraqi government executed
23
44 Quoted in Robert 0. Freedman, op.cit., p. 179.
45 Foreign Broadcast Information Service:The Middle East 
and North Africa, June 7, 1978, p. El. Hereafter cited 
as FBIS:MEA.
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21 Iraqi communist accused of attempting to organize 
political cells in the army. Further news reports 
indicated that the ICP was involved in an abortive at­
tempt backed by the Soviet Union to topple the Ba'athist
46regime.
Given the Soviet-backed communist coup in 
Afghanistan in April 1978, it could be clearly argued 
that that coup might have affected the B a 1ath party
47perception of and policy towards the ICP. It was 
claimed that in December 19 78 the Iraqi government per­
secuted a number of Iraqi communists in the army and 
kept prominent communist party members under control,
including a member of the I C P 1s Central Committee, Majid
48Adbul-Ridha. Furthermore, as Shahram Chubin asserts,
the Iraqi regime set up measures to ensure that the
49communist were under its strict control.
One could argue that the Kremlin was in no 
position to harm relations with a country which on the 
one hand, had held an official friendship treaty with 
the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, undertook the 
persecution of communists. Yet this argument is far 
from sound. Following the Ba'ath persecutions of Iraqi
46 FBIS:MEA, June 19, 1978, p. El.
47 Middle East Economic Digest, April 25, 1979. Cited as 
MEE D .
48 Middle East Research & Information Project, June 1981. 
Cited as MERIP.
49 Shahram Chubin, o p .cit., p. 8 8 .
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communists and the ensuing deterioration in Ba'athist- 
communist relations, Iraqi-Soviet relations plummeted 
to a low point. This could be seen in the event of the 
Gulf war. In addition, as Yodfat argues, in the Soviet _ 
Union, the consideration of not sacrificing principles 
and friends just for temporary and dubious state interests 
was still in effect. The Iraqi communist newspaper was 
quoted as saying that:
The widespread persecution of communists 
in Iraq and repression agaisnt the communists 
party's organizations and press...has been 
continuing for a year. (The ICP) has made 
and is continuing to make efforts to halt 
the deterioration of relations with the rul­
ing Ba'ath Party and not only to preserve the 
cooperation between the two parties but also 
to develop and intensify it still further. 50
At this stage, there is every reason to be­
lieve that the persecutions of the communists served 
the dual Iraqi purposes of punishing (and, at its most 
serious, extinguishing) Soviet-backed dissident groups 
and of manifesting Iraqi independence of Moscow.
(e) The closer Iraqi relations with the West
The Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement also affected 
Iraq's relations with the Western powers. The pragmatic 
Iraqi leaders had made a decision to keep their options 
open. Iraq adopted a new policy, which led to closer
50 Quoted in Aryeh Y. Yodfat, o p .c i t ., p. 89.
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relations with the West both economically and militarily- 
in the latter case, particularly with France.
The resolution of the Iranian-Iraqi dispute 
and the settlement, albeit temporary, of the Kurdish 
rebellion alleviated Iraq's fear of insecurity and en­
circlement. With the removal of these two main threats, 
the Ba'athists became less dependent for military aid 
on the Soviet Union. In addition, after the quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1973, the Baghdad regime attempted to 
end its economic dependence on the Soviet Union. By the 
same token, because of the absence now of pressing secu­
rity threats and the availability of its own huge finan­
cial resources, the Baghdad regime embarked on an exten­
sive economic development plan and diversified its trade 
patterns.
Even though in July 1975 an agreement on co­
operation between Iraq and the Council for Mutual Econo-
51mic Assistance (CMEA) or COMECON was signed m  Moscow, 
no cooperation with the Soviet Union or other CMEA 
countries was adequate for the Iraqis' ambitious deve­
lopment projects. The Soviet Union could no longer cope 
with the multitude of industrial projects for which Iraq 
could pay in hard currency. Hence the Iraqi government 
was prepared to deal with Western European, Japanese and 
even American firms rather than with the Soviet Union
51 Aryeh Y. Yodfat, o p .cit., p. 63. See also Y. Zhuravlyov, 
'Iraq and CMEA', New Times, August 1978, No. 31, p. 17.
and East European countries. Iraq needed the best and 
most advanced technology, and this could only be found in 
Western countries that purchased large quantities of oil 
from Iraq and were hopeful of reducing their balance of _ 
payments deficits.
In effect, its economic relations with the
West experienced phenomenal growth and expansion, while
those with Moscow declined. As Robert 0. Freedman states,
in 1977 there was a sharp increase in Iraqi-American trade,
53equalling the extent of Iraqi-Soviet trade. The volume 
of trade between Iraq and the United States rose from 
$20 million in 1973 to nearly $500 million dollars in
1976, $724 million in 1980 and $914 million in 1 9 8 1 , ^  
despite the fact that the two states had no diplomatic 
relations. At the same time, Iraqi imports from the 
Soviet Union dropped to a low level, accounting for less 
than 10 per cent of Iraq's imports in 1975, while its 
imports from Western Europe and Japan increased tremen­
dously. One significant hallmark of Iraq's policy shift 
towards diversifying its trade patterns and gaining highly- 
needed advanced technology from the West was its agree­
ment with a consortium of American and West German cor-
55poration to build a petrochemical plant m  Southern Iraq.
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52 Robert 0. Freedman, o p .cit., p. 17 6 .
53 Ibid., p. 178.
54 Khadduri, o p .cit., p. 181; Christine Moss Helms, 
Iraq:Eastern Flank of the Arab World, (Washington, 
D.C.:The Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 197.
55 J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 161.
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There was a further agreement with France to build a 
70-megawatt nuclear research reactor.
Development in economic relations does not how­
ever necessarily result in similar development in the poli­
tical sphere. The expansion of Iraq's trade relations 
with the US was not accompanied by an improvement in po­
litical relations. Iraq's refusal to resume diplomatic 
ties with the US stemmed from its perception that the US 
was continuing to give unrestricted support to Israel 
against Arabs. In 1977, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy 
Premier, stated that 'we believe that the United States
was and still is siding with Israel in an exceptional
, 56 w a y ' .
Nonetheless, Iraq's diversification policy
extended to the military field. In April 1975, Saddam
Hussein asserted that Iraq would diversify its sources
57of arms as the national interests dictated. France
had helped the Baghdad regime to achieve this policy.
Iraq was reported to have concluded an enormous arms
deal, concerning the sale of 72 advanced Mirage F-l
5 8aircraft, helicopters and tactical missiles. Quite 
assertively, in June 1980, the Iraqi Minister of Infor­
mation announced in Al-Nahan that Iraq would seek sources
59of weapons outside the Soviet Union.
56 FBIS:MEA , August 5, 1977, p. E3.
57 FBIS:MEA, July 21, 1977, p. El; Washington Post, June 
28, 1977.
58 Washington Post, April 25, 1975.
59 Quoted by Karen Dawisha, 'Moscow's Moves in the Direction 
of the Gulf-So Near and Yet So Far', Journal of Interna­
tional Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1980-81, p.225.
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Certainly, this diversification embarrassed 
and worsened Iraqi-Soviet relations because it confirmed 
the Soviet leaders 1 perception that the Baghdad regime 
was attempting to be more independent of Moscow.
(f) Iraq's disagreement with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan
The sharp decline in Soviet influence in Iraq 
also came from the disenchantment in the Ba'athist elite 
with the role played by the Soviet Union in the Afghan 
communist coup in April 1978. It was even less happy 
when in December 1979 five Soviet divisions crossed the 
border from the Soviet Union into Afghanistan. Three 
basic grounds for intervention were claimed by the Soviet 
Union:
(a) the Afghan government had requested 
military assistance;
(b) under the 1978 treaty, the Soviet Union 
was committed to give that assistance; 
and
(c) it constituted self-defense against 
foreign armed aggression in accordance 
with the UN Charter. (Article 51) 60
But at this time, one of high-ranking Iraqi 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) officials, Tariq 
Aziz, implicitly expressed Iraq's fears of both super­
powers' expansionist ambitions. Hence, when the issue 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came up in the
60 SWB:SU, 6306, December 29, 1979, pp. i-A3/l.
United Nations in early January 1980, among the 104
countries voting against Moscow, Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein strongly and even more publicly condemned the
invasion. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party Newspaper, Al-Thawrah, __
has stated that 'interference in the internal affairs
of others and the wish to impose hegemony on small states
and peoples are some of the most prominent rules adhered
61to by the superpowers'. This further demonstrated 
Iraq's independence of Moscow.
Iraq also joined the Islamic summit conference 
at Islamabad in January 19 8 0 which condemned the Soviet 
invasion. This invasion had, it could be argued, increased 
Iraqi suspicions of being similarly interfered with by 
the Soviet Union. The Iraqis concluded that the Soviets 
might also exploit the internal situation in Iraq in 
order to intervene and determine the nature of its regime. 
They further were worried that the Soviets might support 
some Iraqi dissident equivalent to Babrak Karmal, who 
had been in exile. Moreover, Iraq perceived that this 
Soviet action subsequently invited US adventurism and 
confrontation, which might lead to a division of the 
region between them. Tariq Aziz said:
We vehemently condemn Soviet interven­
tion in Afghanistan. This intervention is 
totally unjustifiable. We openly express 
our disapproval and demand Soviet withdra­
wal. The biggest attraction for the super-
30
61 BBC Summary of World Broadcast (SWB):The Middle East 
and North Africa, 6311, January 5, 1980, p. A/1. 
Hereafter cited as SWB:ME.
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powers to this region is oil wealth. It is 
high time that the states possessing this 
wealth form their defence system in order to 
protect this wealth. Threats connected with
oil are creating unrest in the area. All super­
powers should stop threatening the Gulf and 
the oil-producing Gulf states. 62
In considering Iraq's condemnation of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, two interrelated points
should be mentioned. First, Iraq's denunciation of the
Soviet invasion could arguably be explained by the
fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan are Islamic and
non-aligned countries. Equally disturbing for Soviet-
6 3Iraqi relations was an Arab Charter proclaimed in 
February 1980 by Saddam Hussein. In summary, under this 
Charter, all Arab countries would henceforth dismantle 
foreign bases and facilities from their soil. As far 
as Soviet military facilities in foreign countries 
were concerned, at least on paper, the Soviet Union was 
in both an unfavourable and even more delicate position 
than the US. As Geoffrey Jukes argues:
As the United States has, or is acquiring 
such facilities in several Arab countries (Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Somalia), whereas 
the Soviets have them only in the PDRY and Syria, 
the proposed Charter, to the extent that its 
purpose was not merely to embarrass Egypt and 
Syria, a favourite Iraqi ploy, appeared on the 
face of it to disadvantage the US more than the 
Soviet Union. But in reality, the opposite
62 Cited in Edmund Grareeb, 'Iraq:Emergent Gulf Power', 
in Hossein Amirsadeghi, (ed.), The Security of the 
Persian Gulf, (London:Croom Helm, 1981), p. 222.
63 SWB:M E , 6343, February 12, 1980, p. A/1; The main prin­
ciples of this Charter can be found in 'The Middle East' 
April 1980, p. 20; Adeed Dawisha, 'Invoking the Spirit 
of Arabism:Islam in the Foreign Policy of Saddam's Iraq' 
in Adeed Dawisha, (ed.), Islam in Foreign Policy, 
(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 118-19
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was the case...
Withdrawal to or development of facilities 
in these countries would constitute an operating 
inconvenience for the Americans, but the conse­
quences for the Soviets would be more disruptive... 64
Second, what should be noted here is that, 
based on Tariq Aziz's remark cited p r e v i o u s l y ^ I r a q ' s 
fear of being similarly invaded has probably been over­
stated. In any analysis of the reality of the threat 
of a Soviet invasion of Iraq, some military strategists 
may have exaggerated the danger of an imminent Soviet 
invasion of the Middle East for oil supplies. As 
Geoffrey Jukes persuasively argues, there were distinct
Soviet limitations to using Afghanistan as a springboard
6 6for invading other countries. In addition, in the 
absence of common borders, therefore, Iraq's expressed 
fear of the Soviet invasion could be seen largely as 
a political ploy to counter Soviet influence. This anti- 
Soviet attitude can also be seen in the timing of pro­
claiming the Arab Charter which, although it had little 
chance of gaining broad support, significantly reflected 
Iraq's anti-Soviet posture.
(g) Iraq's displeasure at Soviet support for Ethiopia 
in both the Ethiopian-Somali conflict and the 
Eritrean dispute
In the late 1970s, Soviet-Iraqi relations
64 Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Middle East:The View from Moscow', 
World Review, August 1982, p. 90.
65 See pp. 30-31.
66 Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Middle East:The View from Moscow', 
o p .c i t ., pp. 85-6.
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deteriorated steadily and were marred by differences 
over Soviet policy towards the Horn of Africa and the 
Eritrean question. Soviet support for the Marxist re­
gime of Mengistu Haile-Mariam in Ethiopia against Somalia" 
in the Ogaden war was also a cornerstone of dissension 
in Soviet-Iraqi relations. Despite being a partner in 
a Treaty of Friendship similar to the now defunct Somali- 
Soviet Treaty, Iraq has openly and persistently pledged
support to Eritrean and Somali insurgents fighting for
6 7independence from Addis Ababa.
The ruling Ba'ath Party newspaper, Al-Thawrah,
on August 16, 1977, pointed out that Soviet policy in
the Horn of Africa would be detrimental to Soviet inter-
6 8ests and beneficial to 'imperialist' strategy.
Iraq's support for both the Eritrean libera­
tion movement and Somali insurgents in their struggle 
against the Soviet-backed Marxist regime in Ethiopia 
can be, one could argue, considered in the context of 
Arab nationalism. Tariq Aziz described the Eritrean revo­
lution as the revolution of an Arab people against a state, 
that did not want to respect its natural right of self- 
determination. He also further emphasized Arab nationalism
67 Mohammad Ayoob, 'The Horn of Africa:Regional Conflict 
and Superpower Involvement', Canberra Paper on Strategy 
and Defence, No. 18, (Canberra:The Strategic and Defense 
Studies Center, 1978); Harry Briand, 'Soviet Policy in 
the Horn of Africa', International Affairs, Vol. 60,
No. 1, Winter 1983/84.
68 Cited in International Herald Tribune, August 17, 1977.
by stressing that 'the Red Sea is an Arab sea and all
69the peoples surrounding it are Arab peoples'. In the
light of the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war, Iraq considered
70Somalia an Arab country. Its populations are predomi­
nantly Sunni Muslims. The fighting which erupted, he be­
lieved, was between countries of Arab and non-Arab origin.
To demonstrate their disenchantment with
Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa, the Iraqis banned
any Soviet overflights for cargo aircraft destined for 
71Ethiopia. Moreover, Iraqi leaders bluntly cliamed 
that Iraq refused to be a bridge to support Ethiopia's 
policy to suppress the legitimate rights of the Eritrean 
and Somali people. The Baghdad regime's relations with 
the Kremlin leaders became even more embittered following 
the shift of regional alignments in the Horn of Africa 
culminating in the unilateral Somali abrogation of its 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow on 
November 13, 19 77.
Conclusion
As was noted earlier, the Algiers Agreement came 
as a surprise to the Soviet Union and it can be seen 
as a turning point in Soviet-Iraqi relations. It indi-
69 FBIS:MEA, August 5, 1977, p. E4.
70 Somalia j_s now a member of the Arab League but it is 
not ethnically Arab. Arabic is becoming a standard 
language, but most people still do not speak it well. 
One might say that it is more politically Arab than 
it is culturally or ethnically.
71 J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 163.
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cated the determination of the Ba'athist ruling group 
to pursue policies which were to be increasingly indepen­
dent of Soviet influence.
The divergences portrayed above indicate 
that while the Baghdad regime's dependence on the Soviet 
Union certainly declined, it could not be said to have 
ceased. The Iraqis were careful not to drift too 
far from the Soviets. They still wished to have the 
advantage of being able to criticize Soviet policy.
They also wanted both to maintain their freedom of 
action and monoeuvre, and to receive Soviet political 
and military support. From the Soviet point of view,
Iraq might be seen as its ally, but at the same time, 
the Baghdad regime itself wanted to be seen in Arab 
and Western eyes as non-aligned and no longer dependent 
on the Soviet Union. The Soviets were unable to use 
Iraq for their own purposes.
Based on this analysis, the discussion in the 
next chapter will discuss a further example of the 
pragmatic policy that shaped the independent Iraqi 
decision to invade Iran in September 1980.
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Chapter II: Soviet-Iraqi Relations From the Outbreak
of the Gulf War in September 1980 to May 
1981
Introduction
The previous chapter suggested that, as a result 
of Iraq's independent and pragmatic policy, Soviet-Iraqi 
relations fluctuated after the Algiers Agreement of 
March 1975.
Following both Iraq's unilateral abrogation of 
that agreement and its undeclared full-scale invasion 
of Iranian territory in September 1980, Soviet-Iraqi 
relations became even more precarious. Despite the 
fact that Soviet-supplied military assistance played a 
significant role in Soviet-Iraqi ties,’*' particularly 
in Iraq's military confrontation with Iran, there is 
some evidence that the Soviet proclamation of 'non­
interference' in the Gulf war from the very first day 
of its commencement adversely affected its relations 
with Iraq.
The discussion in this chapter will focus en­
tirely on the initial stage of the Gulf war ranging 
from the beginning of the Iraqi invasion in September 
1980 to the end of the period of so-called 'stalemate'
1 Shahram Chubin, Security in the Gulf:The Role of
Outside Powers, Vol. 4 (London:International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1982), pp. 74-89.
in May 1981. It addresses the three following questions:
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(i) What reasons were there for the Baghdad 
regime's invasion of Iran?
(ii) What was the Soviet reaction once the 
full-scale war broke out?
(iii) What implications did the Gulf hostilities 
have for Soviet-Iraqi relations?
I : Iraq's Decision to Initiate the War
According to Daniel Pipes, the September 1980 full- 
scale fighting basically indicated general hostility 
between Iraq and Iran in the wider context of Arab ver­
sus Iranian, Pan-Arabist versus Pan-Islamist and Sunni
3versus Shi'a conflicts.
Despite the fact that Iraq's motives for its 
incursion into Iran were complex and multi-dimensional, 
they are nonetheless also a result of Iraq's pragmatic
2 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for 
Strategic Stability:Saudi Arabia, the Military 
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli 
Military Balance, (Colorado:Westview Press, 1984), 
p. 667. See also Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq 
War:Islam Embattled, The Washington Papers, No. 92, 
(Washington, D.C.:Center for Strategic and Inter­
national Studies, 1982), p. 21. J.M. Abdulghani,
Iraq & Iran:The Years of Crisis, (London:Croom Helm, 
1984) , p. 209.
3 Daniel Pipes, 'A Border Adrift:Origins of the Conflict', 
in Shirin Tahir-Kheli & Shaheen Ayubi, (eds.), The 
Iran-Iraq War:New Weapons, Old Conflicts, (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp. 4-8.
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and independent policies. It was the latter which pro­
vided the pressing reasons for the Baghdad regime's 
decision to invade in September 1980.
Iraq perceived its action as a pre-emptive 
move designed both to weaken Khomeini's fundamentalist 
movement and to blunt his endeavour to export his Is­
lamic revolution to Iraq and the Arab Gulf states. As 
President Saddam Hussein explains it:
Iraq's invasion of Iran has been a 
battle in defence of the honour, sovereignty, 
constant historical rights, and legitimate 
vital interests of our country...(I )t has 
been a decisive battle for the Arabism of 
the Gulf, (and) for deterring the expansion­
ist, Persian ambitions. 4
He further portrays the war as necessary for 
the defence of the Arab homeland by stating that Iraq
was fighting on behalf of the Arab nation and the
. . 5citizens of the Gulf. The claims of other high-rank­
ing Iraqi officials further justified the invasion. For 
one thing, with regard to international law, Dr. Sa'doun 
Hammadi described the invasion as legitimate self-defence 
in conformity with international law, formulated to 
preserve the safety, security and vital interests of 
g
Iraq. It was rather obvious that in referring to 
international law his aim was to legitimize the invasion
4 Saddam Hussein's speech on September 28, 1980, in 
Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iraqi-Iranian 
Conflict, p. 219. Quoted in J.M. Abdulghani, o p .c i t ., 
p. 204.
5 Ibid., p . 205.
6 Sa'doun Hammadi's speech in Iraq's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Iraqi-Iranian Conflict, p. 231.
Quoted in J.M. Abdulghani, o p .cit., p. 204.
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by his country. In addition, in terms of military power,
Iraq's Defence Minister, Adnan Khairallah, stated that
Iraq's invasion had destroyed the myth of Iranian hege-
7mony. Similarly, Tariq Aziz should be cited as having - 
said that:
One of Iraq's objectives was to prove in 
battle that it (Iraq) is stronger than Iran 
and fully capable of defeating it. And this 
is what Iraq has actually acheived. 8
It is important to analyze in some detail why 
the Baghdad regime reached a decision to invade Iranian 
Khuzestan in September 1980. Before the eruption of 
full-scale infantry assault, the hostility between Tehe­
ran and Baghdad had manifested itself in sporadic mili­
tary clashes along the borders, and both regimes had 
consistently accused each other of violating territorial 
borders and airspace. J.M. Abdulghani quotes official 
sources to make the point that while the Iraqi govern­
ment accused Iran of violating Iraq's territorial borders 
and airspace on 544 occasions between February 1979 and 
September 1980, Iran also accused Iraq of penetrating 
its airspace 182 times, and its border 637 times during
9the period from March 1979 to September 1980. In sum, 
the full-scale military encounter had been gradually 
led up to by a daily pattern of border incidents and
7 New York Times, January 4, 1981.
8 Tariq Aziz, Iraq-Iran Conflict : Questions and Dis­
cussions , transi, by Naji al-Hadithi, (London : Third 
World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1981), p. 28.
9 Quoted in J.M. Abdulghani, op.cit., pp. 200-201.
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military engagements with each side accusing the other 
of initiating hostilities.
On September 17, 1980, President Saddam Hus­
sein heralded the decision in the Iraqi National Assembly 
that, given Iran's alleged frequent violations of the 
Algiers Agreement, Iraq considered it abrogated. Arti­
cle 4 of the accord, referring to the indivisibility 
of the treaty and to the fact that any violation of 
its elements justified making the entire treaty null 
and void, had been aptly seized upon by Iraq to justify 
its abrogation. To emphasize this abrogation, the Iraqi 
News Agency (INA) issued a dispatch on September 20, 1980, 
which said:
The Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) 
has declared its absolute support for the deci­
sion abrogating the Algiers Agreement with the 
Iranian regime. 10
It might possibly be argued that the Baghdad 
regime launched this campaign in order to show that 
even the Iraqi Kurdish people, an essential element 
in the Algiers Agreement, also endorsed Baghdad's de­
cision. But the dispatch was totally misleading. The 
reason was that on September 18, 1980, the Voice of
10 SWB:ME, 6529, September 22, 1980, p. A/3.
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Iraqi Kurdistan had already broadcast a comment that:
Saddam said in his speech that he held 
the treasonous 1975 Algiers Agreement to be 
abrogated. That means that the Algiers Agree­
ment, which is associated with the oppression 
of our Kurdish people, has gone to hell. As 
a result of this agreement, our Kurdish people 
were exposed to the worst forms of oppression, 
deportation, genocide and humiliation. It 
suppressed our people's rights and freedom.
The only drawback to the death of their agree­
ment is that the Ba'athist regime in Iraq has 
not died with it. However, that regime is 
bound to die. 11
Hence, the launching of a full-scale invasion 
of Iran meant that the Iraqi army had to face the situa­
tion of a two-front war. However, the Iraqi full-scale 
invasion in September still went ahead. There were four 
main reasons for this.
First, the Iraqis thought that it was a time
when the Iranians would be less capable of defending
themselves. One and a half years after Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini took power in Teheran, oil revenues
were low while inflation and unemployment rates were
12high. Tension was growing between the central govern­
ment and the diverse ethnic and religious minorities 
in Iran (Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis); resulting, especially
11 Ibid., p. A/3. The "Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan" broad­
casts from an unidentified location in the Iraqi- 
Iranian border area of Kurdistan. (Letter from BBC 
dated 17th July, 1985) . Content of broadcasts sug­
gests it is Iranian-supported and probably in Iranian 
territory.
12 Daniel Pipes, op.cit., p. 3.
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amongst the Kurds, in open rebellion. In addition, the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in Baghdad thought 
that the demoralization and fragmentation of the Iranian 
military had occurred:
The large and well-armed military forces 
built up for years by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahla- 
vi had apparently collapsed. Morale plummeted, 
discipline eroded, and troops deserted as the 
armed forces fell into deep disfavour under 
Khomeini.
The mullahs purged officers, cancelled 
weapons purchases, terminated military privi­
leges and set up a loyal force (the Pasdaran, 
or Revolutionary Guards). 13
Nonetheless, the Baghdad leaders' perception 
of their relative strength was too optimistic. Although 
the Iraqi army had been supplied for years by the Soviet 
Union, it was still in the process of modernizing and diver­
sifying its armed forces. If the Iraqi army, as William 
0. Staudenmaier argues, had waited to complete its 
modernization process, an attack could not have taken 
place in September 1980. He substantiated his argument 
by stating that:
..., to await completion of the moderniza­
tion process, which would have required extensive 
crew training on the new weapons before they 
could be used in combat meant that an attack 
could not occur until the fall of 1981 or per­
haps 1982. Even a few months' delay would have 
shown that any possible settlement of Iraqi 
accounts with Iran could not occur until at 
least July 1981...Such a delay might have allowed 
Khomeini time to consolidate his hold on Iran. 14
13 Ibid., p . 3.
14 William 0. Staudenmaier, 'A Strategic Analysis' in 
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Shaleen Ayubi, (eds.), op.cit., 
p . 37.
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He further compares Iraqi and Iranian fighting 
capability in terms of such qualitative military factors 
as leadership, combat experience, training, logistics 
and command and control by showing that:
(a) the edge in leadership must be ac­
corded to Iraq, especially just prior to the 
war, owing to the disarray that existed in Iran.
(b) in light of combat experience of the 
armed forces...The Iraqi army has had chances to 
sharpen experiences during the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war and in counter-insurgency campaign against 
Kurdish rebels for more than a decade.
(c) in terms of 'training1, it has been 
a problem for both countries because of their 
rapid force expansion and modernization programs.
(d) in view of logistics, the operational 
rate of Iranian equipment was just at about
50 per cent, while Iraq was more capable of main­
taining and operating its modern weapons.
(e) In Iran, owing to a power struggle 
between the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian 
armed forces, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Khomeini, 
the split in the armed forces was an outcome.
In Iraq, Saddam Hussein as Commander-in-Chief 
controlled the war through the Revolutionary 
Command Council. 15
Yodfat asserts that President Saddam Hussein
hoped to reach a quick victory, thereby leading to the
16overthrow of Khomeini's regime. He also hoped to seize
Khuzestan (most of the inhabitants in this region are
17Arabs) within a few days, then trigger successful 
revolts in Iranian Kurdestan, in Iran's armed forces
15 William 0. Staudenmaier, in o p .cit., pp. 30-33.
16 Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian 
Peninsular:Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf 
and Arabia, (London:Croom Helm, 1983), p. 120.
17 Khuzestan was formerly known as Arabistan. The popu­
lation has historically been about 80 per cent Arabic­
speaking, and it thus seems to the Baghdad regime as 
part of the 'Arab nation'.
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and among the population. Iraq at this point under­
estimated the Iranian regime's ability to manipulate 
such religious symbols as Shi'ism, and to stir up Iran­
ian patriotism.
In any analysis of Iran's and Iraq's relative 
strength, Iran's international isolation and Iraq's 
strong relations with the Gulf states ought to be men­
tioned. The Baghdad regime believed that in view of 
the 1980 presidential election in the United States, 
any delay in invading might allow Khomeini to settle 
the American embassy hostages crisis which was isolating 
Iran internationally. On the other hand, Iraq's strong 
relations with the Gulf states, all of which shared 
a common fear of Iran's policy of exporting revolution, 
were regarded as being to Iraq's advantage. Hence, just 
two weeks after Iraq's invasion, in order to dissuade 
the Gulf states from rendering moral and material sup­
port to Iraq, the Iranian regime gave notice that it
would embark on retaliatory measures against any country
18suspected of assisting Iraq. Such retaliatory actions 
were also designed to lessen Jordanian King Hussein's 
support of Iraq. ^
Second, President Saddam Hussein started the 
war in September 1980 because he hoped to be in a posi-
18 Washington Post, October 10, 1980.
19 On October 4, 1980, Amman Television broadcasted HM 
King Hussein's statement as saying that 'we are not 
neutral on the question of the Gulf war. We are 
totally with Iraq, and will do our best to enable 
Iraq to retrieve all its rights to the Shatt-al Arab. 
See SWB:M E , 6541, October 6, 1980, p. A/ll.
tion to make personal gain when the conference of non-
20aligned countries would be held in Baghdad in 1982.
If he could defeat Khomeini in 1980 or 1981, perhaps 
not only would he be the leader of Pan-Arabism, but he 
might also become one of the most influential leaders 
of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Third, of the strategically important areas
21in Iran-West Azerbayjan, Khuzestan, Baluchistan-, one 
could argue that the Baghdad regime attached the greatest 
significance to Khuzestan. Three salient reasons account 
for this. In the first place, it had politically sym­
bolic value:as was noted, Khuzestan was formerly known 
as Arabistan. Hence, had Iraq conquered this land for 
the Arabs, Iraq's ambition to be recognized as the 
leader of the Arab world would be greatly improved. 
Second, Khuzestan is extensively endowed with oil, and 
occupation of this region would result in a significant 
increase in Iraq's oil reserves. Finally, it had a 
strategic contribution : control of Khuzestan, lying along 
the Persian Gulf, would give Iraq much greater access 
to the Gulf. Geographically, any military movement on 
the coastal plains was likely to be impeded by the winter
rains in November and to remain hampered until June or
22July. The flood waters could be utilized to enhance
45
20 William 0. Staudenmaier, in o p .cit., p. 37.
21 See Map C.
22 William 0. Staudenmaier, in op.cit., p. 33.
Map C: The Strategic Areas in Iran
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Sources: George Lenczowski, (ed.), Iran Under the Pahlavis, 
(California:The Hoover Institution Press, 1978); 
National Geographic:Atlas of the W o r l d , (Washington, 
D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1981), pp. 182-83.
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military defense, and September was the appropriate sea­
son for an infantry assault, aimed at capturing the area 
before the rains and utilizing the November-June period 
of enforced military inactivity to consolidate control 
and prepared defences against an eventual Iranian attempt 
to retake it.
Fourth and finally, in late 1980 both the 
United States and the Soviet Union were occupied else­
where. While the United States was preoccupied with 
both seeking a satisfactory solution of the hostage 
crisis and the presidential election campaign, the 
Soviet Union was burdened with its involvement in Afgha­
nistan and Poland. In effect, the Baghdad regime might 
have perceived a freer hand to escalate its military 
confrontation with Teheran.
However, it could also be argued that because 
of the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Iraq's 
leaders expected to count on substantial Soviet support 
in any large-scale military encounter with Iran. But 
this did not happen because (a) the Soviet Union was 
plagued with a guerilla war in Afghanistan and a poli­
tically and economically unstable situation in Poland;
(b) more importantly, before the war erupted, there 
could be little doubt, as Karen Dawisha notes, that 
Moscow was courting Iran in the months leading up to
the Iraqi invasion. The likelihood here is that the 
Iraqi leaders believed a quick victory could be attained 
without requiring Soviet support, and that the Treaty 
could be invoked to inhibit subsequent Iranian counter­
action .
The Kremlin leaders and Soviet press had at 
various times expressed their support for the revolution 
in Iran, characterized in one Tass communique as 'a 
people's revolution with a clear and noble purpose; li­
beration from neo-colonialist domination and the
24
acquisition of genuine independence'. In addition,
Soviet leaders were concerned that, in the event of a
successful rescue of the American hostages in Teheran,
the escalation of conflicts along the Iran-Iraq border
would eventuate in a US-backed intervention in Iran.
Karen Dawisha further indicates that Soviet efforts
to curry Iranian favour were reflected in a large in-
25
crease m  Soviet exports to that country. More in­
terestingly, it has been claimed that, in order to 
ingratiate themselves with the new revolutionary regime 
and to enhance the influence of the Tudeh Party, the 
Soviets advised the Khomeini regime, through the Tudeh,
48
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23 Karen Dawisha, 'Moscow and the Gulf War', The World 
T o d a y , Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1981, p. 10.
24 T a s s , January 16, 1980. Cited in i b i d ., p. 10.
25 I b i d ., pp. 9-10.
of Iraq's military war plans to invade Iran. At this
point, although the reality was that President Saddam
Hussein was more a scheming opportunist than a holy 
27
warrior, one could obviously argue that the Baghdad 
decision-makers miscalculated what the Soviet Union's 
position would be.
I I : The Soviet Union's Policy of 'Non-Interference' and 
Dissatisfaction With the War
The outbreak of the war in September 1980 
was inconvenient for the Soviets. For Soviet decision­
makers, the Iraq-Iran war posed an unavoidable dilemma. 
Undecided between Iraq, the emerging regional power with 
which the Soviets had a Treaty of Friendship and Coopera­
tion, and radical, virulently anti-American Iran, Moscow 
found itself in an extremely delicate position. Anything 
that the Soviets did or said about the conflict could be 
interpreted by either of the warring parties as taking 
sides. Tension between the two might complicate the 
Soviet ability to woo both. Karen Dawisha asserts that, 
for Moscow, the complexities and contradictions in the
49
2 6
26 See the statement of Iran's Foreign Minister, Velayati 
before the UN General Assembly on October 1, 1983.
Verbatim Reco r d s , A38/PV 13, p. 47. See also J.M. 
Abdulghani, o p . c i t ., p. 216; Aryeh Y. Yodfat, o p .c i t ., 
p. 120.
27 Editorial, New York T i m e s , September 23, 1980.
Iraq's invasion was characterized as 'Saddam's Qadisiyya'- 
the Battle of Qadisiyya in A .D . 637, in which the Arabs 
powerfully defeated the Persian army, led to the 
collapse of the Persian Empire.
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situation were so enormous as to be almost farcical.
On the surface, one could possibly have predicted that 
the Soviets would back Iraq against Iran. However, it 
was far from clear that the Soviets favoured an Iraqi 
vic t o r y .
2 8
Chagrined at the prospect of having to choose
sides, the Soviets adopted a policy best described as one
of 'non-interference' and at the same time sought to avoid
antagonizing either Iran or Iraq by describing the war
29
as promoted by the interests of imperialism. The Soviet 
tactic was to seek a scapegoat for the war which it found 
in US imperialism. Two days after the war broke out, 
on September 24, 1980, Izvestia commentator, A. Leonidov, 
noted that:
The forces of imperialism have always 
sought, and are now seeking, to derive a sel­
fish advantage from contradictions that some­
times arise in relations among developing coun­
tries . . .
It is precisely this tactic that the 
United States and other Western countries 
are using now in their approach to the con­
flict between Iraq and Iran that has broken 
out in the Middle East. 30
The US's alleged policy of fishing in trou­
bled waters was further emphasized in Literaturnaya
28 Karen Dawisha, o p .c i t ., p. 218.
29 New York T i m e s , September 26, 1980; Robert 0. Freedman, 
'Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East Since the Inva­
sion of Afghanistan', Journal of International A f f a i r s ,
Vol. 34, No. 2, Fall/Winter 1980/81, p. 298; S W B :S U ,
6545, October 10, 1980, p.A4/7; Soviet News,October 21, 198 
p. 326. Q
30 Complete text entitled 'Who Seeks to Gain From the 
Iranian-Iraqi Conflict?' by A. Leonidov, Izvestia, Septem­
ber 24 , 1980 . Translated in C D S P , October 22, 1980, Vol. 
XXXII, No. 38, p. 37. See also S W B :S U , 6532, September 25, 
1980, p. A4/1.
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G a z e t a , which stated that:
The US has decided to use the Iranian- 
Iraqi conflict to its own advantage. In W a ­
shington, although what people are saying there 
amounts almost to 'neutrality', voices have been 
heard predicting a possible reconsideration of 
Iranian-American relations. President Carter 
feels that at this point Teheran will be forecd 
to come to the Americans on bended knee. 31
Moreover, Leonid Brezhnev was quoted by a 
New Times commentator as saying that:
Neither Iraq nor Iran will benefit from 
the destruction and bloodshed, and from under­
mining each other's economies. The only one to 
benefit is a third party, one to whom the in­
terests of the peoples of this region are alien. 
That third party is imperialism. 32
'Imperialism' in this context clearly meant 
the United States.
The Soviet policy of 'non-interference' seemed 
to disadvantage Iraq more than Iran since Iraq depended 
upon Moscow for emergency resupplies of spare parts 
and equipment. As Dennis Ross argues, despite their 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a treaty which 
the Soviets had worked to invest with credibility and 
international standing, they cut off direct or new arms 
supplies to the Iraqis (although they did fulfill prior
31 I. Belyayev, Literaturnaya G a z e t a , October 1, 1980. 
Translated in C D S P , October 29, 1980, Vol. XXXII, 
No. 39, p. 38.
32 R. Andreasyan, 'The Oil Aspect of the Conflict',
New T i m e s , October 1980, No. 41, p. 8.
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contracts for small arms and ammunitions).
Iraqi leaders could easily perceive the Soviet
displeasure with the invasion. On September 22, 1980 when
34 '
the Iraqi Deputy Premier, T a n q  Aziz, flew to Moscow, 
he was neither met by any of the top Soviet leaders nor 
officially received. He held talks with Boris Ponomarev, 
Secretary of the CPSU in charge of the International 
Department, a candidate member of the CPSU Central Com­
mittee Politburo, and Viktor Maltsev, one of the two
35
F i r s t  D e p u t y  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s .  N o  j o i n t  o f f i c i a l
c o m m u n i q u e  w a s  i s s u e d .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  t w o -
and-a-half hour meeting said simply that a conversation
t o o k  p l a c e  b e t w e e n  P o n o m a r e v  a n d  A z i z ,  w h o  w a s  in t h e
3 6
Soviet Union for a brief visit. The report went on to
say that during the conversation, pressing problems of
the current international situation and events in the
37
N e a r  a n d  M i d d l e  E a s t  w e r e  d i s c u s s e d .
As Karen Dawisha points out, the extent to 
which relations between the two countries had deterio­
rated is obviously indicated by the absence of any 
mention of Aziz being an invited guest, of there having 
been any agreement or even suggestion that talks had
3 8
taken place on a 'cordial' or a 'business-like' basis.
33 Dennis Ross, 'Soviet Views Toward the Gulf War', Orbis,
Vol. 28, No. 3, Fall 1984, p. 438.
34 T a s s , September 22, 1980. FBIS:USSR, September 23, 1980, 
p. Hi.
35 I b i d ., p. Hi.
36 T a s s , September 22 , 1980. S W B : S U , 6531, September 24 , 1980, 
p. A4/1.
37 I b i d .
38 Karen Dawisha, 'Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle
(cont'd)
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The Iraqi News Agency broadcast a report that the two-
day official visit of Tariq Aziz to the Soviet Union fell
within the framework of joint consultations with the
Soviet Union about bilateral relations and international'
39
issues of joint interest. But Soviet disagreement with 
the Iraqi action, and with Baghdad's almost certain failure 
to inform the Kremlin in advance of its intensions, was 
further reflected in the failure to mention, in the re­
port, that discussions had taken place within the context
40
of the treaty provisions calling for mutual consultations.
The Soviets deliberately tried to downplay the significance
41
of Tariq Aziz's visit to Moscow.
The Kremlin's further disenchantment with
Baghdad was also apparent from the signing of a Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union
and Syria, Iraq's Ba'athist antagonist, on October 8,
1980. Given Syria's support for Iran (discussed later),
this treaty was tacitly seen as a signal of a Soviet
42
shift in favour of Iran. A joint communique was 
officially issued at the end of the talks between Pre­
sidents Brezhnev and Assad, in which a clause supported 
'Iran's inalienable right to determine its destiny
43
independently and without any foreign interference' 
that clearly referred to the Iraqi invasion.
38 (cont'd) East:The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War', 
International A f f a i r s , Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1980-81,p. 55.
39 Iraqi News Agency, September 23, 1980. SWB:SU,6531, Septem­
ber 24, 1980, p. A4/1.
40 Karen Dawisha, o p .c i t ., p. 55.
41 F B I S :U S S R , September 24, 1980, p. H3.
42 Karen Dawisha, 'Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: 
The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf W a r 1,o p . c i t .,p. 56.
43 P r a v d a , October 11, 1980. I b i d ., p. 56.
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In November 1980, Soviet media reported Tariq
44
Aziz's other visit to Moscow. In like manner, this 
visit was accorded with a lukewarm reception by Boris 
Ponomarev and Viktor Maltsev. During Tariq Aziz's one- 
day visit, a conversation was held during which the sides 
discussed some questions of bilateral Soviet-Iraqi rela­
tions and the current situation in the Middle East.
True enough, the issue of the Gulf war came up again in 
the conversation and met with no further progress. Inso­
far as the Iranian press report of Soviet arms deliveries 
to Iraq was concerned, Radio M o s c o w 's commentator Vera
Lebedeva strongly stated that 'such reports, scandalously
45
disseminated by the US imperialism, were groundless'.
The aim of these reports, he further noted, was 'to pro­
duce doubts about the Soviet Union's position on the 
Iranian-Iraqi war and thus damage the Kremlin's reputa­
tion and foreign p o l i c y ' . ^
Moreover, speaking at the 26th CPSU Congress
in Moscow in early March 1981, the leader of the Iraqi
Communist Party, Aziz Mohammed, presumably with the
Kremlin's approval, both condemned the war with Iran
as a 'ruinous military adventure', accusing President
47
Saddam Hussein of bringing economic misery to Iraq, 
and accused Baghdad of repression and persecution of
48
Iraqi communists and other political forces m  Iraq.
44 S W B : S U , 6575, November 14 , 1980 , p. A4/4.
45 SWB:SU, 6639, February 3, 1981, p. A4/3.
46 I b i d .
47 Washington P o s t , March 3, 1981.
48 Ibid.
What explains the Soviet Union's position of 
'non-interference' or standing on the sidelines?
As already mentioned, the war came at a bad
time for the Soviet Union. One could possibly argue that,
once the war began, it would not take the Kremlin leaders
long to be aware that the Soviet Union could gain little
and risked losing much of its influence. The Kremlin
leaders' calculations for pursuing a policy of 'non-inter-
ference' were heavily based on the view that a total victo
ry by either of the warring countries was undesirable.
Again, as Karen Dawisha discerns, a total Iranian defeat
might lead to Khomeini's replacement by a more pro-Western
regime while simultaneously deepening Iraq 's independence
49
of Moscow. On the other hand, the Kremlin leaders could 
derive no benefit from an Iraqi defeat, especially in 
the light of Moscow's immediate refusal to supply spare 
parts and equipment to Iraq. In this situation, as one 
could perceive, subsequent Iraqi leaders and Iraqi public 
opinion might blame the Soviet Union for the defeat of 
their country.
Despite the Soviet Union's statement which 
indicated a policy of 'non-interference', it in fact, 
although not explicitly, inclined towards Teheran. Moscow 
view of Iran was attributable to the following factors.
49 Karen Dawisha, 'Moscow and the Gulf War', op.cit., 
p. 11.
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First, Iran's policy had become vocally anti- 
American. The Khomeini revolution shifted Iran from 
its close relationship with the United States.
Second, the Kremlin was aware of the relatively 
greater strategic importance of Iran in terms of its 
geographical contiguity with the Soviet Union, its loca­
tion along the Gulf, and the vital Strait of Hormuz.
Third, given Iran's common border with Afghanis­
tan, one could not rule out Teheran's aid to the Afghan
guerillas against Soviet occupation, should Moscow side
. , 50
with Iraq.
The Soviet ambassador to Iran, Vladimir Vino­
gradov, met the Iranian Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali 
Raja'i, and was reported by Iranian radio as saying:
'We can cooperate in various fields and are prepared
51
to help you with military equipment'. One could argue 
that such report by the Iranian radio, not the most 
trustful media, was probably not truthful, particularly 
since by saying that the Iranians had rejected the offer, 
they saved the embarassment of having later to account 
for the non-arrival of Soviet aid at a later date. While 
Prime Minister Raja'i was reported to have rejected the
50 Robert 0. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle 
East Since 1 9 7 0 , (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1982), 
p . 232.
51 Teheran Domestic Serv i c e , October 5, 1980. F B I S :South 
Asia, October 6, 1980, pp. 18-19.
p r o p o s a l ,  s u c h  a n  o f f e r  w a s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  A y a t o l l a h
Mohammad Baheshti, head of the ruling Islamic Republican
53
Party in Iran. Tass reported that: 'There have been no
proposals from the Soviet side to Iran concerning arms
deliveries and, consequently the Iranian Premier had
54
nothing to reject'.
On October 11, 1980, the Iranian President, 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, met with Soviet Ambassador Vino­
gradov and strongly protested Soviet aid to Iraq. The 
ambassador tactfully replied that his government had 
been committed to a stance of 'non-interference' since
the war began. He added that his country was seeking
55
good and neighbourly relations with Iran.
As the war continued, Soviet dissatisfaction 
with the hostilities became more apparent since the war 
brought with it a number of serious problems for Moscow.
For one thing, the eruption of the Iraq-Iran 
war polarized the Arab world into two contending camps. 
Whereas Libya, Syria and Algeria and the People's Democra­
tic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) came out for Iran, Jordan 
and the Gulf sheikhdoms openly backed Iraq. The Syrians 
stressed that the war diverted attention from the Palesti­
nian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Besides, the
57
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53 F B I S : S o u t h  A s i a , O c t o b e r  9, 1980, p. 15.
54 T a s s  i n  E n g l i s h ,  O c t o b e r  8, 1980. F B I S :U S S R , O c t o b e r  9, 
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55 F B I S : S o u t h  A s i a , O c t o b e r  14, 1980. p. 111.
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Libyan President Qaddafi saw the conflict within:
the context of the crusade existing 
between Moslems and Christians, between East 
and West and between the Islamic nation and 
the Europeans. It is, therefore, an Islamic 
duty to be allied with the Moslems in Iran 
in this confrontation. 56
In October 1980, the Baghdad regime broke 
off diplomatic relations with Damascus and Tripoli. 
A spokesman for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry stated 
that :
It has been confirmed that the Syrians 
and Libyan regimes have colluded with the 
Persian aggressors by supplying them with 
arms and hardware and by erecting an air 
bridge linking Teheran with Damascus and 
Tripoli. 57
Given the severe relations between the 
Baghdad regimes and the Damascus and Tripoli rulers, 
a new realignment of powers consequently emerged in 
the Arab world, as indicated by the emergence of an 
Iranian-Syrian-Libyan axis versus an Iraqi-Saudi-Jordan- 
ian axis. In addition to Iraq breaking off diplomatic 
relations with Syria and Libya, Saudi Arabia also broke 
off diplomatic relations with Libya because the Tripoli 
leader had criticized Riyadh's decision to allow the 
stationing of US Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
(AWACS) aircraft on Saudi oil. Moscow could see a
56 S W B :M E , 6546, October 11, 1980, p. A/2.
57 Baghdad Voice of the M a s s e s , October 11, 1980. 
S W B :M E , 6547, October 13, 1980, p. A/4.
a major disruption of the anti-imperialist Arab unity 
that it had wanted for so long. As New Times commentator 
Alexander Usvatov lamented:
59
Fought between two non-aligned countries 
pursuing anti-imperialist policies, the war is 
bound to weaken them in the face of intensified 
imperialist scheming, and sow divisions and 
disarray in the world's anti-imperialist front, 
creating a serious threat to peace and inter­
national security. 58
This war also weakened the Iraqi-led anti- 
Sadat Arab coalition. It was Egyptian support for Iraq 
that precipitated a gradual steady improvement in Egypt- 
ian-Iraqi relations. This regional realignment presented a 
so profoundly complex situation that the Kremlin leaders 
deemed the containment of the conflict very difficult.
As Karen Dawisha argues:
The Gulf war risked escalation because 
the very lack of clear division into two 
groups of combatants, each with their super­
power p a t r o n , increased the chances of either 
or both superpowers pursuing policies indepen­
dent of the local conflict to protect their own 
interests, thereby introducing the possibility 
of a gradual and uncontrollable escalatory 
cycle. 59
Second, Moscow feared a major American gain 
in the conflict that would provide the United States 
with a pretext for offering 'protection' to the Gulf
58 Alexander Usvatov, 'Put Out the Fire', New T i m e s , 
October 1980, No. 40, p. 12.
59 Karen Dawisha, 'Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle 
East:The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War',
o p .c i t ., p . 54.
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states and thus building a military presence in the 
6 0
region. As New Times Middle East commentator Dmitry 
Volsky lamented:
This tragic and senseless conflict, as 
Leonid Brezhnev described it, is beginning 
to cause serious unpleasantness not only for 
the belligerents, but also for the consumers 
of their oil. And it is no secret that US 
imperialist quarters are using the conflict 
as a pretext for stepping up their prepara­
tions for intervention in the Persian Gulf.
Today it is preparations for intervention, 
but what might it be tomorrow? 61
At any rate, it can be argued that Soviet 
leaders possibly believed that the stationing of Ameri­
can AWACS aircraft and ground radar personnel in Saudi 
Arabia demonstrated American willingness to help defend 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in time of need and 
helped neutralize Moscow's charge that the US military
increase in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area was
6 2
a threat to the Arab world. As a related problem 
for the Soviets, another spin-off of the Gulf war was 
the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 
in February 1981, comprising the conservative monar­
chies of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. All have diplomatic 
relations with the United States, the first three maintain
60 S W B :SU ,6533, September 26, 1980, p. A4/1.
61 Dmitry Volsky, 'Time Will Not Wait', New T i m e s , December
1980, No. 51, p. 8.
62 S W B :S U , 6533, September 26, 1980, p. A4/1.
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military ties as well, while only Kuwait has even diplo­
matic relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow feared 
that the Council would provide both a military and 
political setting for increased American activities 
in the Persian Gulf, particularly in the light of Oman's 
agreement to provide a base for the American Rapid Deploy­
ment Force at Masirah Island.
Third, an inevitable result of the war would 
be that Iraq and Iran would be both financially and 
economically exhausted. Moscow became concerned that, 
once the war was over, both countries might have to 
turn to the United States and Western Europe for aid 
in reconstruction. A Tass commentary on October 10, 
voiced this Soviet concern:
It is easy to see in these conditions 
the imperialist powers are quite willing to 
turn the conflict to their advantage, to 
capitalize on the economic weakening of Iran 
and Iraq, so as to grant them imperialist 
economic aid on their own terms, whose aim 
will undoubtedly be to restore in those coun­
tries the positions of Western oil monopolies, 
to entangle them in the web of predatory 
financial agreements, in short to restore 
their economic domination. 63
However, what should be noted here is the 
fact that the Soviet leaders candidly declared such 
a posture of 'non-interference' since the outbreak 
of the war remained controversial. With regard to 
the account presented in preceding sections, the
63 F B I S :U S S R , October 14, 1980, p. H3.
62
Gulf war put the Soviet Union into a quandary about 
which side should be supported even though, as one 
could argue, the Kremlin leaders should adhere to the 
treaty-based commitment to help the Baghdad regime.
The Soviet leaders, however, could repudiate such claims 
by arguing that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
has specified help by each to the other in the event 
of any attack by a t h i r d  party. As Iraq initiated 
the war, the Soviets could assert that it would not be 
applicable. Quite likely, that was what they told 
the Iraqi Deputy Premier Tariq Aziz when he flew to 
Moscow on September 22, 1980 when the full-scale mili­
tary invasion of Iran broke out. Despite this treaty, 
as Dennis Ross had already noted, the Soviets cut off dir­
ect or new arms supplies to the Iraqis. Hence, some might 
hastily surmise that Moscow undertook a position of 
'non-interference1 in the Gulf hostilities.
It is no exaggeration that such a Soviet posi­
tion would be likely to be thought of as hollow rhetoric 
for peace. For the reason that notwithstanding Moscow's 
decision to cut off direct arms supplies to Iraq, the 
SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and Disarmament reported 
that the Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe-Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland, East Germany, and Hungary did supply weapons 
to Iraq, and did so with implicit Soviet approval.
Ill; The Impact of the Soviet Policy of 'Non-Inter­
ference' on Soviet-Iraqi Relations
There is little doubt that the Soviet Union's 
policy of 'non-interference' in relation to the Gulf 
war brought about acute reactions from high-ranking Iraq 
officials. One example of this was Tariq Aziz's dis­
satisfaction with a lukewarm low-level meeting with So­
viet counterparts when he paid a visit to Moscow on 
September 22, 1980. His reaction was made even clearer 
when he commented on the question as to whether he had 
requested any sophisticated weapons or fresh supplies.
H e  b l u n t l y  r e p l i e d  t h a t ;
We have been buying arms for twelve years 
and we would not have waged a war in which we 
would be in need of arms within five minutes 
of waging it. Our arms are stockpiled and 
will suffice us for a long war.
The aim of the Moscow visit was to inform 
the Soviets that it was in their own interests 
to watch the situation on the Iraq-Iran border 
and understand what was happening without inter­
vening, as long as the conflict was confined to 
Iraq and Iran. 64
Iraqi dissatisfaction with the Soviet stance 
was equally indicated by both the Defence and Foreign 
Ministers' acknowledgement of the cutting off of weapons 
and equipment by the Soviets. Both ministers also put
64 Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, September 30, 1980. Cited in 
Aryeh Y. Yodfat, o p .c i t ., p. 121.
64
emphasis on alternative soruces of arms supply excluding
65 . . .
o n l y  I s r a e l .  F r a n c e  w a s  r a n k e d  as t h e  m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t
alternative supplier, while others included Italy, West
6 6
Germany, Spain and Brazil. Iraqi officials contrasted^
the willingness of France to honour any agreement with
those who sought pretexts to avoid them. They were
referring in fact to the Soviets having cut off supplies.
From the very outset of the war, France's arms trade
policy involved the supply not only of Mirage fighters,
but also HOT anti-tank missiles, Matra-Super 530 air-to-
air missiles, missile-equipped fast attack craft as well
as v a r i o u s  m o d e l s  o f  h e l i c o p t e r s  ( G a z e l l e ,  L y n x ,  P u m a
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and Super F r e l o n ) , replacements and spare parts.
It is quite clear that both the Soviet policy 
of 'non-interference' and the Iraqi response could worsen 
their already-strained relations. Soviet leaders deter­
mined to prevent any further deterioration which might 
lead to the abrogation of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship 
Treaty while the Iraqis made it clear that the Soviet 
refusal to supply arms during the war with Iran would
65 Shahram Chubin, o p .c i t ., p. 99.
66 See Table 7.5 tabulating arms resupply and other 
support to Iraq and Iran, 1980-83 in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 
1 9 8 4 :World Armaments and Disarmament, (London & 
Philadelphia:Taylor & Francis, 1984), p. 198.
67 The Middle East and North A f r i c a , (London:Europa 
Publications Limited, 1980), p. 122.
not quickly be forgotten. Yet opportunities still 
existed to avoid deterioration of their relations and 
to improve ties. It was opportune that on April 9, 1981, 
the ninth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi - 
friendship treaty was observed in both countries. Both 
Pravda and the Iraqi News Agency reported an exchange 
of greetings between Soviet and Iraqi leaders. Both 
sides called for friendship and cooperation. The Soviet 
greetings said:
65
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The Soviet Union is prepared to continue 
developing relations with Iraq on the basis of 
mutual interest in strengthening friendship 
and cooperation between our countries. 69
President Saddam Hussein sent a cable of thanks 
to the Soviet leaders in reply to their congratulatory 
cable. It said:
...Iraq is prepared to develop the 
existing relations of friendship with the 
Soviet Union on the bases of mutual coopera­
tion, bolstering the struggle and indepen­
dence of the peoples against imperialism and 
confrontation of all forms of intervention 
in the region. 70
It seems obvious that both messages purposely 
avoided touching upon the sensitive issue of the Gulf 
war. At this point, cooperation in non-political, non-
68 Karen Dawisha, 'The Correlation of Forces and Soviet 
Policy in the Middle East', in Adeed Dawisha & Karen 
Dawisha, (ed.), The Soviet Union in the Middle E a s t : 
Policies and Perspectives, (London:Heinemann, 1982), 153.
69 P r a v d a , April 11, 1981. Cited in Aryeh Y. Yodfat, 
o p .c i t ., p. 130.
70 S W B :M E , 6696, April 10, 1981, p. A/9.
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military fields was still in effect. A delegation 
of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Society visited Moscow, 
and both they and the Soviets issued statements on
ways of enhancing cooperation between the two peoples.
In turn, a Soviet delegation led by the Chairman of the 
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Semyon 
Skachkov, attended a meeting of the permanent Soviet-
Iraqi Commission on Economic and Technical Co-operation
72 . .
m  Baghdad. These exchanges of visits held out hope
for the development of co-operation in the fields of
73
industry, agriculture, and irrigation.
These were signs of a desire by both sides 
not to permit their relations to deteriorate any further. 
They wished to maintain, or even upgrade, them as far 
as possible while the ensuing situation in the Gulf war 
gradually changed to a new phase. This involved an 
Iranian offensive, during which Soviet-Iraqi relations 
slightly improved.
Conclusion
There was little doubt that Iraqi leaders 
embarked on another independent and pragmatic decision 
to wage a full-scale military confrontation with Iran 
at what they perceived as a suitable and necessary time.
71
71 F B I S :U S S R , April 24, 1981, p. H3.
72 S W B :S U , 6701, April 16, 1981, p. 4/2.
73 FBIS:MEA, April 22, 1981, p. El; FBIS:USSR, June 22, 1981, 
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The Baghdad regime unilaterally abrogated 
the Algiers Agreement of March 1975 and launched its 
large-scale invasion of the Iranian province of Khuzes- 
tan in September 1980 without giving advance notice 
to the Kremlin decision-makers. Given Moscow's pre­
vailing policy of courting both countries and its dis­
satisfaction with the Iraqi decision, a policy of 'non­
interference' in the Gulf war was the best option.
The Soviet Union's policy of 'non-interference' was used 
for not taking sides with one of the rivals and for 
cutting off the supply of weapons and equipment to 
Iraq. In turn, Iraq's turning to their suppliers, par­
ticularly France, further dampened its relations with 
the Soviet Union.
It is worth noting, however, that both the 
Soviet Union and the Iraqi Ba'athist regime still had 
available options for improving their ties and avoiding 
any further deterioration. The next chapter, therefore, 
will discuss the way in which Soviet-Iraqi relations 
improved, though only slightly, as the Gulf war evolved 
towards a new phase.
Chapter III: Soviet-Iraqi Relations During a Period
of Protracted War:The Soviet Shift to A 
Position of 'Wait and S e e '
Introduction
The main discussion in Chapter II clearly showed 
that Soviet-Iraqi relations underwent a number of ups and 
downs from the time the intensified Gulf war broke out 
in September 1980. These flunctuating relations were 
mainly conditioned by both the Baghdad regime's indepen­
dent decision to launch the invasion and the Soviet Union's 
policy of 'non-interference' towards the war.
While it might be argued that the fierce military 
conflict in the Gulf war beyond the control or even 
manipulation of external powers, it could equally be as­
serted that the evolving situation in the Gulf itself had 
a profound impact on their positions and policies towards 
the Gulf war, particularly those of the Soviet Union.
Quite obviously, the most significant element in the evolv­
ing situation was the Iranian counter-offensives that 
took place after a period of so-called 'stalemate' in May
1981. Whether or not the Kremlin leaders viewed the 
Iranian counter-offensives as the turning point in the 
Gulf war, they had, at least, been prepared for modifying 
their stances and policies towards the Iraqi Ba'athist
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regime. The Soviet Union's policy of 'wait and see', then, 
took precedence over the previous policy of 'non-interference'. 
This new Soviet position of 'wait and see' denoted the Soviet 
leaders' calculation of any 'cost and benefit' incurring " 
from the possible further involvement while the situation 
of the war has evolved. Put simply, this new policy held 
for the Soviet Union a chance to, even more explicitly, come 
out more closely for either one of the antagonists.
What should be taken into account here is that 
one could argue that it is quite difficult to shed light 
on the distinction between a position of 'non-interference' 
and a posture of 'wait and see'. This argument is sug­
gested by the fact that when the war broke out in Septem­
ber 1980, the Soviet Union claimed a 'non-interference' 
posture towards the war, but Tariq Aziz, in November 1980, 
described the Soviet attitude towards the war as one of 
'wait and s e e '.^
Analysis of Soviet-Iraqi relations in this 
chapter will be carried out in terms of the new situation 
of the war centred on Iranian counter-offensives. The 
task of this chapter will be to argue that the Kremlin 
leaders have pursued (or are even still pursuing) a policy 
of 'wait and see'. In so doing, three related questions 
will be considered:
1. J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran:The Years of Crisis, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1984), p. 217.
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(i) W h a t  w a s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  in t h e  G u l f  r e g i o n  
a f t e r  t h e  ' s t a l e m a t e '  o f  1 9 8 1 ?
(ii) H o w  d i d  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  m o d i f y  t h e i r  
p o l i c i e s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  e v o l v i n g  s i t u a t i o n  in t h e  G u l f ?
(iii) W h a t  i m p a c t  d i d  c h a n g i n g  S o v i e t  p o l i c y  
h a v e  o n  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s ?
I : T h e  S i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  G u l f : T h e  I r a n i a n  C o u n t e r - O f f e n s i v e s
T h e  I r a n i a n  c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e s  h a v e  b e e n  c h a r a c ­
t e r i z e d  b y  a s e r i e s  o f  l o c a l  I r a n i a n  i n c u r s i o n s  a n d  v i c t o r i e s
2
m  p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a s .  T h e s e  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  w e r e  h i g h ­
l i g h t e d  b y  t h e  I r a n i a n  a r m y ' s  m a j o r  v i c t o r i e s  in, f i r s t l y ,  
r e c a p t u r i n g  t h e  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  c i t y  of S u s a n g e r d
3
a n d  s u r r o u n d i n g  a r e a  in M a y  1 9 81. I n  S e p t e m b e r  o f  t h a t  
y e a r ,  I r a q i  g a r r i s o n s  w e r e  e x p e l l e d  in d i s o r d e r  f r o m  A b a d a n .
I r a n ' s  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  c o n t i n u e d  t h r o u g h o u t  
N o v e m b e r  a n d  D e c e m b e r  1 981. T h e  r e c a p t u r e  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  
t o w n  o f  B o s t a n  b u i l t  u p  I r a n ' s  c o n f i d e n c e  a n d  n e u t r a l i z e d  
I r a q ' s  l o g i s t i c  l i n k  b e t w e e n  D e z f u l  a n d  A h v a s .  T h i s ,  in 
t u r n ,  l e d  to I r a n ' s  l a t e r  c a p t u r e  o f  s t r a t e g i c  l o c a t i o n s  
in t h e  D e z f u l  a r e a  i n  M a r c h  1982. M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  a n o t h e r  
m a j o r  I r a n i a n  v i c t o r y  w a s  it s  e f f e c t i v e  r e c a p t u r e  of t h e  
m a j o r  I r a n i a n  c i t y  a n d  p o r t  o f  K h o r r a m s h a h r  in M a y  1982.
2 S t e p h e n  R. G r u m m o n ,  T h e  I r a n - I r a q  W a r : I s l a m  E m b a t t l e d ,
T h e  W a s h i n g t o n  P a p e r s , No. 92, ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . :
C e n t e r  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s ,  1 9 8 2 ) ,  
p . 27.
3 K e e s i n g  C o n t e m p o r a r y  A r c h i v e s , 1 9 8 1 ,  pp. 3 1 0 0 8 - 9 .  S e e  a l s o  
M a p  D.
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S o u r c e :  S t e p h e n  R. G r u m m o n ,  'The I r a n - I r a q  W a r : I s l a m  E m b a t t l e d ' ,
T h e  W a s h i n g t o n  P a p e r , No. 92, ( W a s h i n g t o n  : T h e  C e n t e r  
f o r  S t r a t e g i e  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S t u d i e s ,  1 9 8 2 ) ,  p. 28.
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S u c h  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  v i c t o r i e s  w h i p p e d  u p
g r o w i n g  I r a n i a n  c o n f i d e n c e .  S p e e c h e s  in t h e  M a j l i s  (the
I r a n i a n  P a r l i a m e n t )  b y  v a r i o u s  I r a n i a n  l e a d e r s ,  as S t e p h e n
G r u m m o n  s p e c u l a t e s ,  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s u c h  v i c t o r i e s  s h o w e d
4
t h a t  G o d  w a s  t r u l y  o n  t h e  I r a n i a n  s i d e .  W i t h  t h i s  r e i n ­
f o r c e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  c o n v i c t i o n ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  l e a d e r s  
b e g a n  t o  t h r e a t e n  t o  c r o s s  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o r d e r  i n t o  
Iraq. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e y  p l e d g e d  to c o n t i n u e  t h e  w a r  u n t i l
f i n a l  v i c t o r y  w a s  a c h i e v e d  o r  p e a c e  a n d  s t a b i l i t y  w e r e  e s t a -
5 . . . .
b l i s h e d  f o r  t h e  o p p r e s s e d .  M o r e  m t i m i d a t i n g l y , I r a n i a n
c l e r g y m e n  c a l l e d  o n  t h e  I r a n i a n  a r m y  t o  l i b e r a t e  t h e  S h i 1it e
6
h o l y  p l a c e s  i n  I r a q  f r o m  t h e  o p p r e s s i v e  B a ' a t h i s t s .  T h i s  
w a s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  M o h s e n  R e z a i ,  C o m m a n d e r  of t h e  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  
G u a r d s  ( P a s d a r a n ) , w h e n  h e  p r o c l a i m e d  t h a t  t h e  I r a n i a n  
p a r a t r o o p s  w o u l d  m o v e  f o r w a r d  to K a r b a l a  (the I r a q i  S h i 'ite
7
h o l y  city) i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .
T o  f o r e s t a l l  f u r t h e r  m i l i t a r y  l o s s e s ,  t h e  B a g h d a d  
r e g i m e  p r o p o s e d  a c e a s e - f i r e .  A  j o i n t  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  
R e v o l u t i o n a r y  C o m m a n d  C o u n c i l  (RCC) o f  I r a q  a n d  t h e  l e a d e r ­
s h i p  o f  t h e  B a ' a t h  P a r t y  w a s  h e l d  to p r o p o s e  a c e a s e - f i r e  
a n d  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  I r a q i  t r o o p s  f r o m  I r an, c o n d i t i o n a l  
o n  a r b i t r a t i o n  as a w a y  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n
g
t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s .  T o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  P r e s i d e n t
4 S t e p h e n  R. G r u m m o n ,  o p .c i t . , p. 29.
5 F B I S :S A , M a y  11, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. 14.
6 I b i d . , p . 13.
7 W a s h i n g t o n  P o s t , A p r i l  13, 1982.
8 F B I S :U S S R  , J u n e  10, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. Hi.
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S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  a n n o u n c e d  i n  h i s  ' a d d r e s s  to t h e  p e o p l e '  t h a t :
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  a n n o u n c e m e n t  o f  a c e a s e ­
f i r e  a n d  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  I r a q i  t r o o p s  f r o m  t h e  
I r a n i a n  t e r r i t o r y  o n  J u n e  10, (the I r a q i  t r o o p s )  
w i l l  b e  w i t h d r a w n  t o  t h e  I r a n i a n - I r a q i  b o r d e r  
i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  10 d a y s .  9
O n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  h o w e v e r  t h a t  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  
w a r  h a d  b e e n  g r e a t l y  a g g r a v a t e d  b y  K h o m e i n i ' s  f o r c e f u l  
p r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  n o  c o m p r o m i s e  w i t h  t h e  i n f i d e l ,  c o r r u p t  
I r a q i  P r e s i d e n t ,  S a d d a m  H u s s e i n :
N o w ,  h e  ( S a d d a m  H u s s e i n )  w h o  is w e l l  k n o w n  
b y  a l l  t h e  I r a q i  n a t i o n a ,  w h o  is h e  t r y i n g  to 
d e c e i v e  b y  p r a y i n g  o r  g o i n g  t o  t h e  m o s q u e ? ... T h e  
I r a q i  n a t i o n  k n o w s  h i s  i n n e r  n a t u r e ... O n l y  s o m e  
p e o p l e  w h o  l i v e  o n  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ,  
i n  A m e r i c a ,  o r  i n  E u r o p e ,  m a y  n o t  k n o w  h i m , . . .
F o r  m a n y  y e a r s  t h e  p e o p l e  h a v e  l i v e d  w i t h  t h e  
B a 'a t h  P a r t y  a n d  h a v e  s u f f e r e d  m a n y  c a l a m i t i e s  
f r o m  i t . . . S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  h a s  e x t e n d e d  h i s  h a n d  
t o  c o m p r o m i s e  w i t h  u s . W e  h a v e  n o  c o m p r o m i s e  
w i t h  him. H e  is a n  i n f i d e l ,  c o r r u p t ,  a n d  a 
p e r p e t r a t o r  o f  c o r r u p t i o n .  10
K h o m e i n i  f u r t h e r  a t t e m p t e d  to e x c i t e  t h e  I r a q i
p e o p l e :
Y o u  s h o u l d  r i s e  u p  a n d  i n s t a l l  t h e  I s l a m i c  
g o v e r n m e n t  t h a t  y o u  w a n t . . . ( a n d )  g r e e t  y o u r  
I r a n i a n  b r o t h e r s  w h o  h a v e  b e e n  f o r c e d  to c r o s s  
o v e r  i n t o  I r a q  t o  s a v e  t h e  o p p r e s s e d  I r a q i  
p e o p l e  f r o m  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  t h e  B a ' a t h  P a ry.
T o  u n d e r s c o r e  its w a r n i n g ,  a n o t h e r  I r a n i a n  m i l i ­
t a r y  a t t a c k  o n  I r a q  w a s  u n l e a s h e d .  In J u l y  1 982, I r a n  m a d e
9 F B I S : U S S R , J u n e  21, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. Hl; S W B : SU , 7 060, J u n e  24 , 1 9 8 2 ,
p. A 4 / 2 .  I n  J u n e  1 9 8 3 ,  P r e s i d e n t  S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  a g a i n  
p r o p o s e d  a n  a g r e e m e n t  o n  t h e  c e s s a t i o n  o f  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a ­
t i o n s  b e t w e e n  I r a n  a n d  Iraq. It w a s  a g a i n  t u r n e d  d o w n  b y
t h e  I r a n ;  F B I S : U S S R , J u n e  17, 1 9 8 3 ,  p. H2.
10 S W B :M E , 6 5 3 8 ,  O c t o b e r  2, 1 9 80, pp. A 3 - 4 .
11 W a s h i n g t o n  P o s t , J u l y  15, 1982.
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g o o d  its t h r e a t  b y  c r o s s i n g  t h e  I r a q i  b o r d e r  a n d  l a u n c h i n g  
a f u l l - s c a l e  i n v a s i o n  i n  t h e  B a s r a  r e g i o n .  T h i s  c o u l d  b e  
s e e n ,  l i k e  t h e  i n i t i a l  I r a n i a n  c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e s ,  as a 
t u r n i n g  p o i n t  i n  t h e  G u l f  w a r .  Y e t ,  it d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
l e a d  t o  a v i c t o r y  f o r  I s l a m i c  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  I r a n .  B o t h  
I r a q  a n d  I r a n  h a v e  b e e n  p l u n g e d  i n t o  a w a r  w h i c h  is u n l i k e l y  
t o  b e  c o n c l u s i v e .  A  s e r i e s  o f  a r t i l l e r y  e x c h a n g e s  a n d  
b o m b a r d m e n t s  o n  b o t h  s i d e s '  c i v i l i a n  t a r g e t s  a n d  m i l i t a r y  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  a l o n g  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o r d e r  a r e  s t i l l  
in  p r o g r e s s .
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w a s  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i ­
c a t e d  b y  a w a r  o f  lies. T h e  I r a q i  N e w s  A g e n c y  a n d  t h e  
I r a n i a n  N e w s  A g e n c y  (P a r s ) c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e l e a s e d  m i l i t a r y  
c o m m u n i q u e s  a n d  r e p o r t s  t h a t  w e r e  c o m p l e t e l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  
T h e s e  c l a i m s  m a d e  it i m p o s s i b l e  to p l a c e  m u c h  f a i t h  in 
t h e  w o r d  o f  e i t h e r  side.
H o w e v e r ,  a t t e n t i o n  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  g i v e n  t o  v a r i o u s  
a t t e m p t s  t o  b r i n g  b o t h  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  t a b l e .
F r o m  t h e  v e r y  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  w a r ,  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  
t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n f e r e n c e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  (ICO) a n d  t h e  N o n - A l i g n e d  
M o v e m e n t  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a p p e a l e d  t o  b o t h  r i v a l s  to f i n d  a 
s o l u t i o n  t h r o u g h  p e a c e f u l  m e a n s .  O t h e r  a t t e m p t s  a t  c o n c i l i a ­
t i o n  c a m e  f r o m  t h e  P a l e s t i n i a n  L i b e r a t i o n  O r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  
l e a d e r ,  Y a s s e r  A r a f a t ,  t h e  P a k i s t a n i  P r e s i d e n t ,  Z i a - u l - H a q ,  
a n d  a n  A l g e r i a n  n e g o t i a t i n g  t e am.
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Q u i t e  c l e a r l y ,  t h e  U N  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  h a d  a v i t a l  
r o l e  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s o l v e  t h i s  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l  a d o p t e d  R e s o l u t i o n  No. 479 a t  s e s s i o n  No. 2 2 4 8  
o n  2 8 t h  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 0  w h i c h  u r g e d  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  t e r m i n a ­
t i o n  o f  a l l  c o m b a t  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  a l s o  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f
12
a l l  f o r c e s  w i t h i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  r e c o g n i z e d  b o r d e r s .
Mr. O l o f  P a l m e ,  t h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l ' s  p e r s o n n e l  e n v o y ,  
p l a y e d  t h e  r o l e  o f  g o - b e t w e e n .
H o w e v e r ,  n e i t h e r  t h i s  r e s o l u t i o n  n o r  P a l m e ' s  o n ­
g o i n g  a t t e m p t s  m e t  w i t h  s u c c e s s .  T h e  T e h e r a n  r e g i m e  w a s  
f i r m l y  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  r e s o l u t i o n  479 
f o r  t w o  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  i t s  l e a d e r s  p u t  e m p h a s i s  o n  a 
c l a i m  t h a t  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  w a s  a p p r o v e d  a t  a t i m e  w h e n  
I r a q i  t r o o p s  w e r e  o n  I r a n i a n  s oil. S e c o n d ,  t h e  T e h e r a n  
l e a d e r s ,  i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  I r a q  m u s t  b e  c o n d e m n e d  as t h e  
a g g r e s s o r ,  w e r e  o b v i o u s l y  i n f u r i a t e d  b y  t h e  S e c u r i t y  
C o u n c i l ' s  a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  c o n d e m n a t i o n  o f  t h e  I r a q i  i n v a ­
s i o n .  I r a n ,  t hus, h a s  b e e n  v e r y  s u s p i c i o u s  of t h e  U N ' s  
ro l e .  I r a n i a n  r e j e c t i o n  o f  r e s o l u t i o n  479 w a s  e c h o e d  
in I r a n i a n  P r e s i d e n t  A b o l h a s s a n  B a n i - S a d r ' s  l e t t e r  t o  
t h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  w h i c h  read:
T h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  r e s o l u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  
a d o p t e d  a t  a t i m e  w h e n  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  I r a q  
h a s  w a g e d  a w a r  o f  a g g r e s s i o n  i n  c l e a r  v i o l a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  C h a r t e r  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , . . .  
w h i c h  is a v i v i d  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  t r u e  n a t u r e  a n d  
a m b i t i o n s  o f  t h e  I r a q i  a u t h o r i t i e s  w h o , . . . ,
12 U N  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l :O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s , S / I N F / 3 6 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  
p . 23.
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h a v e  n o w  d e c e p t i v e l y  u s e d  t h e  p e a c e f u l  i n i t i a ­
t i v e  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .
. . . , t h e  p r o p o s a l s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  y o u r  l e t t e r  
a n d  c o n t a i n e d  in t h e  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l  R e s o l u t i o n  
c a n n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  b y  o u r  G o v e r n m e n t .  13
U n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n f e r e n c e
14
O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  t h e  I s l a m i c  P e a c e  C o m m i t t e e  w a s  f o r m e d  m
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  t h i r d  I s l a m i c  s u m m i t
c o n f e r e n c e  h e l d  i n  M e c c a  a n d  in T a ' i f  i n  J a n u a r y  1 9 81.
T h i s  c o m m i t t e e  is ' f u l l y  a w a r e  o f  t h e  n e e d  t o  h a l t  t h e
15
d i s p u t e  b e t w e e n  I r a n  a n d  I r a q ' .  T h e  c o m m i t t e e  b e l i e v e s
in t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  I s l a m  f o r  t h e  p r o p a g a t i o n  of p e a c e
a n d  h a r m o n y  a m o n g  M u s l i m s  b r o t h e r s .  A g a i n ,  t h e r e  h a s
b e e n  a s t r o n g  c o m m i t m e n t  b y  t h i s  c o m m i t t e e  to p r e s e n t
to b o t h  s i d e s  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  p r o p o s a l  to f a c i l i t a t e  a
p e a c e f u l  s o l u t i o n  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  I s l a m  a n d  t h e  p r i n -
16
c i p l e s  o f  j u s t i c e  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. M o r e o v e r ,
Mr. H a b i b  C h a t t i , t h e  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  ICO, h a s  
s h u t t l e d  b e t w e e n  T e h e r a n  a n d  B a g h d a d  a t  v a r i o u s  t i m e s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h e  d i v e r g i n g  p o s i t i o n s  in t h e  
c o n f l i c t .
T h e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  r o l e  o f  t h e  N o n - A l i g n e d  M o v e ­
m e n t  s h o u l d  a l s o  n o t  b e  l e f t  o u t  o f  a c c o u n t .  T h e  N o n -
13 U N  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l :O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s , 3 5 t h  Y e a r ,  D o c u m e n t  
S / 1 4 2 0 6 ,  p. 3.
14 T h e  I s l a m i c  P e a c e  C o m m i t t e e  s e t  u p  a s u b - c o m m i t t e e  t o  
a s s i s t  b o t h  s i d e s  to i m p l e m e n t  t h e  m e a s u r e s  f o r  a c o m p r e ­
h e n s i v e  p e a c e f u l  s o l u t i o n .  It w a s  c o m p o s e d  o f  (1) t h e  
G u i n e a n  P r e s i d e n t ,  A h m e n  S e k o u  T o u r e  (2) t h e  G a m b i a n  
P r e s i d e n t ,  D a w d a  J a w a r a  (3) t h e  B a n g l a d e s h  P r e s i d e n t ,  Z i a u r  
R a h m a n  (4) t h e  P a k i s t a n i  P r e s i d e n t ,  Z i a - u l - H a q  (5) M r . Y a s s e r  
A r a f a t  (6 ) t h e  T u r k i s h  P r e m i e r ,  B u l e n t  U l u s u  (7) t h e  S e n e g a l ­
e s e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  M o u s t a p h a  N i a s s e  (8 ) t h e  M a l a y s i a n  
F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  A h m a d  R i t h a u d d e e n  B i n  I s m a i l  a n d  (9) Mr. 
H a b i b  C h a t t i ,  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n f e r e n c e  
O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  S W B :M E , 6 6 6 6 , M a r c h  6 , 1 9 8 1 ,  p. A / 7 .
15 I b i d . , p. A / 5 .
16 I b i d . / p • A / 6 .
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A l i g n e d  M o v e m e n t ' s  c o o r d i n a t i n g  b u r e a u  h a s  d e l e g a t e d
to a c o m m i t t e e  c o m p o s e d  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s  o f  s e v e n
m e m b e r  c o u n t r i e s  t h e  t a s k  o f  o b t a i n i n g  a p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e -
17
m e n t  b e t w e e n  I r a n  a n d  I r a q .  T h e  d e c i s i o n  to s e t  u p  t h i s
c o m m i t t e e  w a s  d e e m e d  n e c e s s a r y  a f t e r  t h e  C u b a n  F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r ,  I s i d o r o  M a l m i e r c a ,  h a d  m a d e  a p e a c e  e f f o r t  b y
v i s i t i n g  b o t h  T e h e r a n  a n d  B a g h d a d  a n d  m e e t i n g  t h e  P r e s i -
18
d e n t s  o f  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e  s e v e n t h  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s  
w a s  i n i t i a l l y  s c h e d u l e d  f o r  B a g h d a d  i n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 82.
G i v e n  t h e  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  f i g h t i n g  a n d  t h e  u n l i k e l i ­
h o o d  o f  a n  i m m e d i a t e  e n d  t o  t h e  w a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  s u m m i t  
w a s  u l t i m a t e l y  h e l d  in N e w  D e l h i ,  I n d i a ,  i n  M a r c h  1 9 83. A t  
t h i s  s u m m i t ,  t h e  n o n - a l i g n e d  c o u n t r i e s  a p p r o v e d  t h e  c a l l  
b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  m o v e m e n t ,  P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  I n d i r a  
G a n d h i  o f  I n d i a ,  t o  I r a n  a n d  I r a q  t o  p u t  a n  e n d  to t h e  
c o n f l i c t  :
W e  e x p r e s s  o u r  d e e p  r e g r e t  a t  t h e  I r a n -  
i a n - I r a q i  c o n f l i c t  w h i c h  is c o n t i n u i n g  f o r  30 
m o n t h s  a n d  h a s  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  p e o p l e s  o f  t h e s e  
t w o  c o u n t r i e s  b i g  l o s s e s  o f  l i f e  a n d  m a t e r i a l  
d a m a g e .
I r a n  a n d  I r a q  a r e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  n o n -  
a l i g n e d  m o v e m e n t ,  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of 
w h i c h  is t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  a l l  d i f f e r e n c e s  
e x i s t i n g  b e t w e e n  c o u n t r i e s  b y  p e a c e f u l  m e a n s .
W e  a r e  c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  t h e  e n d i n g  o f  t h e  
c o n f l i c t  w i l l  b e  a c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  s t r e n g ­
t h e n i n g  o f  t h e  m o v e m e n t ' s  u n i t y  a n d  s o l i d a r i t y .  
F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  w e  c a l l  o n  I r a n  a n d  I r a q  to 
b r i n g  a n  i m m e d i a t e  e n d  t o  t h e  w a r .  19
17 T h e  c o m m i t t e e  is c o m p o s e d  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  m i n i s t e r s
o f  A l g e r i a ,  C u b a ,  I n d i a ,  P a k i s t a n ,  t h e  PLO ,  Y u g o s l a v i a  
a n d  Z a m b i a .  S W B :M E , 6 5 6 2 ,  O c t o b e r  30, 1 9 8 0 ,  p. A / 4 .
18 I b i d .
19 F B I S : U S S R , M a r c h  14 , 1 9 8 3 ,  p. D D 5 .
W h a t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  h e r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  is t h e  f a c t
t h a t  t h e s e  n u m e r o u s  p e a c e  i n i t i a t i v e s  h a v e  b e e n  to no
a v a i l .  O n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  m o s t  c o m m o n  r e a s o n  f o r
t h e  f a i l u r e s  o f  t h e s e  p e a c e  e f f o r t s  w a s  t h e  I r a n i a n  r e g i m e ' s
r e c a l c i t r a n t  p o s i t i o n .  W h i l e  t h e  I r a q i  g o v e r n m e n t  w e l c o m e d
t h e s e  p e a c e  e f f o r t s ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  l e a d e r s  b l u n t l y  t u r n e d
20
t h e m  d o w n .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  a r g u m e n t  is s l i g h t l y  m i s l e a d i n g .
T w o  p o i n t s  m u s t  b e  m a d e .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e  I r a q i
B a ' a t h i s t  l e a d e r s  s t r o n g l y  e m p h a s i z e d  a p r a g m a t i c  p o s i t i o n
d u r i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  w a r .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  I r a q i
l e a d e r s  c o n d u c t e d  ' c a r r o t  a n d  s t i c k '  d i p l o m a c y .  T h e  f a c t
t h a t  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  w a s  m o r e  r e a d y  to b e  c o o p e r a t i v e
in s e t t l i n g  t h e  c o n f l i c t  p e a c e f u l l y  d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y
m e a n  t h a t  t h e  B a g h d a d  l e a d e r s  w o u l d  n o t  a c h i e v e  t h e i r  a i m s
b y  f o r c e ,  if p o s s i b l e .  O n  o n e  h a n d ,  T a r i q  A z i z  t o l d  t h e
U N  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  o n  O c t o b e r  1, 1 9 8 3  t h a t  I r a q  a c c e p t e d
t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  o f  a n  a r b i t r a t i o n  c o m m i s s i o n  to d e t e r m i n e
w h i c h  c o u n t r y  h a d  p r o v o k e d  t h e  h o s t i l i t i e s  a n d  w h e t h e r
e i t h e r  c o u n t r y  c o u l d  b e  h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  d r a g g i n g
o u t  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  I r a q ,  it w a s  a d d e d ,  w a s  p r e p a r e d  to
21
a c c e p t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  s u c h  a r b i t r a t i o n .  B u t  as a n  e x a m ­
p l e  o f  t h e  'stick' a p p r o a c h ,  d i s a p p o i n t e d  b y  I r a n ' s  r e f u s a l  
t o  n e g o t i a t e  a s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t ,  I r a q  t h r e a t e n e d
78
20 S W B :M E , 6 5 5 4 ,  O c t o b e r  21, 1 9 8 0 ,  pp. A / 3 - 6 ;  6 5 55, O c t o b e r  
22, 1 9 8 0 ,  pp. A / 4 - 5 ;  6 6 6 8 , M a r c h  9, 1 9 8 3 ,  p. A/4 .
21 S e e  T a r i q  A z i z ' s  s p e e c h  b e f o r e  t h e  U N  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y ,  
3 8 t h  s e s s i o n ,  P r o v i s i o n a l  V e r b a t i m  R e c o r d ,  A / 3 8 / P V  12, 
O c t o b e r  1, 1 9 8 3 ,  p. 6 6 .
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to i m p a i r  I r a n ' s  o i l - e x p o r t i n g  c a p a c i t y  b y  b o m b i n g  its 
v i t a l  o i l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in h i s  i n t e r v i e w  
w i t h  K u w a i t i  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  P r e s i d e n t  S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  c o n f i r m ­
e d  t h a t  'his c o u n t r y  l o o k s  f o r w a r d  t o  p e a c e  w i t h  its 
n e i g h b o u r  I r a n ,  b u t  I r a q  w o u l d  n o t  n e g l e c t  i t s  m i l i t a r y  
p r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  w o u l d  e s c a l a t e  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t i o n s  
a g a i n s t  I r a n ' s  K a r g  (sic) i s l a n d  so t h a t  I r a n  w o u l d  n o t
p r o l o n g  t h e  w a r  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  g o i n g  o n  f o r  a b o u t  f o u r
22
y e a r s ' .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  r e a l  m o t i v e  o f  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s '
m o r e  f l e x i b l e  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  w a r  w a s  s t i l l  o p e n  to q u e s ­
t i o n .  It c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f t e r  t h e  
I r a n i a n  t r o o p s  h a d  s t a g e d  t h e i r  c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e s ,  t h e  
B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  w a s  t a c t f u l  e n o u g h  i n  p r o p o s i n g  a c o n d i ­
t i o n a l  c e a s e - f i r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  f o r e s t a l l  a n y  f u r t h e r  m i l i ­
t a r y  l o s s e s .
A t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  t h e  s e v e r i t y  o f  t h e  w a r  w a s
f u r t h e r  e x a c e r b a t e d  b y  i n c r e a s i n g l y  c l o s e  F r a n c o - I r a q i
r e l a t i o n s .  F r a n c e  d e v e l o p e d  a p o l i c y  o f  u n c o n d i t i o n a l
s u p p o r t  f o r  I raq. T h e  F r e n c h  g o v e r n m e n t  w a s  p r e p a r e d
23
t o  g r a n t  a d a n g e r o u s  'loan' t o  I r aq: t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
f i v e  S u p e r  E t e n d a r d  a t t a c k  a i r c r a f t  t o  t h e  I r a q i  g o v e r n ­
m e n t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  M i t t e r r a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n n o u n c e d  
t h a t  it h a d  b e g u n  t r a i n i n g  I r a q i  c r e w s  i n  F r a n c e .  T h i s
22 S W B :M E , 7 6 3 7 ,  M a y  8 , 1 9 8 4 ,  p. A / 5 .
23 T h e  G u a r d i a n  W e e k l y , S e p t e m b e r  4, 1983.
k i n d  o f  a i r c r a f t ,  a r m e d  w i t h  A M - 3 9  E x o c e t  a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  
m i s s i l e s  i n c r e a s e d  I r a q ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  i n t e r d i c t  t h e  u s e  
o f  I r a n i a n  p o r t s  b y  o i l  t a n k e r s  o r  t o  s t r i k e  at G u l f
s h i p p i n g  w i t h  g r e a t e r  r a n g e  a n d  d i m i n i s h e d  v u l n e r a b i l i t y .
I n  N o v e m b e r  1 9 8 3 ,  T a r i q  A z i z  c o n f i r m e d  t h e  a r r i v a l  i n  I r a q
25
o f  F r e n c h  S u p e r  E t e n d a r d  f i g h t e r s .  T h i s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  a r m s
b y  F r a n c e  p r o v o k e d  b o t h  r e g i o n a l  a n d  g l o b a l  r e p e r c u s s i o n s .
T h e  I r a n i a n  .leaders p l e d g e d  to c l o s e  t h e  e n t r a n c e  t o  t h e
G u l f  i n  t h e  S t r a i t  o f  H o r m u z  if I r a n ' s  k e y  o i l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
2 6
w e r e  a t t a c k e d .  S u c h  r e t a l i a t i o n  w o u l d  s e r i o u s l y  j e o p a r ­
d i z e  th e  o i l  s u p p l y  r o u t e s  o f  a g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  J a p a n .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  s o m e  m e n t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  o f  t h e
I r a n i a n  a c c u s a t i o n  o f  I r a q ' s  u s e  o f  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s .
In e a r l y  1 9 8 4 ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  N e w s  A g e n c y  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e
I r a q i  f o r c e s  h a d  a t  v a r i o u s  t i m e s  u s e d  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s
27
a g a i n s t  I r a n i a n  c o m b a t a n t s  a n d  c i v i l i a n s .  T h e r e  w e r e  a l s o
u n c o n f i r m e d  r e p o r t s  t h a t  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  e x p e r t s  w e r e
t r a i n i n g  t h e  I r a q i  r e g i m e ' s  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  c h e m i c a l
2 8
w e a p o n s  a t  a m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  c a m p  i n  n o r t h  B a g h d a d .
T h e  I r a n i a n  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  A l i  A k b a r  V e l a y a t i ,  r e q u e s t e d  
t h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l  t o  a u t h o r i z e  a d e l e g a t i o n ,  c o m ­
p r i s i n g  m i l i t a r y  a n d  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s  e x p e r t s ,  to i n s p e c t  
t h e  c i v i l i a n  a r e a s  w h i c h  h a d  b e e n  a t t a c k e d  a n d  to i n v e s t i ­
g a t e  t h e  u s e  o f  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s  b y  t h e  I r a q i  f o r c e s .
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24 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e , S e p t e m b e r  1 7 - 1 8 , 1 9 8 3 ,  p. 5.
25 W a s h i n g t o n  P o s t , N o v e m b e r  3, 198 3.
26 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e ,  o p . c i t . ,p. 5.
27 S W B :M E , 7 5 6 8 ,  F e b r u a r y  16, 1 9 8 4 ,  p. A / l l ;  T h e  G u a r d i a n  
W e e k l y , M a r c h  11, 1 9 84.
28 S W B : M E , 7 5 8 7 ,  M a r c h  9, 1 9 8 4 ,  p. A / 1 2 .
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N o t  u n e x p e c t e d l y ,  G e n e r a l  A d n a n  K h a y r a l l a h ,
D e p u t y  C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f  o f  t h e  I r a q i  A r m e d  F o r c e s  a n d  
D e f e n c e  M i n i s t e r ,  f i r m l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e s e  I r a n i a n  a c c u s a ­
t i o n s  w e r e  g r o u n d l e s s .  H e  a f f i r m e d  t h a t  I r a q  h a d  n o t  a t  -
a n y  p o i n t  u s e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y - b a n n e d  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s
29
a g a i n s t  I r a n i a n  f o r c e s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  I r a q ' s  a r m e d  
f o r c e s  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  g o t  t h e  u p p e r  h a n d  i n  t h e  w a r ,  p a r t i ­
c u l a r l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  a i r  s u p e r i o r i t y . ^ ^  A  M i l i t a r y - P o l i t i ­
c a l  R e v i e w  b y  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b s e r v e r ,  V. P u s t o v  a l s o  
n o t e d  t h a t :
I r a q ' s  o b v i o u s  s u p e r i o r i t y  in t h e  air ,  p a r t i ­
c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  t h e  f i g h t i n g ,  w a s  a l s o  
o f  i m p o r t a n c e .  W h e r e a s  i n  J a n u a r y  (1985) I r a q i  
a i r c r a f t  a n d  h e l i c o p t e r s  m a d e  a l i t t l e  o v e r  100 
o p e r a t i o n a l  f l i g h t s  a day ,  in F e b r u a r y  t h e  f i g u r e  
w a s  a r o u n d  2 0 0 , w h i l e  d u r i n g  t h e  f i e r c e s t  f i g h t i n g  
i n  M a r c h  t h i s  n u m b e r  w a s  c l o s e  to 1 , 0 0 0 . . .  I r a n i a n  
m i l i t a r y  a i r c r a f t  a r e  o b v i o u s l y  i n f e r i o r  to I r a q i  
m i l i t a r y  a i r c r a f t  i n  t e r m s  o f  n u m b e r s  a n d  c o m b a t  
q u a l i t i e s .  31
T h e  I r a q i  H i g h  M i l i t a r y  C o m m a n d  h a d  b e e n  q u o t e d  
b y  T a s s  as r e g u l a r l y  r e p o r t i n g  t h a t  t h e  I r a q i  a i r c r a f t  
h a d  d e s t r o y e d  I r a n i a n  s h e l t e r s ,  o b s e r v a t i o n s  p o s t s ,  c o m ­
b a t  p o s i t i o n s  a n d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  I r a n i a n  t r o o p s  in
32
" t h e  e a s t  o f  T i g r i s  R i v e r " . It is w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d
29 S W B :M E , 7 5 6 8 ,  M a r c h  8 , 1 9 8 4 ,  pp. A / 1 0 - 1 1 .
30 T h e  A g e , J u n e  8 , 1984.
3 1 F B I S : U S S R , M a r c h  26, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H 2 .
32 F B I S : U S S R , M a r c h  25, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H4; M a r c h  28 , 1 9 8 5 , p. H3;
M a r c h  29, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H7; A p r i l  5, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. Hi; A p r i l  8 ,
19 8 5 ,  p. H5; A p r i l  11, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H4; A p r i l  16, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H4; 
A p r i l  18, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H 5 ; A p r i l  22, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H3; A p r i l  25, 1 9 8 5  
p. H2; M a y  2, 1 9 8 5 ,  p. H2; M a y  10, 1 985, p H 2 . T h e  O b s e r v e r , 
J u n e  30, 1 9 8 5 .  T h e  T i m e s , J u l y  13, 1985.
t h a t  K h a r g  I s l a n d ,  o n  w h i c h  t h e  m a i n  I r a n i a n  o i l  t e r m i n a l s  
a r e  s i t u a t e d ,  h a s  b e e n  t h e  m a i n  t a r g e t  o f  t h e  I r a q i  a i r  
a t t a c k s .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h i s  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s i t u a ­
t i o n ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  p o l i c y  o f  ' n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e ' ,  
as n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  h a s  s h i f t e d  to a p o s i t i o n  o f  ' w ait a n d  
s e e ' .
I I : T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  P o s i t i o n  o f  ' Wait a n d  S e e '
In  C h a p t e r  II, it w a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  
p o l i c y  o f  ' n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e '  s i n c e  t h e  e r u p t i o n  o f  t h e  w a r  
w a s  in f a c t  r e g a r d e d  as a t i l t  t o w a r d s  Iran. H o w e v e r ,  g i v e n  
b e t t e r  I r a n i a n  f o r t u n e s  in t h e  w a r  a n d  t h e  I r a n i a n  c o u n t e r ­
o f f e n s i v e s  a g a i n s t  I r a q  i n  J u l y  1 982, t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s
33
r e s u m e d  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  a r m s  to t h e  I r a q i s .  T h i s  r e s u l t e d  
in  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a n e w  a r m s  a g r e e m e n t .  T h e  a g r e e m e n t  
h a s  c o n t i n u e d .  In M a y  1 9 8 4 ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  C o l i n  L e g u m  r e ­
p o r t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  s i g n e d  a $2. 5  b i l l i o n  a r m s
34
d e a l  w i t h  I r a q  in a l m o s t  t o t a l  s e c r e c y  i n  M o s c o w .
T h e  S o v i e t s ,  as b o t h  A r y e h  Y. Y o d f a t  a n d  K a r e n  
D a w i s h a  a r g u e ,  w e r e  k e e n  t o  a s s i s t  I r a n  as l o n g  as it 
r e m a i n e d  w e a k ,  b u t  it w o u l d  n o t  b e  t o  t h e i r  a d v a n t a g e  
to  h e l p  I r a n  t o  a t t a i n  v i c t o r y .  In C h a p t e r  II, it w a s  
a l s o  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  c o u l d  d e r i v e  no
82
33 D e n n i s  R o s s ,  ' S o v i e t  V i e w s  T o w a r d  t h e  G u l f  W a r ' ,  O r b i s , 
V o l .  28, No. 3, F a l l  1 9 8 4 ,  pp. 4 3 9 - 4 0 .
34 T h e  A g e , M a y  29, 198 4.
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b e n e f i t  f r o m  a n  I r a q i  d e f e a t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in t h e  l i g h t  
o f  M o s c o w ' s  e a r l i e r  r e f u s a l  t o  s u p p l y  s p a r e  p a r t s  a n d  
e q u i p m e n t  t o  I r a q .  I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  as h a s  a l r e a d y  
b e e n  n o t e d ,  s u b s e q u e n t  I r a q i  l e a d e r s  a n d  I r a q i  p u b l i c  
o p i n i o n  m i g h t  b l a m e  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  f o r  t h e  d e f e a t  of 
t h e i r  c o u n t r y .  T w o  o t h e r  l i k e l y  s p i n - o f f s  o f  a n  I r a n i a n  
v i c t o r y  w e r e  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  F o r  o n e  t h i n g ,  
t h e  A r a b  c o u n t r i e s  in t h e  G u l f  r e g i o n  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  
t u r n  t o  t h e  U S  w i t h  a s u b s e q u e n t  w e a k e n i n g  o f  S o v i e t  
e f f o r t s  a t  a c q u i r i n g  a c c e p t a n c e  in t h e  A r a b  w o r l d .  S e c o n d ,  
a s t r o n g e r  I s l a m i c  I r a n  m i g h t  l e a d  to b o t h  i n c r e a s e d  s u p ­
p o r t  f o r  t h e  I s l a m i c  a n t i - S o v i e t  e l e m e n t s  in A f g h a n i s t a n  
a n d  g r o w i n g  a p p e a l s  to S o v i e t  M u s l i m s  to t u r n  to I s l a m i c  
f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . 35
I n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  e v o l v i n g  s i t u a t i o n  in t h e  G u l f ,  
t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  a d j u s t e d  t h e i r  s t a n c e .  A l t h o u g h  t h e y  
u n d o u b t e d l y  s t i l l  a t t a c h e d  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  I r an, a t  t h e  
s a m e  t i m e  t h e y  a c t e d ,  e v e n  if i m p l i c i t l y  a n d  i n d i r e c t l y ,  
to  m a k e  it c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  I r a n i a n s '  c o n t i n u i n g  h o s t i l i t y  
w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  a r e s u m p t i o n  o f  S o v i e t  m a t e r i a l  s u p p o r t  
fo r  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  a d j u s t m e n t  in 
t h e  S o v i e t  a t t i t u d e  t o  I r a n  d i d  n o t  y e t  i m p l y  a n y  s h i f t  
t o w a r d s  I raq. T o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h i s  l i k e l y  f r u s t r a t i n g  
d i l e m m a ,  t h e  K r e m l i n ' s  i n a b i l i t y  to i n f l u e n c e  t h e  d e v e l o p -
35 A r y e h  Y. Y o d f a t ,  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  
I r a n , ( L o n d o n :C r o o m  H e l m ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  p. 108. S e e  a l s o  
A l e x a n d r e  B e n n i g s e n  a n d  M a r i e  B r o x u p ,  T h e  I s l a m i c  
T h r e a t  t o  t h e  S o v i e t  S t a t e , ( L o n d o n :C r o o m  H e l m ,  1983) , 
p. 116.
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m e n t s  o f  t h e  w a r ,  h a d ,  it c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d ,  a f f e c t e d  M o s ­
c o w ' s  c h a n g i n g  p o s i t i o n  t o  o n e  o f  ' w ait a n d  see'.
W h a t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  h e r e  is t h a t  it c o u l d  b e  
a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  c o m m o n  t h r e a d  r u n n i n g  t h r o u g h  t h e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  ' n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e '  a n d  a p o s t u r e  o f  ' w a i t  a n d  see' w a s  
t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s '  d e s i r e  t o  m a i n t a i n  a p o l i c y  o f  g o o d -  
n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s  t o w a r d s  b o t h  I r a q  a n d  Iran. I n  p o i n t  o f  
fa c t ,  t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s  s h o u l d  b e  d e e m e d  o p p o r t u n i s t s  
w h o  t a c t f u l l y  a n d  s h r e w d l y  v a r i e d  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  t o  s u i t  
t h e i r  o w n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  w a r .
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  I r a q i  m i l i t a r y  r e t r e a t ,  e m p h a s i s  
o n  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  p o l i c y  o f  ' n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e '  w a s  
l e s s  c o m m o n .  T h e  S o v i e t  m e d i a  e n c o u r a g e d  b o t h  o f  t h e  
c o n f l i c t i n g  p a r t i e s  t o  s e t t l e  t h e  d i s p u t e  b y  p e a c e f u l  
m e a n s .  C o m m e n t i n g  o n  a p e a c e  i n i t i a t i v e  b y  t h e  I s l a m i c  
C o n f e r e n c e  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  A l e k s a n d r  T i m o s h k i n  s t a t e d :
T h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  a r m e d  d i s p u t e  
b e t w e e n  I r a q  a n d  I r a n  w i l l  a l s o  h a r m  t h e  
n o n - a l i g n e d  m o v e m e n t ,  o f  w h i c h  I r a n  a n d  I r a q  
a r e  m e m b e r s ;  it w i l l  a l s o  d a m a g e  t h e  e f f o r t s  
o f  t h e  I s l a m i c  ( C o n g r e s s )  O r g a n i z a t i o n , . . .
It  is w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t  t h e  m e e t i n g  
o f  t h e  n i n e - m e m b e r  c o m m i t t e e  a t t a c h e d  to 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  is t a k i n g  p l a c e  a m i d  e n c o u ­
r a g i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  in r e g a r d  t o  t h e  I r a n -  
i a n - I r a q i  d i s p u t e .
It is n e c e s s a r y  n o w  t o  s u p p o r t  t h o s e  
( s t a t e m e n t s  w i t h )  a c t s  a n d  s t e p s  t o w a r d s  
h a l t i n g  a n d  s e t t l i n g  t h e  d i s p u t e .  36
36 S W B :S U , 6974, M a r c h  10, 1982, p. A4/2.
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W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p e a c e  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t h e  U N  
t o  r e a c h  a s e t t l e m e n t ,  T a s s  r e p o r t e d  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  fo r  
it s  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t :
S i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  a r m e d  c o n ­
f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  n e i g h b o u r i n g  s t a t e s  
t h a t  a r e  f r i e n d l y  t o  us. O.A .  T r o y a n o v s k i y , 
t h e  S o v i e t  a m b a s s a d o r  t o  t h e  UN, s a i d . . . ,  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a s  b e e n  s t r e s s i n g  t h e  
n e e d  t o  e n d  as s o o n  as p o s s i b l e  m i l i t a r y  
a c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e m  so as t o  s e t t l e  t h e  
d i s p u t e d  q u e s t i o n s  t h r o u g h  n e g o t i a t i o n . ..
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  s u p p o r t e d  a n d  c o n t i n u e s  to 
s u p p o r t  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  t o  p u t  
a n  e n d  t o  t h i s  c o n f l i c t ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  
g o o d  o f f i c e s  o f  t h e  U N  S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l . . .
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n . . . v o t e d  f o r  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n .  37
M o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  S o v i e t  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
I r a q i  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a c e a s e - f i r e  a n d  f o r  t r o o p  w i t h d r a ­
w a l  f r o m  I r a n  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d .  A g a i n ,  A l e k s a n d r  T i m o s h -  
k i n  h a i l e d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t :
T h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s h i p  h a s  d e c i d e d  to w i t h ­
d r a w  it s  f o r c e s  f r o m  a l l  t h e  I r a n i a n  t e r r i t o r y  
w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  o c c u p i e d  f o r  a l m o s t  2 y e a r s  
d u r i n g  t h e  a r m e d  c o n f l i c t .  It w o u l d  n o t  b e  a n  
e x a g g e r a t i o n  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h i s  is a p o s i t i v e  
s t e p  b y  B a g h d a d  a n d  it c a n  b o l s t e r  t h e  g o o d  
e f f o r t s  o f  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  w o r l d  a i m e d  a t  e n d i n g  t h e  b l o o d y  c o n f l i c t  
as s o o n  as p o s s i b l e .  38
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o n  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  t h e  v i s i t  b y  
T a h a  Y a s i n  R a m a d a n ,  t h e  I r a q i  F i r s t  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r ,  to 
M o s c o w  i n  A p r i l  19 8 4 ,  S o v i e t  m e d i a  r e p o r t e d  o n  h i s
37 F B I S :U S S R , O c t o b e r  25, 1 9 8 2 ,  p. Hi; J u l y  15, 19 8 2 ,  p. Hi; 
O c t o b e r  12, 19 82 ,  p. Hi; S W B :S U , 7080,  J u l y  17, 19 82 , p. 
A / 4 .
38 F B I S :U S S R  , J u n e  22, 1 9 8 2  , p. H7; J u l y  16, 1 98 2  , p. H 8 ;
S e e  a l s o  V l a d i m i r  G u d e v ,  'A N e e d l e s s  a n d  D a n g e r o u s  
C o n f l i c t ' ,  N e w  T i m e s , N o v e m b e r  19 82 , No. 47, p. 23.
m e e t i n g  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r ,  N i k h o l a y  T i k h o n o v ,  in 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t e r m s :
T h e  S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  p r a i s e d  I r a q ' s  p e a c e  
i n i t i a t i v e s  a n d  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a l l  m e d i a t i o n  
t o  e n d  t h e  c o n f l i c t  p e a c e f u l l y .  H e  a f f i r m e d  
t h a t  t h e  U S S R  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  i t s  e f f o r t s  to 
e n d  t h e  I r a q - I r a n  c o n f l i c t ,  a n d  s t r e s s e d  t h e  
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  s t o p p i n g  t h e  w a r  a n d  s o l v i n g  
t h e  p r o b l e m s  a r o u n d  t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  t a b l e .  39
F r o m  t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s '  v i e w p o i n t ,  o n e  c o u l d
a r g u e  t h a t  t h e y  m i g h t  h a v e  w a n t e d  t o  s t e p  i n  to a c t  as
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a b r o k e r  in t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h i s  c o n f l i c t .  T h i s  
w o u l d  r e m i n d  l o c a l  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  c o u l d  n o t  b e  
e x c l u d e d  f r o m  a n y  p e a c e - m a k i n g  e f f o r t s ;  a n d  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  m u s t  p l a y  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  in l o c a l  s e c u ­
r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  H o w e v e r ,  s u c h  a S o v i e t  r o l e  was,  in 
f a c t ,  f a r  f r o m  r e a l i z e d  b e c a u s e  S o v i e t  l e v e r a g e  o n  t h e  
c o n f l i c t i n g  p a r t i e s  w a s ,  as it r e m a i n s ,  t e n u o u s .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  s u c h  a S o v i e t  r o l e  
in a f f e c t i n g  a n y  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n f l i c t  
c o u l d  b e  c l e a r l y  d e r i v e d  f r o m  a n  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  it is 
u n c l e a r  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  c o n s u l t e d  w i t h  
t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  i n  a d v a n c e  a b o u t  it s  p e a c e  i n i t i a ­
t i v e s .  T h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  I r a q i  
p e a c e  e f f o r t ,  b u t  t h i s  w a s  b l u n t l y  r e b u f f e d  b y  t h e  T e h e ­
r a n  a u t h o r i t i e s .  N o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h i s  r e b u f f  w a s  s e e n  
as d u e  t o  t h e  e x c e s s i v e  a r r o g a n c e  o f  t h e  T e h e r a n  l e a d e r s ,
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39 S W B :S U , 76 3 0 ,  A p r i l  30, 1 9 8 4 ,  p. A 4 / 3 .
40 D e n n i s  R o s s ,  o p . c i t . , p. 446.
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a n d  w a s  s t r o n g l y  c a s t i g a t e d  b y  S o v i e t  c o m m e n t a t o r ,  V l a d i ­
m i r  T s v e t o v ,  as h i n d e r i n g  a p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e
41
c o n f l i c t .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e r e  w e r e  p r e s s  r e p o r t s  t h a t  t h e
S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  g i v e n  I r a n  a s t r o n g l y  w o r d e d  m e m o r a n d u m  _
42
o n  i t s  i n t r a n s i g e n t  r e f u s a l  t o  e n d  t h e  w a r  w i t h  Iraq.
In t h e  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  c h e m i ­
c a l  w e a p o n s  b y  t h e  I r a q i  a r m e d  f o r c e s ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  r e g i m e ,  
f r u s t r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s ' s i l e n c e  o n  t h i s
i s s u e ,  a c c u s e d  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  o f  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e s e
43
i n h u m a n e  o p e r a t i o n s .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h a t ,  I z v e s t i a , h o w ­
e v e r ,  f i r m l y  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  ' n e i t h e r  h a s  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n
u s e d  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s  n o r  t r a n s f e r r e d  s u c h  w e a p o n s  t o  a n y
44
o f  t h e  c o m b a t a n t s '. W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
h a s  a c t u a l l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s  to t h e  B a g h d a d  
r e g i m e ,  it is c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w a s  f a c e d  w i t h  
a n o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t i o n .  O n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  if t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i d  s u p p l y  c h e m i c a l  w e a p o n s  t o  I r aq, t h e  
K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  m u s t  h a v e  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  s u c h  
w e a p o n s  b y  t h e  I r a q i  a r m e d  f o r c e s  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  
in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  S o v i e t  i n t e r e s t s  o r  p u r p o s e s .  O n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  e v e n  if t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  h a d  n o t  s u p p l i e d  
s u c h  w e a p o n s  t o  I r a q ,  t h e  I r a n i a n  a l l e g a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e d  
s u s p i c i o n  o f  S o v i e t  c o l l u s i o n  w i t h  Iraq.
41 S W B :S U  ^ 769 2,  J u l y  11, 19 8 4 ,  p. A 4 / 4 .  C D S P , M a y  23, 
1 9 8 4 ,  V o l .  X X X V I ,  No. 17, p. 9.
42 F B I S :U S S R , A p r i l  8 , 19 8 3 ,  p. H3.
43 S W B : M E , 75 9 0 ,  M a r c h  13, 19 8 4 ,  p. A / 1 5 .
44 S W B :S U , 760 7,  A p r i l  2, 19 8 4 ,  p. 4/1.
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In a d d i t i o n ,  g i v e n  I r a q ' s  s u p e r i o r  a i r f o r c e s  
w h i c h  r e p o r t e d l y  a t t a c k e d  t a r g e t s  i n  Ir an ,  it c o u l d  b e  
n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  m e d i a  m a i n l y  j u s t  r e p o r t e d  t h e s e  
c o m b a t  m i s s i o n s  b u t  r a r e l y  c o n d e m n e d  (or e v e n  c r i t i c i z e d )  
s u c h  a t t a c k s .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  r e p e a t e d  r h e t o ­
r i c a l l y  t h a t  it s u p p o r t e d  t h e  s p e e d i e s t  c e s s a t i o n  o f  
t h i s  f r a t i c i d a l  a n d  s e n s e l e s s  war.
T h i s  c h a n g i n g  S o v i e t  p o l i c y  d i d  s e e m  t o  w o r r y
t h e  I r a n i a n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  t h e i r  a l r e a d y  s e v e r e d
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  M o s c o w  h a d  b e e n  c o m p o u n d e d  by, o n  M a y  4
45
1983,  t h e i r  e x p u l s i o n  o f  18 S o v i e t  e n v o y s .  T h e  e x p u l ­
s i o n s ,  a n n o u n c e d  b y  t h e  I r a n i a n  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y ,  w e r e
c o n d u c t e d  h o u r s  a f t e r  t h e  I r a n i a n  r e g i m e  d i s s o l v e d  t h e
46
c o m m u n i s t  T u d e h  P a r t y .  It w a s  a l l e g e d  t h a t  l e a d e r s  
o f  t h e  T u d e h  P a r t y  w e r e  s p i e s  a n d  h a d  p a s s e d  o n  m i l i t a r y  
a n d  p o l i t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  M o s c o w  f o r  d e c a d e s .
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  s i g n s  o f  i n t e r e s t  in r e s t o r i n g  
d i a l o g u e  a n d  i m p r o v i n g  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  n o t  e n t i r e l y  a b s e n t .  
I n  e a r l y  J u n e  1 9 84 ,  S a y e d - M o h a m m a d  S a d r ,  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  
o f  t h e  I r a n i a n  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y ,  p a i d  a v i s i t  to M o s c o w  
a n d  h e l d  a d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  Mr. 
A n d r e i  G r o m y k o .  It w a s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  w a s  
f o c u s s e d  o n  t h e  I r a n i a n  o f f i c i a l ' s  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h e
45 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e ,  M a y  5, 1983.
46 I b id.
in l a t e  J u n e ,  D e p u t y  P o w e r  a n d  E l e c t r i c i t y  M i n i s t e r ,
A l e k s e i  M a k u k h i n ,  h e a d e d  a S o v i e t  e n e r g y  d e l e g a t i o n  to
T e h e r a n ,  w h i c h  c o n c l u d e d  a g r e e m e n t s  o n  S o v i e t  c o n s t r u c t i o n
48
a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  I r a n i a n  p o w e r  p l a n t s .  O n e  c o u l d  c l e a r l y  
c o n c l u d e  t h a t ,  f r o m  t h e  S o v i e t  v i e w p o i n t ,  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  
(and e v e n  i m p r o v e m e n t )  o f  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  T e h e r a n  
a u t h o r i t i e s  w a s  o f  g r e a t  c o n c e r n .
I l l : I m p a c t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  'Wait a n d  S e e 1 P o l i c y  o n  
S o v i e t - I r a q i  R e l a t i o n s
A s  w a s  s u g g e s t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  S o v i e t  m e d i a  w e l ­
c o m e d  as a ' p o s i t i v e  step' t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s h i p ' s  m o v e  
t o  w i t h d r a w  i t s  f o r c e s  f r o m  t h e  I r a n i a n  t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  
t h e y  h a d  o c c u p i e d .  T h i s  m e a n t  t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c e  S o v i e t  
a n d  I r a q i  v i e w p o i n t s  w e r e  c o n v e r g i n g  m o r e  c l o s e l y  t h a n  
t h o s e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  I r an. A s  a s e n i o r  S o v i e t  
c o m m e n t a t o r  a s s e r t e d :
T h i s  is a s e n s e l e s s  w a r  w h i c h  h a s  c a u s e d ,  
a n d  is s t i l l  c a u s i n g ,  g r e a t  d a m a g e  b o t h  to 
I r a n  a n d  I r a q . . . s o m e  c i r c l e s  in T e h e r a n  c a l l  
t o d a y  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  w a r  i n  o r d e r  
t o  p u n i s h  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s  a n d  s p r e a d  t h e  
I r a n i a n  m o d e l  o f  I s l a m .  A r e  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  
n o t  p a y i n g  t o o  h i g h  a p r i c e  in t r y i n g  to 
c l a r i f y  t h e  p o i n t  as to w h o  is b e t t e r ,  t h e  
S u n n i s  o r  t h e  S h i ' i t e s ?  49
S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s  h a d  i m p r o v e d  s l i g h t l y .
F o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n  J u l y  17, 19 82,  o n  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  t h e
89
47
S o v i e t s  r e d u c e  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  a i d  to B a g hdad. L ater,
47 C i t e d  i n  D e n n i s  R o s s ,  o p . c i t . , p. 445.
48 F B I S :U S S R , J u l y  3, 1 9 8 4 ,  p. HI.
49 F B I S :U S S R , A u g u s t  6 , 1982, p. H12.
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t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  t h e  I r a q i  B a ' a t h i s t  P a r t y ' s  
r i s e  t o  p o w e r ,  F a d i l  a l - ' I z z a w i ,  I r a q i ' s  a m b a s s a d o r  t o  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  s p o k e  o n  M o s c o w  t e l e v i s i o n .  H e  m a i n t a i n e d  
t h a t  I r a q  h a d  b e e n  a p r o g r e s s i v e ,  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o u n t r y ,  
w h o s e  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w e r e  e n ­
s h r i n e d  i n  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  a n d  c o o p e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  b e t w e e n  
t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s .  ' Time h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  o u r  r e l a t i o n s  
i n  a l l  a r e a s  o f  l i f e  a r e  d e v e l o p i n g  s u c c e s s f u l l y  to t h e
b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  p e o p l e s  o f  t h e s e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s ' ,  h e  f u r t h e r
50
s t a t e d .  T h e r e  h a d  b e e n  a g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  S o v i e t - I r a q i
a c t s  o f  c o o p e r a t i o n .  T h e y  i n c l u d e d  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t s ,
t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  a l - T h a r t h a r - T i g r i s  c a n a l  a n d  t h e
F a l l u j a h  a n d  a l - H a d i t h a h  d a m s  o n  t h e  E u p h r a t e s  R i v e r ,
a n d  j o i n t  o i l  p r o j e c t s  i n  N o r t h e r n  R u m a y l a h  a n d  N a h r
51
U ma r .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  w e r e  e m b a r k e d  u p o n  w i t h  
S o v i e t  a s s i s t a n c e .
T h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  in S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s  w a s
f u r t h e r  m a n i f e s t e d  b y  t h e  o f f i c i a l  v i s i t s  of h i g h - r a n k i n g
I r a q i s ,  F i r s t  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  T a h a  Y a s i n  R a m a d a n  a n d  D e p u t y
52
P r e m i e r  T a r i q  A z i z .  D u r i n g  t h e  t a l k s ,  b o t h  s i d e s  f i r m l y
50 F B I S :U S S R , J u l y  19, 19 82 , pp. H4 -5 .
51 S W B :S U , 6998, A p r i l  7, 19 82,  p. A 4 / 1 ;  70 81, J u l y  19,
1 9 82 , p. A 4 / 4 ;  F B I S : U S S R  , J u l y  1, 198 3,  p. H5;
J u l y  6 , 1 9 83 ,  p. H5; I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e ,
A p r i l  10, 198 4.
52 F B I S :U S S R , N o v e m b e r  21, 1983,  p. H5; S W B :S U , 7498, 
N o v e m b e r  23, 19 83 , p. A 4 / 3 ;  7627,  A p r i l  26, 19 84 , p. A 4 / 4 ;  
77 80,  O c t o b e r  22, 19 84,  p. A 4 / 4 .
O n  J a n u a r y  24, 1 9 8 3 ,  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  T a r i q  A z i z  r e p l a c e d  
Dr. S a ' d o u n  H a m m a d i  as F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r .  Dr. H a m m a d i  
r e p o r t e d l y  t u r n e d  o v e r  t h e  p o r t f o l i o  f o r  h e a l t h  r e a s o n s ,  
M E E D , J a n a u r y  28, 1983.
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a s s e r t e d  t h e i r  c o m m o n  i n t e r e s t  in m a i n t a i n i n g  c l o s e  f r i e n d ­
sh ip. M o r e o v e r ,  it w a s  e m p h a s i z e d  b y  t h e  S o v i e t  s i d e  t h a t  
t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  e n d  t o  t h e  w a r  w o u l d  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  
v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  b o t h  I r a q  a n d  I r a n  a n d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of- 
p e a c e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .  T h e s e  v i s i t s  w e r e  m o r e  f a v o u r a b l y  
r e c e i v e d  b y  S o v i e t  c o u n t e r p a r t s  ( S o v i e t  P r e m i e r  N i k h o l a y  
T i k h o n o v  a n d  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  A n d r e i  G r o m y k o )  t h a n
t h e  I r a q i  v i s i t s  j u s t  a f t e r  t h e  w a r  e r u p t e d .  Mr. R a m a d a n
53
w a s  g i v e n  a n  u n u s u a l l y  w a r m  w e l c o m e ,  w h i c h  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  s h i f t i n g  p o s i t i o n .
H o w e v e r ,  m e n t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  o f  s o m e  i s s u e s  
t h a t  c o u l d  p o s s i b l y  (and e v e n  s e r i o u s l y )  h a m p e r  S o v i e t -  
I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s .  F o r  o n e  t h i n g ,  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  i s s u e  of 
I r a q ' s  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  W e s t .  T h e  K r e m l i n  a u t h o ­
r i t i e s  e x p r e s s e d  t h e i r  c o n c e r n  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
a l t h o u g h  n o t  in t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e ,  o f  t h e  U S  a n d  I r a q  r e s u m i n g
d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w h i c h  w e r e  b r o k e n  o f f  a f t e r  t h e  1 96 7
54
A r a b - I s r a e l i  c o n f l i c t .  B e f o r e  t h e n ,  o n  s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s ,  
P r e s i d e n t  S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  h a d  s h o w n  h i s  i n t e r e s t  i n  n o r m a l i z ­
i n g  d i p l o m a t i c  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  t h e  US. A s  T a r e q  Y. I s m a e l  
a r g u e s ,  in t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s p h e r e ,  I r a q  h a s  s o u g h t
to u p g r a d e  its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  its m a i n  i d e o l o g i c a l  r i v a l ,
55
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h i s  i n t e r e s t  w a s ,  to a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t ,  
w a r m l y  r e c e i v e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  R e a g a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
53 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e , A p r i l  2 8 - 2 9 ,  1984.
54 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  H e r a l d  T r i b u n e , M a r c h  30, 1984; T h e  A g e , 
N o v e m b e r  23, 1984.
55 T a r e q  Y. I s m a e l  & J a c q u e l i n e  S. I s m a e l ,  ' I r a q ' s  
I n t e r r u p t e d  R e v o l u t i o n ' ,  C u r r e n t  H i s t o r y , V o l .  84,
No. 498, J a n u a r y  1 9 8 5 ,  p. 39.
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r e m o v e d  I r a q  f r o m  t h e  l i s t  o f  c o u n t r i e s  a c c u s e d  o f  a i d i n g
a n d  a b e t t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t e r r o r i s m . 5 ^ F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o n
N o v e m b e r  26, 19 84 ,  it w a s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  I r a q i  F o r e i g n
M i n i s t e r  a n d  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  T a r i q  A z i z  m e t  w i t h  P r e s i d e n t
57
R o n a l d  R e a g a n  i n  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. L a t e r ,  f o r m a l  d i p l o ­
m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w e r e  r e s u m e d ,  w i t h o u t  a n y  o f f i c i a l  s t a t e -
5 8
m e n t  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t .
F r e n c h  d e l i v e r i e s  o f  t h e  S u p e r  E t e n d a r d s  w a s  a l s o  
a p o i n t  o f  c o n t e n t i o n .  S o v i e t  p o l i t i c a l  o b s e r v e r  B o r i s  
K a l y a g i n  l a m e n t e d :
F o r e i g n  m a s s  i n f o r m a t i o n  m e d i a  a r e  r e p o r t i n g  
o n  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  
o f  t h e  I r a n - I r a q  c o n f l i c t .  T h e  c a u s e  f o r  s u c h  
a l a r m  is i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  F r a n c e  h a s  s u p p l i e d  to 
I r a q  f i v e  S u p e r  E t e n d a r d  f i g h t e r s . . . I r a q  c o u l d  
u s e  t h e s e  p l a n e s ,  e q u i p p e d  w i t h  E x o c e t  m i s s i l e s ,  
f o r  a t t a c k s  o n  I r a n i a n  o i l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  o r  
t a n k e r s  t r a n s p o r t i n g  I r a n i a n  oil .  59
F i n a l l y ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  I r a q i  i d e o l o g i c a l  
v i e w p o i n t ,  t h e  I r a q  B a ' a t h i s t  P a r t y  n e w s p a p e r ,  A l - T h a w r a h , 
p u b l i s h e d  a n  a r t i c l e  o n  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s  t h a t  
s e v e r e l y  c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  e n d e a v o u r  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
t o  i m p o s e  i t s  d o m i n a t i o n  o v e r  t h e  w o r l d  t h r o u g h  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r o l e t a r i a n  r e v o l u t i o n .  ' This', A l - 
T h a w r a h  a s s e r t e d ,  'is s o m e t h i n g  w e  c a n n o t  a g r e e  w i t h ' .  60
56 C i t e d  b y  M . S .  E l  A z h a r y ,  'The A t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  S u p e r ­
p o w e r s  T o w a r d s  t h e  G u l f  W a r ' ,  in  M . S .  E l  A z h a r y ,  (ed.), 
T h e  I r a n - I r a q  W a r : A n  H i s t o r i c a l ,  E c o n o m i c  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  
A n a l y s i s , (New Y o r k : S t .  M a r t i n ' s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  p. 94.
57 N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s , N o v e m b e r  27, 19 8 4 .  P h i l i p  M a r f l e e t ,
' N e w  M o v e s  o n  t h e  R e g i o n a l  C h e s s b o a r d ' ,  T h e  M i d d l e  E a s t , 
J a n u a r y  1985, pp. 5-6.
58 N e w  Y o r k  T i m e s , N o v e m b e r  27, 19 84 .
59 F B I S :U S S R  , O c t o b e r  14, 19 8 3 ,  p. Hi.
60 F B I S : U S S R ,  A u g u s t  19, 1 9 8 3 ,  p. H 6 .
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C o n c l u s i o n
O n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  I r a n i a n  c o u n t e r - o f f e n ­
s i v e s  a n d  p o t e n t i a l  I r a q i  d e f e a t  c o n s t i t u t e d  a g r a v e  
c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h e  s t a l e m a t e  o n  t h e  b a t ­
t l e f i e l d ,  h o w e v e r ,  r e m a i n e d  p r o t r a c t e d .  N e i t h e r  o f  t h e  
c o m b a t a n t s  c o u l d  g a i n  a d e c i s i v e  v i c t o r y  o v e r  t h e  o t h e r .
C l e a r l y  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s  i m p r o v e d  a f t e r  
t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e  o f  t h e  G u l f  w a r .  S o v i e t - I r a q i  a t t i t u d e s  
t o w a r d s  w a y s  o f  s e t t l i n g  t h e  c o n f l i c t  c o n v e r g e d .  T h e  
B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  p r o p o s e d  b o t h  a c e a s e - f i r e  a n d  t r o o p  w i t h ­
d r a w a l  f r o m  Ir an ,  b o t h  o f  w h i c h  w e r e  w a r m l y  h a i l e d  b y  
t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  s u c h  I r a q i  p r o ­
p o s a l s  w e r e  r e s o l u t e l y  t u r n e d  d o w n  b y  T e h e r a n .  T h e  
K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  a l s o  b l u n t l y  c a s t i g a t e d  w h a t  t h e y  s a w  
as I r a n i a n  a r r o g a n c e .
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  o n e  c o u l d  a r g u e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
m a d e  u s e  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  w a r  to s h i f t  its p o s i t i o n  
f r o m  ' n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e '  t o  a s o - c a l l e d  ' wait a n d  see' 
p o l i c y .  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  it c o u l d  u p g r a d e  
its r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e ,  w h i l e  a t  t h e  
s a m e  t i m e  n o t  h a v i n g  t o  b r e a k  o f f  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
I s l a m i c  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  r e g i m e  i n  Iran.
T h e  n e x t  a n d  l a s t  c h a p t e r  w i l l  m a i n l y  d e a l  w i t h  
t h e  g e n e r a l  o u t l o o k  o n  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s .
C h a p t e r  IV: The G e n e r a l  O u t l o o k  on  S o v i e t - I r a q i  R e l a t i o n s
I n t r o d u c t i o n
C o n t e m p o r a r y  I r a q ,  u n d e r  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  t h e  
A r a b  B a ' a t h  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y  (ABSP) f r o m  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  
J u l y  19 68 r e v o l u t i o n ,  f o u n d  b o t h  a d v a n t a g e s  a n d  d i s a d v a n ­
t a g e s  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  t i e s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  S i m i l a r ­
ly, t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  v i e w e d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e  i n  B a g h d a d  as a m i x t u r e  o f  b o t h  s u c c e s s e s  
a n d  failures.^"
I n  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s ,  it w a s  s h o w n  t h a t  S o v i e t -  
I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r o m  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  
A l g i e r s  A g r e e m e n t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  i n c o n c l u s i v e  G u l f  w ar , 
a r e  so c o m p l e x  t h a t  t o  g e n e r a l i z e  a b o u t  a n y  a c c u r a t e  d i r ­
e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t .  T h i s  
c o u l d  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  I r a q i  P r e s i d e n t  
S a d d a m  H u s s e i n ,  w h o  p r e s e n t s  t h e  i m a g e  o f  b e i n g  p r a g m a t i c ,  
u n d e r t o o k  a n d  c o n t i n u e s  t o  u n d e r t a k e  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s  
a i m e d  a t  p r e s e r v i n g  a n d  m a x i m i z i n g  t h e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  h i s  c o u n t r y .  T r u e  e n o u g h ,  t w o  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x a m p l e s  
o f  s u c h  p r a g m a t i c  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s  w e r e ,  a c c o r d ­
i n g  to t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s ,  b o t h  t h e  o n e  to r e a c h  t h e  
A l g i e r s  A g r e e m e n t  w i t h  I r a n  a n d  t h e  o n e  w h i c h  i n i t i a t e d
1 S e e  R o b e r t  0. F r e e d m a n ,  ' S o v i e t  P o l i c y  T o w a r d  B a ' a t h i s t  
I r a q ' ,  i n  R o b e r t  H. D o n a l d s o n ,  (ed.), T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
i n  t h e  T h i r d  W o r l d  : S u c c e s s e s  a n d  F a i l u r e s , ( C o l o r a d o :  
W e s t v i e w  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 1 ) ,  pp. 1 6 6 - 8 6 .
2 P e t e r  M a n f i e l d ,  ' S a d d a m  H u s s e i n ' s  P o l i t i c a l  T h i n k i n g :  
T h e  C o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  N a s s e r ' ,  i n  T i m  N i b l o c k ,  (ed.), 
I r a q : T h e  C o n t e m p o r a r y  S t a t e , ( L o n d o n : C r o o m  H e l m ,  1982) , 
pp. 6 5- 73 .
s u c h  a n  u n r e s o l v e d  c o n f l i c t  as t h e  G u l f  war .  F r o m  t h e  
S o v i e t  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  it is l i k e l y  t h a t  f u r t h e r  s t r a i n  in 
it s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  w o u l d  r e s u l t  f r o m  
a n o t h e r  o f  B a g h d a d ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s .
T h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h i s  l a s t  c h a p t e r  w i l l ,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  e x a m i n e  t h e  t w o  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s .
(i) Is t h e r e  a n y  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  I r a q  w i l l  
u n i l a t e r a l l y  a b r o g a t e  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y ?
(ii) S h o u l d  I r a q  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a 'clie n t '  s t a t e  
o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ?
I : T h e  V i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  F r i e n d s h i p  a n d  C o o p e r a ­
t i o n
O n  A p r i l  9, 1 9 7 2  n e a r l y  f o u r  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e
I r a q i  B a ' a t h i s t  p a r t y  t o o k  o f f i c e  i n  B a g h d a d ,  t h e  S o v i e t
U n i o n  a n d  I r a q  c o n c l u d e d  a T r e a t y  o f  F r i e n d s h i p  a n d  C o o p e r a
t i o n .  It w a s  n o  a c c i d e n t  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s
a t t a c h e d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  s u c h  a t r e a t y  as a m e a n s  o f  r e i n -
3
f o r c i n g  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  I r a q ,  it w a s  
a r g u a b l y  t h e  p r a g m a t i c  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  r u l i n g  B a ' a t h i s t  
r e g i m e  t o  m a k e  t h e  b e s t  u s e  o f  t h i s  t r e a t y  for, a t  
t h e  t i m e ,  p u r p o s e l y  c h a l l e n g i n g  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
W e s t e r n  " i m p e r i a l i s t s " .  T h e r e  is, h e n c e ,  l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  
t o  t h e  I r a q i  B a ' a t h i s t  l e a d e r s h i p ,  t h i s  t r e a t y  w a s  d e e m e d  
to b e  a c o n d u i t  f o r  t h e  I r a q i  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
I r a q i  P e t r o l e u m  C o m p a n y  j u s t  l e s s  t h a n  t w o  m o n t h s  l a t e r .
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3 S e e  Z a f a r  I m a m ,  ' S o v i e t  T r e a t i e s  W i t h  T h i r d  W o r l d
C o u n t r i e s ' ,  S o v i e t  S t u d i e s ,Vol. X X X V , N o .  1 , J a n u a r y  19 83 , 
PP. r . ; - 7  0 .
M o r e o v e r ,  b a s e d  o n  t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  
e x p e c t e d  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  to b e  o b l i g e d  t o  h o n o u r  t h e i r  
m i l i t a r y  c o m m i t m e n t s  in its m i l i t a r y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  
Iran.  T h e  B a g h d a d  l e a d e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  m e t  w i t h  a S o v i e t  r e f u ­
sal. A s  w a s  n o t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I, t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s  a s c r i b e d  
t h e i r  i n e v i t a b l e  d e c i s i o n  to c o m p r o m i s e  w i t h  t h e  S h a h  o f  
I r a n  t o  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  to h o n o u r  its m i l i ­
t a r y  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  Iraq. S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  r e f u s e d  
to  s u p p l y  a r m s  t o  I r a q  o n c e  t h e  G u l f  w a r  e r u p t e d .
It is n o  s e c r e t  t h a t  i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s ,  b o t h  
E g y p t  a n d  S o m a l i a  u n i l a t e r a l l y  a b r o g a t e d  t h e i r  T r e a t i e s  o f  
F r i e n d s h i p  a n d  C o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  o n  t h e  
g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  h a d  r e j e c t e d  t h e i r  p l e a s  
f o r  w e a p o n s  t h e n  n e e d e d  in t h e i r  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  I s r a e l
4
a n d  E t h i o p i a  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  H e n c e ,  s o m e  m i g h t  c a s t  d o u b t  
o n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  w o u l d  h a v e  to 
f a c e  a n o t h e r  h u m i l i a t i n g ,  a n d  p r e s t i g e - e r o d i n g  s e t b a c k  
as s t e m m i n g  f r o m  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e ' s  u n i l a t e r a l  a b r o g a t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r e a t y .
It c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  at l e a s t  
t w o  m a j o r  r e a s o n s  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  a b r o g a t i o n  o f  t h e  
f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y .  F i r s t ,  Y o d f a t  a r g u e s ,  as w a s  t h e  c a s e  
w i t h  A f g h a n i s t a n ,  t h a t  'the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  
g a v e  t o  t h e i r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in A f g h a n i s t a n  w a s  t h a t ,  it
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4 S e e  Y a a c o v  R o ' i ,  'The S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  E g y p t : T h e  C o n ­
s t r a i n t s  o f  a P a t r o n - C l i e n t  R e l a t i o n s h i p ' ,  i n  Y a a c o v  
R o ' i ,  (ed.), T h e  L i m i t s  to P o w e r : S o v i e t  P o l i c y  in t h e  
M i d d l e  E a s t , (New Y o r k : S t .  M a r t i n ' s  P r e s s ,  1 9 79 ),  pp. 
1 8 1 - 2 0 6 .  S e e  a l s o  M o h a m m e d  A y o o b ,  'The H o r n  o f  A f r i c a :  
R e g i o n a l  C o n f l i c t  a n d  S u p e r p o w e r  I n v o l v e m e n t ' ,  C a n b e r r a  
P a p e r  o n  S t r a t e g y  a n d  D e f e n c e , No, 18, ( C a n b e r r a :T h e  
S t r a t e g i c  a n d  D e f e n s e  S t u d i e s  C e n t r e ,  19 78 ) .
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f e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h e  U S S R - A f g h a n i s t a n  f r i e n d -
5
s h i p  t r e a t y ' .  T h i s  i n v a s i o n  h a d  d e e p e n e d  I r a q i  s u s p i c i o n  
of  b e i n g  s i m i l a r l y  i n t e r f e r e d  w i t h  b y  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  
S e c o n d ,  as w a s  n o t e d ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  h a d  r e f u s e d  to s u p ­
p l y  a r m s  fo r  I r a q  in t h e  G u l f  war.
g
G i v e n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  in C h a p t e r  I, t h e  f i r s t  
r e a s o n  s h o u l d  b e  d o u b t e d .  I n s o f a r  as S o v i e t  a r m s  s u p p l i e s  
w e r e  c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  s e c o n d  r e a s o n  s h o u l d  b e  c r i t i c a l l y  - 
e x a m i n e d .  W h i l e  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  M o s c o w  h a d  b e e n  c u r t a i l i n g  
a r m s  a n d  e q u i p m e n t  f o r  I r a q  s i n c e  t h e  o u t b r e a k  o f  t h e  
w a r ,  t h e  I r a q i  D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  T a r i q  A z i z  r e m a r k e d  in A p r i l  
1 9 8 1  t h a t  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  s a w  n o  r e a s o n  t o  c a n c e l  t h e
7
1 9 7 2  t r e a t y  w i t h  M o s c o w .  L a t e r  i n  N o v e m b e r  19 82, h o w e v e r ,  
P r e s i d e n t  S a d d a m  H u s s e i n  w a s  r e p o r t e d  as s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
1 9 7 2  I r a q i - S o v i e t  T r e a t y  o f  F r i e n d s h i p  h a d  n o t  w o r k e d  s i n c e
g
t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  w a r .  W h i l e  t h e  r e a l  i n t e n t i o n  b e h i n d  
s u c h  a r e m a r k  w a s  a t  t h e  t i m e  u n c l e a r ,  a n y  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
I r a q  w a s  p r e p a r e d  to r e p e a l  t h e  f r i e n d h i p  t r e a t y  w a s  b o u n d  
to  b e  i n  s o m e  w a y s  m i s l e a d i n g .  A s  w a s  n o t e d  in C h a p t e r  III, 
g i v e n  b e t t e r  I r a n i a n  f o r t u n e s  i n  t h e  G u l f  w a r  a n d  t h e  
I r a n i a n  c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e s  a g a i n s t  I r a q  i n  J u l y  19 8 2 ,  t h e  
K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  r e s u m e d  t h e  s u p p l y  of a r m s  to t h e  I r a q i s .
T h i r d ,  g i v e n  t h e  u n l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  a n  e n d  to 
t h e  G u l f  w a r  is in t h e  o f f i n g ,  it is w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t
5 A r y e h  Y. Y o d f a t ,  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  a n d  t h e  A r a b i a n  P e n i n ­
s u l a , ( L o n d o n : C r o o m  H e l m ,  1 9 8 3 ) ,  p. 90.
6 S e e  p a g e s  3 1 - 3 2  i n  C h a p t e r  I.
7 W a s h i n g t o n  P o s t , A p r i l  19, 1981.
8 C i t e d  in J.M.  A b d u i g h a n i ,  I r a q  & I r a n : T h e  Y e a r s  o f  C r i s i s , 
( L o n d o n : C r o o m  H e l m ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  p. 217.
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t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  s t i l l ,  in s o m e  w a y s ,  d i s c e r n s  a d v a n t a g e s  
i n  k e e p i n g  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
i n  e f f e c t .  R e l a t e d  t o  b o t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  p o s i t i o n  
o f  'wait a n d  see' a n d  t h e  u n y i e l d i n g  I r a n i a n  p o s i t i o n  o f  " 
s e t t l i n g  t h e  h o s t i l i t i e s  b y  p e a c e f u l  m e a n s ,  t h e  B a g h d a d  
r e g i m e ' s  p l e d g e  t o  p e a c e f u l l y  e n d  t h e  c o n f l i c t  is i n  l i n e  
w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  p u t t i n g  a q u i c k  e n d  
t o  t h i s  s e n s e l e s s  wa r.  T h u s ,  o n  t h e  o c c a s i o n  o f  t h e  1 3 t h  
a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  w i t h  Ir a q ,  a S o v i e t  
c o m m e n t a t o r  V i k t o r  ( Y u riyev) n o t e s  t h a t :
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  is c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  b o t h  I r a n  a n d  I r a q  a n d  
of  a l l  t h e  s t a t e s  in t h i s  r e g i o n  p e r s i s t e n t l y  
r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h i s  w a r  b e  h a l t e d  a n d  a l l  d i s ­
p u t e d  i s s u e s  b e  r e s o l v e d  p e a c e f u l l y .  W h a t  is 
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  is f o r  b o t h  s i d e s  t o  h a v e  g o o d ­
w i l l ,  b e  r e a l i s t i c ,  a n d  f i n d  t h e  s u i t a b l e  c l i ­
m a t e  f o r  b e g i n n i n g  a d i a l o g u e .  T h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n ,  f o r  i t s  p a r t s ,  is m a k i n g  e v e r y  p o s s i b l e  
e f f o r t  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  
c o n f l i c t  a n d  t o  g u a r a n t e e i n g  p e a c e  a n d  s e c u r i ­
t y  i n  t h e  G u l f  r e g i o n .  9
F o u r t h ,  b y  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h e  g r o w i n g  c l o s e  S o v i e t -  
S y r i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  it is n o  e x a g g e r a t i o n  t h a t  h a d  t h e  
B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  u n i l a t e r a l l y  a b r o g a t e d  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y ,  
o n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  S o v i e t - S y r i a n  r e l a t i o n s  w o u l d  p r o b a b l y  
b e  f u r t h e r  f o s t e r e d ,  b u t  at t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  t h e  B a g h d a d  
r e g i m e .  T h i s  a r g u m e n t  f o l l o w s  f r o m  t h e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  
as w i t h  m a i n t a i n i n g  c l o s e  t i e s  w i t h  t h e  M a r x i s t  r e g i m e  
in S o u t h  Y e m e n ,  t h e  M o s c o w  l e a d e r s  c o n s i d e r  it n e c e s s a r y  
to  m a i n t a i n  (or e v e n  c o n s o l i d a t e )  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  e i t h e r
9 F B I S :U S S R , April 10, 1985, p. H 7 .
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in S y r i a  o r  I ra q ,  o r  b o t h .  F r o m  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s '  v i e w ­
p o i n t ,  I r a q  is i n  t h e  g e o p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  a l r e a d y  
b e i n g  o u t f l a n k e d  b y  h o s t i l e  n e i g h b o u r i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  H e n c e ­
f o r t h ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  r i v a l  B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e  i n  D a m a s ­
cus, t h e  B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e  i n  B a g h d a d  d e e m s  it e s s e n t i a l  to 
p r e v e n t  M o s c o w  f r o m  t o t a l l y  s h i f t i n g  t o  t h e  D a m a s c u s  r e g i m e
F i n a l l y ,  it c a n  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  I r a q  s a w  n o  r e a s o n  
f o r  c a n c e l l i n g  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  b e c a u s e  o f  it s  c l o s e  
e c o n o m i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  Q u i t e  r e p e a t e d l y  
o n  e a c h  a n n i v e r s a r y  o f  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y ,  e c o n o m i c  
c o o p e r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s  h a s  a l w a y s  b e e n  
r e f e r r e d  to as b e i n g  s t r e n g t h e n e d  a n d  d e v e l o p e d  e v e r y  y e a r .
I n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  w h a t  s h o u l d  b e  b o r n e  
in m i n d  is t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n  is s t i l l  in e f f e c t ,  it d o e s  n o t  o b s t r u c t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  I r a q  a n d  t h e  W e s t  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e y  
h a v e  n o t  a n y  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t i e s .  T h i s  d i v e r s i f i e d  I r a q i  
e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  m a n i f e s t s  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s '  p r a g m a t i c  
d e c i s i o n s .
B y  c o n s i d e r i n g  A r t i c l e  12 o f  t h e  t r e a t y  w h i c h
r e a d s :
T h e  p r e s e n t  T r e a t y  is c o n c l u d e d  f o r  a t e r m  
o f  15 y e a r s  a n d  w i l l  b e  p r o l o n g e d  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
f o r  e a c h  s u b s e q u e n t  f i v e - y e a r  p e r i o d ,  if n e i t h e r  
o f  t h e  H i g h  C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t i e s  d e c l a r e s  it s  d e ­
s i r e  o f  t e r m i n a t i n g  it s  o p e r a t i o n ,  n o t i f y i n g  t h e  
o t h e r  H i g h  C o n t r a c t i n g  P a r t y  12 m o n t h s  b e f o r e  
t h e  e x p i r i n g  o f  t h e  t e r m  o f  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
T r e a t y .  10
10 See A p p e n d i x  C.
T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e  19 72  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y ,  fo r  
t h e  f i r s t  t e r m ,  w i l l  s t i l l  b e  t e n a b l e  u n t i l  A p r i l  9, 1987. 
W h a t  c o n c e r n s  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  m o r e ,  it c o u l d  b e  a r g u e d ,  
is w h e t h e r  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  w i l l  h o n o u r  t h e  t r e a t y  a f t e r  
t h e  e x p i r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  f i f t e e n - y e a r  t e r m  r a t h e r  t h a n  
w h e t h e r  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e  w i l l  w o r s e n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  
M o s c o w  by ,  as t h e  C a i r o  a n d  M o g a d i s h u  r e g i m e s  did ,  u n i l a ­
t e r a l l y  a b r o g a t i n g  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  b e f o r e  A p r i l  9,
19 87.  I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  n e i t h e r  I r a q  n o r  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
b e i n g  o p p o s e d  to t h e  s u b s e q u e n t l y  a u t o m a t i c  c o n t i n u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  t r e a t y ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  w o u l d  p o s s i b l y  b e  i n  a 
f a v o u r a b l e  p o s i t i o n  t o  s c o r e  s o m e  d i p l o m a t i c  s u c c e s s e s .  T h i s  
c o u l d  r e f l e c t  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  b e i n g  a b l e  to a t  l e a s t  
m a i n t a i n  o r  a t  b e s t  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  B a g h d a d  
r e g i m e  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
h a d  b e e n  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  e m b i t t e r e d  b y  d i v e r g i n g  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  S o v i e t  
d i s r u p t i o n  o f  a r m s  s u p p l i e s  to I r a q  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  o u t s e t  
o f  t h e  G u l f  w ar .
H e n c e ,  if it is t h e  c a s e  t h a t  I r a q  c o n t i n u e s  
t o  d i s c e r n  a d v a n t a g e s  i n  h o l d i n g  t h e  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y  
w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  a p l a u s i b l e  a r g u m e n t  is t h a t  I r a q  
h a s  b e e n  a n d  r e m a i n s  a ' c l i e n t '  s t a t e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .
I I : I r a q  as a 'C l i e n t '  S t a t e  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n :  A  C r i ­
t i q u e
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A  p a t r o n - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is o n e  b e t w e e n
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u n e q u a l  p a r t n e r s .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a 'clie n t '  s t a t e  is b o t h  
m i l i t a r i l y  a n d  e c o n o m i c a l l y  w e a k e r  t h a n  it s  p a t r o n .  T h e r e  
m u s t  b e  a v a s t  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
o f  t h e  p a t r o n  a n d  t h o s e  o f  t h e  c l i e n t . M o r e o v e r ,  o n e  
c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  s u c h  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is b a s e d  o n  r e c i p r o c i t y . ^  
A  ' c l i e n t '  s t a t e  is g i v e n  a s s i s t a n c e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e c o n o m i c ,  
m i l i t a r y  (or e v e n  s e c u r i t y  p r o t e c t i o n )  a n d  t e c h n i c a l ,  b y  
it s  p a t r o n  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  s e r v i c e s  a n d  l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  p a t r o n .
In p o i n t  o f  fa c t ,  it s e e m s  o b v i o u s  t h a t ,  as w e l l  
as t h e  1 9 7 2  f r i e n d s h i p  t r e a t y ,  t h e  B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e  i n  B a g h ­
d a d  h a s  b e e n  g i v e n  a l a r g e  s u m  o f  e c o n o m i c ,  m i l i t a r y  a n d  
t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  b y  M o s c o w .  It is, t h e r e f o r e ,  e q u a l l y  
c l e a r  t h a t  o n e  m i g h t  h a s t i l y  a s s u m e  t h a t  I r a q  is o n e  o f  t h e  
' client' s t a t e s  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  is, 
h o w e v e r ,  a n  i n c o r r e c t  o n e  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h i c h  f o l l o w .
F i r s t ,  S h o e m a k e r  a n d  S p a n i e r  a r g u e  t h a t  a p a t r o n
s t a t e  s e e k s  t o  a c h i e v e  v a r i o u s  o b j e c t i v e s  in a ' client'
s t a t e ,  w h i c h  a r e  i d e o l o g i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  s o l i d a r i t y  w i t h
13
t h e  p a t r o n ,  a n d  s t r a t e g i c  a d v a n t a g e s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  B a g h ­
d a d  r e g i m e  is i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  s e r v e  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  in 
r e l a t i o n  t o  s u c h  o b j e c t i v e s .  T h r e e  r e a s o n s  a c c o u n t  f o r  
t h i s .
(a) A s  R o b e r t  0. F r e e d m a n  a r g u e s ,  t h e  
I r a q i  B a ' a t h i s t  l e a d e r s  h a v e  a p p l i e d  s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f
11 C h r i s t o p h e r  C. S h o e m a k e r  & J o h n  S p a n i e r ,  P a t r o n - C l i e n t  
S t a t e  R e l a t i o n s h i p : M u l t i l a t e r a l  C r i s e s  in t h e  N u c l e a r  
A g e ,  (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r  P u b l i s h e r s ,  19 8 4 ) ,  p. 13.
12 M i c h a e l  H a n d e l ,  W e a k  S t a t e s  in t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S y s t e m , 
( L o n d o n : F r a n k  C a s s  a n d  C o m p a n y  L t d . ,  1 9 8 1 ) ,  p. 132.
13 C h r i s t o p h e r  C. S h o e m a k e r  & J o h n  S p a n i e r ,  o p . c i t . , pp. 1 8 - 2 0
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w h a t  m i g h t  b e  c a l l e d  t h e  ' S o v i e t  m o d e l '  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e i r
14
c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  I r a q i  p e o p l e .  H e  f u r t h e r  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t
t h e  s t r i c t  m e a s u r e s  i n  t h e  I r a q i  a r m e d  f o r c e s  h a v e  b e e n
p u r p o s e l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  o r d e r  b o t h  to p r e v e n t  a m i l i t a r y
c o u p  a n d  a l s o  t o  i n d o c t r i n a t e  t h e  o f f i c e r s  i n  B a ' a t h i s t
i d e o l o g y .  T h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s ,  m o r e o v e r ,  h a v e  k e p t  t h e  p a r t y
a n d  s t a t e  s e p a r a t e d ,  w i t h  t h e  B a 'a t h  p a r t y  i n  a p o s i t i o n
15
t o  c o n t r o l  s t a t e  a c t i v i t i e s .  Y e t ,  m  t h e  c a s e  o f  i d e o l o ­
g i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  s u c h  a s y s t e m ,  s i m i l a r  
as it is t o  t h e  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  ( C P S U ) , 
d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  t h e  I r a q i  B a ' a t h i s t  l e a d e r s  w i l l  h o l d  
a n  i d e o l o g i c a l  p a t t e r n  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  
A s  w a s  n o t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I, t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e ' s  p o s i t i o n  
t o w a r d s  t h e  I r a q i  C o m m u n i s t  P a r t y  (ICP) m i g h t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
a p o l i t i c a l  b a r o m e t e r  i n  S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  
B a ' a t h i s t  v i e w ,  t h e  c o m m u n i s t s  w e r e  S o v i e t  a g e n t s ,  s e r v i n g  
S o v i e t  i n t e r e s t s .  A s  J o h n  C. C a m p b e l l  c o n v i n c i n g l y  m a i n ­
t a i n s  :
..., t h e  A r a b  v a r i e t y  n e v e r  f o u n d  r e a l  
c o m m o n  g r o u n d  w i t h  S o v i e t  s o c i a l i s m  a n d  is 
m o v i n g  f u r t h e r  a w a y  f r o m  i t . . . A n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m  
w a s  t h e  r e a l  c e m e n t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t - A r a b  w o r k i n g  
p a r t n e r s h i p ,  b u t  t h i s  w a s  a m a t t e r  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  
n o t  i d e o l o g y ,  a n d  s o m e  o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  h a v e  
c h a n g e d .  16
(b) A s  f a r  as t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  w i t h  a p a t r o n
14 R o b e r t  0. F r e e d m a n ,  ' S o v i e t  P o l i c y  T o w a r d  B a ' a t h i s t  
I r a q ' ,  i n  o p . c i t . , p. 165.
15 I b i d . , p. 166.
16 J o h n  C. C a m p b e l l ,  ' S o v i e t  P o l i c y  in t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t ' ,  in 
R o g e r  E. K a n e t  a n d  D o n n a  B a h r y ,  (eds.), S o v i e t  E c o n o m i c  
a n d  P o l i t i c a l  R e l a t i o n s  W i t h  t h e  D e v e l o p i n g  W o r l d , (New
Y o r k : P r a e g e r  P u b l i s h e r s ,  1975), p. 97.
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is c o n c e r n e d ,  t h i s  c o u l d  p o s s i b l y  m e a n  t h a t  a p a t r o n  h o p e s  
to  s e e  a ' c l i e n t '  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  s a m e  l i n e  w i t h  it i n  a n y  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  Y e t ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  to S o v i e t - I r a q i  r e l a ­
t i o n s ,  t h i s  w a s  r a t h e r  m i s l e a d i n g .  In C h a p t e r  I, it 
w a s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  A l g i e r s  
A g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  I r a q  a n d  Ir an ,  b o t h  t h e  K r e m l i n  a n d  
B a g h d a d  l e a d e r s  w i t n e s s e d  a c h i l l  in t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  o n  
t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e  B a ' a t h i s t s  p u r s u e d  p r a g m a t i c  a n d  
i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s .  T h e i r  s o l i d a r i t y  w i t h  M o s c o w  w a s  
u n d e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s :
(i) I r a q ' s  a t t e m p t  to u p g r a d e  its r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  n e i g h b o u r i n g  P e r s i a n  G u l f  s t a t e s ;
( i i ) T h e  e n s u i n g  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  c o n f l i c t  
b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  B a ' a t h i s t  r e g i m e s  in B a g h d a d  a n d  D a m a s c u s ;
( i i i ) I r a q ' s  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  W e s t ;
( i v ) I r a q ' s  d i s e n c h a n t m e n t  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  A f g h a n i s t a n ;
(v) I r a q ' s  d i s p l e a s u r e  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  s u p ­
p o r t  o f  E t h i o p i a  in b o t h  t h e  E t h i o p i a n - S o m a l i  c o n f l i c t  
a n d  t h e  E r i t r e a n  d i s p u t e .
(c) In t e r m s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a d v a n t a g e s ,  o n e  c o u l d  
q u e r y  w h e t h e r  I r a q  s e r v e s  as a s t r a t e g i c  a d v a n t a g e  f o r  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n .  T a k i n g  t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f  a n d  t h e  S t r a i t  
o f  H o r m u z  as a c e n t r e p o i n t ,  w i t h  A f g h a n i s t a n  s i t u a t e d  in 
t h e  n o r t h e a s t ,  I r a q  i n  t h e  n o r t h w e s t ,  a n d  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  
D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c  o f  Y e m e n  (PDRY) l o c a t e d  in t h e  s o u t h
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o f  t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f ,  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  has,  s t r a t e g i c a l l y
s p e a k i n g ,  u n d e r t a k e n  a n  e n c i r c l i n g  s t r a t e g y .  T h i s  v i e w
o f  S o v i e t  e x p a n s i o n  as a p l a n  f o r  e n c i r c l e m e n t  a n d  i s o l a -
17
t i o n  is h e l d  b y  t h e  E g y p t i a n  o f f i c i a l s .  T h i s  e x p a n s i o n "  
c a n  a r g u a b l y  b e  s e e n  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  A d e n - B a g h d a d - K a b u l  
s t r a t e g i c  t r i a n g l e .  T h e  s t r a t e g i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  I r a q  
m i g h t  b e  a s s e r t e d  b y  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  I r a q ' s  d e e p  p o r t  
f a c i l i t y  o f  U m m  Q a s r ,  s i t u a t e d  at t h e  h e a d w a t e r  o f  t h e  
P e r s i a n  G u l f ,  is a g o o d  p o s i t i o n  to s h o w  t h e  S o v i e t  f l a g  
a n d  p r e p a r e d n e s s  to i n t e r d i c t  t h e  o i l  r o u t e  f r o m  t h e  
P e r s i a n  Gu l f .
W h a t  s h o u l d  b e  k e p t  in m i n d ,  h o w e v e r ,  a c c o r d i n g
t o  C l a u d i a  W r i g h t ' s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  I r a q ' s  g e o p o l i t i c a l
18
v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s ,  is t h a t  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  a d v a n t a g e  o f  Iraq, 
m o r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  in t h e  c a s e  o f  U m m  Q a s r ,  h a s  b e e n  m i s ­
l e a d i n g l y  o v e r r a t e d .  U m m  Q a s r  i n  I r a q  is a g o o d  p l a c e  
t o  s h o w  t h e  S o v i e t  f l ag, b u t  it is p o o r l y  l o c a t e d  fo r  
s u p p o r t  o f  c o m b a t  o p e r a t i o n s  b e c a u s e  i t s  o u t l e t  to t h e
G u l f  is b l o c k e d  b y  W a r b a h  a n d  B u b i y a n  I s l a n d s  t h a t  a r e
19
u n d e r  K u w a i t i  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
S e c o n d ,  S h o e m a k e r  a n d  S p a n i e r  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  u n d e r
a s i t u a t i o n  o f  h i g h - t h r e a t ,  a 'client' w o u l d  b e  in a w e a k
20
p o s i t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  T h e  I r a q i  d e c i s i o n  
to i n v a d e  I r a n ,  as w a s  n o t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  II, d i d  not ,  h o w e v e r ,  
f i t  i n  w i t h  s u c h  a n  a s s u m p t i o n .  T h e  I r a q i  d e c i s i o n  to
17 A v i a t i o n  W e e k  & S p a c e  T e c h n o l o g y , A u g u s t  15, 19 83 , p. 138.
18 S e e  f o o t n o t e  no. 31 in C h a p t e r  I.
19 K e i t h  A. D u n n ,  ' C o n s t r a i n t s  o n  t h e  U S S R  in t h e  S o u t h w e s t  
A s i a :A  M i l i t a r y  A n a l y s i s ' ,  O r b i s , V o l .  25, No. 3, F a l l  1981, 
p. 623.
20 C h r i s t o p h e r  C. S h o e m a k e r  & J o h n  S p a n i e r ,  o p . c i t . , p. 23.
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i n v a d e  I r a n i a n  K h u z e s t a n  w a s  m a d e  a c c o r d i n g  to t h e i r  o w n  
p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  n e c e s s i t y  a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  t i m i n g ,  t h e  B a g h ­
d a d  r e g i m e  n e i t h e r  c o n s u l t e d  w i t h  n o r  i n f o r m e d  t h e  M o s c o w  
l e a d e r s  a b o u t  i t s  i n v a s i o n  p l a n .
O n c e  t h e  w a r  b r o k e  o u t ,  it w o u l d  b e  p o s s i b l e  to 
v i e w  t h e  S o v i e t  r o l e  as o n e  o f  f o l l o w i n g ,  n o t  d i r e c t i n g ,  
t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s .  G i v e n  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
c l o s e  F r a n c o - I r a q i  r e l a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  - 
a r m s  s u p p l i e s ,  t h e  K r e m l i n  l e a d e r s  m i g h t  p o s s i b l y  v i e w  t h i s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  I r a q i  d e c i s i o n  as c h a l l e n g i n g  t h e i r  o w n  r o l e  
o f  a r m s  s u p p l i e r .  T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  c o u l d  not ,  h o w e v e r ,  
i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  a r m s  f l o w  f r o m  F r a n c e .
T h i r d ,  o n e  c o u l d  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  v o l u n t a r y  e l e m e n t  
o f  c o o p e r a t i o n  u n d e r t a k e n  b y  a 'client' s t a t e  s h o u l d  b e  
f o u n d  in a p a t r o n - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  t h e  B a g h d a d  r e g i m e ,  t h e  I r a q i  l e a d e r s  
h a v e  c l e a r l y  a t t a c h e d  p r i o r i t y  to t h e i r  c o u n t r y ' s  f r e e d o m  
o f  m a n e u v e r i n g  t h e  p r a g m a t i c  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  p o l i c i e s  f o r  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a n d  m a x i m i z i n g  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  A s  h a s  
b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  f r o m  t h e  o u t s e t ,  it is n o t  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  
t h e  B a g h d a d  l e a d e r s '  w i l l i n g n e s s  fo r  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  w i l l  a d v e r s e l y  j e o p a r d i z e  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t s .
F o u r t h  a n d  f i n a l l y ,  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t h i r d  r e a s o n ,
21
t h e  p a t r o n - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  is b a s e d  o n  i n f o r m a l i t y .
21 M i c h a e l  H a n d e l ,  o p .c i t . , p. 134.
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In other words, it is less uniform in character than formal 
alliances. A friendship and cooperation treaty could not, 
therefore, very well guarantee the viability of the patron- 
client relationship, particularly, as was mentioned, in the 
case of Egypt and Somalia. In the case of Iraq, it still 
foresees advantages in having a treaty in effect, but the 
Baghdad regime's decisions and policies have not been 
manipulated by the Moscow leaders.
However, one fact that should not be forgotten 
is that Iraq still, to a certain extent, depends on the 
Soviet Union. There took place and continues to take 
place a large number of Soviet-Iraqi acts of cooperation - 
for example, cooperation projects in the fields of industry, 
agriculture, irrigation. All of these projects have been 
embarked upon with Soviet assistance.
Conclusion
Concerning the friendship treaty with the Soviet 
Union, it seems obvious that it is pragmatism which keeps 
the Baghdad regime from not unilaterally abrogating it. The 
Baghdad leaders realize that, by not abrogating it, they 
are in a position more favourable for maximizing their 
interests. However, for its parts, by still maintaining 
a friendship treaty, the Soviet Union has not been able 
to achieve its aim of inducing Iraq to declare solidarity 
with it, nor achieve Iraqi ideological conformity or gain
107
As to whether the Soviet-Iraqi relationship 
is one of patron-client relationship, it has to be con­
cluded that the relationship represents a low-level of 
Soviet influence over a 'client' state. Iraq has returned 
little obedience despite a large amount of Soviet assistance. 
It has been the case that the Baghdad leaders have made 
efforts to prevent any further deterioration in their - 
relations with the Soviet Union. The prior significance 
of being able to freely formulate their own decisions is, 
however, still of great concern to their interests.
significant strategic advantage.
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This paper has examined the Soviet-Iraqi rela­
tionship since the Algiers Agreement on the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway between Iraq and Iran on 6 March, 1975 up to 
the present situation of the Gulf war.
It has been shown that the Kremlin leaders have 
experienced opportunities, dilemmas and constraints in 
dealing with the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad. Not only 
has the Baghdad regime been secularist, revolutionary 
and anti-imperialist, but it has also been an emerging 
regional actor in both the Persian Gulf politics and the 
Arab-Israeli confrontation. It seemed to be a proper op ­
portunity for the expansion of Soviet influence in Iraq. 
The Soviet-Iraqi relationship was enshrined in reaching, 
in April 1972, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
between the Moscow and Baghdad leaders. Iraq has been 
given a large amount of economic, military and technical 
assistance by the Soviet Union.
However, Soviet-Iraqi relations have been full 
of impediments. The Moscow regime could not manipulate 
pragmatic and independent Iraqi decisions to serve its 
interests. To conclude the Algiers Agreement with the 
Teheran regime without consulting with the Soviet Union 
was one of the outstanding independent Iraqi decisions 
that have brought with them a number of problems for
CONCLUSION
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Moscow. In September 1980, the Kremlin leaders were 
placed in an unexpected dilemma when the Iraqi regime, 
again, without informing Moscow in advance, initiated 
a full-scale invasion of Iranian province of Khuzestan. 
'Non-interference' was, therefore, the best option for 
the Moscow leaders' position in the war that left the 
Soviet Union impotent on the sidelines. Even the Krem­
lin leaders could discern the Baghdad regime's acute 
disenchantment with their refusal of arms supplies, they 
also equally regarded a good-neighbourly policy with Iran 
as their major concern. The Soviet-Iraqi relationship 
had, therefore, witnessed a difficult time during the 
first stage of the Gulf war.
It was opportune, however, that while the situa­
tion of the war evolved toward a new phase of so-called 
the Iranian counter-offensives, Soviet-Iraqi relations 
had improved slightly. Even so, the Kremlin leaders 
have been aware of some major constraints in maintaining 
their relations with Iraq. In other words, such improve­
ment in Soviet-Iraqi relations has not been necessarily 
accompanied by Iraq's willingness to conform with the 
same ideological pattern as the Soviet Union, nor political 
solidarity with Moscow. It has been the Baghdad regime's 
desire to maintain its own freedom for embarking on prag­
matic and independent decisions.
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A P P E N D I X  A
ALGIERS DECLARATION OF MARCH 6th, 1975. JOINT 
COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN
During the meeting in Algiers of the Summit Conference 
of the Member Countries of OPEC and on the initiative 
of President BOUMEDIENNE, His Majesty the SHAHINSHAH 
of Iran and H.E. SADDAM HUSSEIN, Vice President of the 
Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq, held two meetings 
and had lengthy discussions on the subject of relations 
between the two countries.
These meetings, which took place in the presence 
of President BOUMEDIENNE, were marked by great frank­
ness and a sincere wish on both sides to reach a final 
and permanent solution to all the problems existing 
between the two countries.
In application of the principles of territorial 
integrity, the inviolability of borders and non-inter­
ference in internal affairs, the two contractual parties 
have decided:
1. To effect a definitive demarcation of their land 
frontiers on the basis of the Protocal of Constan­
tinople, 1913, and the proces-verbaux of the Deli­
mitation of Frontiers Commission of 1914.
2. To delimit their fluvial frontiers according to the 
thalweg line.
3. Accordingly, the two parties will restore security 
and mutual trust along their common boundaries, and 
hence will commit themselves to exercising a strict 
and effective control over their common boundaries 
with a view to putting a definitive end to all acts 
of infiltration of a subversive character no matter 
where they originate from.
4. The two parties also agreed to consider the arrange­
ments referred to above as integral elements of a 
comprehensive solution. Hence any impairment of any 
of their components shall naturally be contrary to 
the spirit of the Algiers Agreement.
The two parties will remain in permanent touch with 
President BOUMEDIENNE who will offer, in case of need, 
the fraternal assistance of Algeria to implement the deci­
sions which have been taken.
The parties have decided to reestablish traditional 
ties of good neighborliness and friendship, particularly 
by the elimination of all negative factors in their rela­
tions, the continuous exchange of views on questions of 
mutual interest and the development of mutual cooperation.
Ill
The two parties solemnly declare that the area should 
be kept free from any outside interference.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and Iraq 
met in the presence of the Algerian Foreign Minister on 
15 March 1975 in Teheran to fix the details of work for - 
the Joint Iraqi-Iranian Commission created to implement 
the decisions reached above by mutual agreement.
In accordance with the wishes of both parties,
Algeria will be invited to all the meetings of the Joint 
Iraqi-Iranian Commission.
The Joint Commission will draw up its timetable 
and work-plan so as to meet, in case of need, alternatively 
in Baghdad and Teheran.
His Majesty the SHAHINSHAH has accepted with plea­
sure the invitation which has been conveyed to him, on 
behalf of H.E. President AHMED HASSAN E L-BAKR, to make 
an official visit to Iraq; the date of this visit will 
be fixed by mutual agreement.
Furthermore, H.E. SADDAM HUSSEIN has agreed to make 
an official visit to Iran on a date to be agreed between 
the two parties.
His Majesty the SHAHINSHAH and H.E. Vice President 
SADDAM HUSSEIN wish to thank particularly and warmly 
President HOUARI BOUMEDIENNE who, acting from fraternal 
and disinterested motives, has facilitated the establish­
ment of direct contacts between the leaders of the two 
countries and, as a result, has contributed to the esta­
blishment of a new era in relations between Iran and Iraq 
in the higher interest of the future of the region con­
cerned .
Algiers, 6 March 1975
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A P P E N D I X  B
T R E A T Y  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  B O U N D A R I E S  A N D  G O O D  
N E I G H B O R L I N E S S  B E T W E E N  I R A Q  A N D  I R A N  S I G N E D  O N
J U N E  13th, 1975
H i s  I m p e r i a l  M a j e s t y  t h e  S h a h i n s h a h  o f  I r an,
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq,
Considering the sincere desire of the two Parties 
as expressed in the Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975, to 
achieve a final and lasting solution in all the problems 
pending between the two countries,
Considering that the two Parties have carried out 
the definitive redemarcation of their land frontier on 
the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and 
the minutes of the meetings of the Frontier Delimitation 
Commission of 1914 and have delimited their river frontier 
along the thalweg,
Considering their desire to restore security and 
mutual trust throughout the length of their common 
frontier,
Considering the ties of geographical proximity, his­
tory, religion, culture and civilization which bind the 
peoples of Iran and Iraq,
Desirous of strengthening their bonds of friendship 
and good neighborliness, expanding their economic and 
cultural relations and promoting exchanges and human rela­
tions between their peoples on the basis of the principles 
of territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers 
and non-interference in internal affairs,
Resolved to work towards the introduction of a new 
era in friendly relations between Iran and Iraq based on 
full respect for the national independence and sovereign , 
equality of States,
Convinced that they are helping thereby to implement 
the principles and acheive the purposes and objectives of 
the Charter of the United Nations,
Have decided to conclude this Treaty and have appointed 
as their plenipotentiaries:
His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran:
His Excellency Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Iran.
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq: 
His Excellency Saadoun Hamadi, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq.
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W h o ,  h a v i n g  e x c h a n g e d  t h e i r  f u l l  p o w e r s ,  f o u n d  t o  b e  
in g o o d  a n d  d u e  f o r m ,  h a v e  a g r e e d  as f o l l o w s :
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State 
land frontier between Iraq and Iran shall be that which 
has been redemarcated on the basis of and in accordance 
with the provisions of the Protocol concerning the rede­
marcation of the land frontier, and the annexes thereto, 
attached to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 2
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State 
frontier in the Shatt Al Arab shall be that which has 
been delimited on the basis of and in accordance with 
the provisions of the Protocol concerning the delimita­
tion of the river frontier, and the annexes thereto, 
attached to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise 
strict and effective permanent control over the frontier 
in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subver­
sive nature from any source, on the basis of and in accord­
ance with the provision of the Protocol concerning frontier 
security, and the annex thereto, attached to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 4
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the pro­
visions of the three Protocols, and the annexes thereto, 
referred to in articles 1, 2 and 3 above and attached 
to this Treaty as an integral part thereof shall be final 
and permanent. They shall not be infringed under any 
circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible ele­
ments of an over-all settlement. Accordingly, a breach 
of any of the components of this over-all settlement 
shall clearly be incompatible with the spirit of the 
Algiers Agreement.
ARTICLE 5
In keeping with the inviolability of the frontiers 
of the two States and strict respect for their territorial 
integrity, the High Contracting Parties confirm that the 
course of their land and river frontiers shall be inviola­
ble, permanent and final.
ARTICLE 6
1. In the event of a dispute regarding the inter­
pretation or implementation of this Treaty, the three 
Protocols or the annexes thereto, any solution to such
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a dispute shall strictly respect the course of the Iraqi- 
Iranian frontier referred to in articles 1 and 2 above, 
and shall take into account the need to maintain security 
on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in accordance with article
3 a b o v e .
2. Such disputes shall be resolved in the first 
instance by the High Contracting Parties, by means of 
direct bilateral negotiations to be held within two 
months after the date on which one of the Parties so 
requested.
3. If no agreement is reached, the High Contracting 
Parties shall have recourse, within a three-month period, 
to the good offices of a friendly third State.
4. Should one of the two Parties refuse to have 
recourse to good offices or should the good offices p r o ­
cedure fail, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration' 
within a period of not more than one month after the 
date of such refusal or failure.
5. Should the High Contracting Parties disagree as 
to the arbitration procedure, one of the High Contracting 
Parties may have recourse, within fifteen days after such 
disagreement was recorded, to a court of arbitration.
With a view to establishing such a court of 
arbitration each of the High Contracting Parties shall, 
in respect of each dispute to be resolved, appoint one 
of its nationals as arbitrators and the two arbitrators 
shall choose an umpire. Should the High Contracting 
Parties fail to appoint their arbitrators within one 
month after the date on which one of the Parties received 
a request for arbitration from the other Party, or should 
the arbitrators fail to reach agreement on the choice of 
the umpire before that time-limit expires, the High 
Contracting Party which requested arbitration shall be 
entitled to request the President of the International 
Court of Justice to appoint the arbitrators or the 
umpire, in accordance with the procedures of the Perma­
nent Court of Arbitration.
6. The decision of the court of arbitration shall 
be binding on and enforceable by the High Contracting 
P art i e s .
7. The High Contracting Parties shall each defray 
half the costs of arbitration.
ARTICLE 7
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes 
thereto shall be registered in accordance with Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 8
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes 
thereto shall be ratified by each of the High Contract­
ing Parties in accordance with its domestic law.
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes 
thereto shall enter into force on the date of the exchange 
of the instruments of ratification in Teheran.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Plenipotentiaries of the High 
Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty, the three 
Protocols and the annexes thereto.
DONE at Baghdad, on 13 June 19 75.
(Signed)
Abbas Ali Khalatbary 
Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Iran
(Signed)
Saadoun Hamadi 
Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Iraq
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes 
thereto were signed in the presence of His Excellency 
Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council of the R evo­
lution and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.
(Signed)
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A P P E N D I X  C
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNION 
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE IRAQI REPUBLIC
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi 
Republic,
firmly convinced that the further development 
of friendship and all-round cooperation between them 
accords with the national interests of both states 
and serves the cause of peace throughout the world 
and in the area of the Arab countries, the interests 
of freedom of the peoples, their security and res­
pect for sovereignty,
believing that the strengthening of the soli­
darity of all forces of peace and progress, includ­
ing the consolidation of unity of the Arab states, 
on an anti-imperialist basis is a vital means of 
the struggle for a lasting peace and international 
security,
inspired by the ideals of struggle against 
imperialism, colonialism, Zionism and reaction, 
for freedom, independence, and social progress 
of the peoples,
convinced that in the modern world interna­
tional problems should be settled by means of co­
operation and a search for mutually-acceptable 
solutions,
reaffirming their peaceable foreign policy 
and allegiance to the aims and principles of the 
United Nations Charter,
moved by a desire to develop and strengthen 
the existing relations of friendship, cooperation 
and mutual trust, and striving to raise these 
relations to a new, still higher level, have d e ­
cided to conclude the present Treaty and have 
agreed on the following:
A R T I C L E  1
The High Contracting Parties declare that unbreak­
able friendship will exist between the two countries and 
their peoples and all-round cooperation will develop in 
the political, economic, trade, scientific, technologi­
cal, cultural and other fields on the basis of respect 
for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non­
interference in each other's internal affairs.
ARTICLE 2
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
Iraqi Republic declare that they will cooperate closely
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and in all fields to ensure conditions for preserving 
and further developing the social and economic gains of 
their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each 
of them over all their natural resources.
ARTICLE 3
The High Contracting Parties, consistently conducting 
a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing 
social systems, will, in conformity with their peaceable 
foreign policy, continue to work for universal peace, 
relaxation of international tension, and general and com­
plete disarmament, embracing both nuclear and conventional 
types of armaments, under effective international control.
ARTICLE 4
Guided by ideals of freedom and equality of all peoples, 
the High Contracting Parties condemn imperialism and colo­
nialism in all their forms and manifestations. They will 
continue to wage a steadfast struggle against imperialism 
and Zionism, for the complete, final and unconditonal 
liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism 
and apartheid, and to come out for the earliest and total 
implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples.
The Parties will cooperate with each other and with 
other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle 
of the peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence 
and social progress.
ARTICLE 5
Attaching great importance to economic, technical 
and scientific cooperation between them, the High Con­
tracting Parties will continue to expand and deepen such 
cooperation and exchange of experience in industry, 
agriculture, irrigation, water conservancy, development 
of oil and other natural resources, in the sphere of commu­
nications and in other sectors of the economy, as well as 
in the training of national personnel. The Parties will 
expand trade and shipping between the two states on the 
basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and 
most-favoured-nation treatment.
ARTICLE 6
The High Contracting Parties will further promote 
the development of ties and contacts between them in the 
fields of science, art, literature, education, health 
services, the press, radio, cinema, television, tourism, 
sport and other fields.
The Parties will promote wider cooperation and direct 
ties between state bodies and public organizations, enter­
prises, cultural and scientific institutions of both states
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for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquainstance with the 
life, work and accomplishements of the peoples of the two 
countries in various spheres.
ARTICLE 7
Attaching great importance to concerted action in 
the international arena in the interests of ensuring peace 
and security, as well as to the development of political 
cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the High 
Contracting Parties will regularly consult each other 
at different levels on all important international issues 
affecting the interests of both states, as well as on 
questions of the further development of bilateral rela­
tions .
ARTICLE 8
In the event of the development of situations 
spelling a danger to peace of either Party or creating 
a danger to peace or violation of peace, the High Con­
tracting Parties will contact each other without delay 
in order to agree their positions with a view to removing 
the threat that has arisen or re-establishing peace.
ARTICLE 9
In the interests of security of both countries, the 
High Contracting Parties will continue to develop co­
operation in the strengthening of their defence capacity.
ARTICLE 10
Each of the High Contracting Parties declares that 
it will not enter into alliances and will not take part 
in any groupings of states, in actions or measures dir­
ected against the other High Contracting Party.
Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges not to 
allow its territory to be used for any action to be car­
ried out that would do military harm to the other Party.
ARTICLE 11
The two High Contracting Parties declare that their 
commitments under existing international treaties are not 
in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty 
and undertake not to enter into any international agree­
ments incompatible with it.
ARTICLE 12
The present Treaty is concluded for a term of 15 
years and will be prolonged automatically for each sub­
sequent five-year period, if neither of the High Con­
tracting Parties declares its desire of terminating its
operation, notifying the other High Contracting Party 
12 months before the expiring of the term of operation 
of the Treaty.
ARTICLE 13
Any differences which may arise between the High 
Contracting Parties in relation to the interpretation 
of any provision of the present Treaty will be settled 
bilaterally in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect 
and understanding.
ARTICLE 14
The present Treaty is subject to ratification and 
shall come into force on the day of exchange of ratifi­
cation instruments, which will take place in Moscow in 
the nearest possible future.
The present Treaty is done in two copies, each in 
Russian and Arabic, both texts being equally authentic.
Done in the City of Baghdad on April 9, 1972, 
which corresponds to 25 Safar 1392, Hegira.
For the Union of For the Iraqi
Soviet Socialist Republic
Republics
A. KOSYGIN A . H . a l - B A K R
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